Concept
Labels and Intent
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Labels and Intent
A court decides whether a stipulated sum is a penalty by asking what the clause does, not what the parties called it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) both measure the amount against the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proving it. Both make a sum that is unreasonably large on that measure unenforceable as a penalty, whatever the contract says about its character.1 Neither text lists the parties' intention as a factor, so intent is of little moment.2 Most jurisdictions look past the label and the stated intent to the clause's substance and function.3
The reason lies in what a liquidated damages clause is. It is an advance estimate of money damages, the kind of loss that can be estimated and compensated in money.4 An estimate is judged by how close it comes to the loss, not by its caption. A court asked to enforce the clause therefore asks whether it was a genuine attempt by the parties to settle damages in advance. If it was not, the court calls it a penalty, a provision whose purpose or effect is to punish or deter breach by imposing liability beyond reasonably anticipated loss, and refuses to enforce it.5 Subjective intent adds little to that inquiry. Recent discussions of the reasonableness test have generally discarded it, because it has little bearing on whether the clause is objectively reasonable.6
Kemble v. Farren shows a label losing to substance. A theatre engagement there declared that £1,000 was liquidated damages and said in terms that it was not a penalty. The same £1,000 was payable on breach of any stipulation, from a missed small payment to the gravest default. The court found it “a contradiction in terms” to say that a very large sum payable on nonpayment of a very small one was anything but a penalty.7 The explicit disclaimer did not save the clause, because the same sum attached to breaches of every size.
The label can mislead in the opposite direction too. People in the construction industry commonly call delay provisions “penalty clauses,” though many are ordinary liquidated damages.8
The label is not wholly irrelevant. Some courts give the parties' terminology some weight as one factor, and it has some evidentiary value, though it is never conclusive.9 It also has practical force in the courtroom: a lawyer who wants a delay clause enforced should avoid the word “penalty,” which seems to invite the judge to treat the clause as one.10 Sincere intent cannot rescue a clause either. Even parties who conscientiously meant to provide for liquidated damages lose the clause if the stipulated sum is out of proportion to the probable and actual injury.11 With labels and intent set aside, the inquiry turns to the clause's design. The next section takes up the patterns that most often fail it, beginning with the one that sank the clause in Kemble: a single sum payable for every kind of breach.