Concept
Recurring Penalty Patterns
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Recurring Penalty Patterns
The Restatement and the UCC put one question to every liquidated damages clause: is the stipulated sum reasonable in light of the loss the breach causes? The Restatement measures the loss as anticipated or actual and adds the difficulty of proving it. The UCC adds the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of obtaining an adequate remedy some other way. Each condemns an unreasonably large sum as a penalty, the Restatement by making it unenforceable and the UCC by making it void.1 Some clauses answer that question on their face. Three drafting designs recur in the cases that strike clauses: one sum payable for every breach, a formula that pays the full price without crediting the costs the breach saves, and a fixed sum that the promisee may supplement with proof of actual damages.
Each design guarantees or invites a payment above the loss, which is why courts distrust it. A sum substantially in excess of the injury may support an inference of unfairness in bargaining, or of an in terrorem agreement meant to deter breach, secure performance, and punish the promisor if the deterrent fails.2
These patterns are shortcuts, not substitutes for the reasonableness test. A clause that fits one gives the challenger a strong argument, and a clause that avoids all three can still fail if its figure grossly exceeds the probable damages, one of the traditional grounds for calling a sum a penalty.3 The test itself has also softened in places. Under the Restatement formulation, a clause is valid if the amount is reasonable at the time of contracting in light of the anticipated loss, or alternatively in light of the actual loss, and the UCC and other statutes contain similar provisions.4 California goes further. It treats a liquidated damages provision as valid unless the party attacking it shows that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances existing when the contract was made, and the statute does not apply against a consumer.5 On an exam, scan the clause for these designs first, then confirm the conclusion under the reasonableness test.
One Sum for Every Breach
Breaches of one contract can cost the promisee very different amounts, and a single stipulated sum can approximate the loss from at most one of them. That is why the traditional catalogue treats as a penalty a sum made payable for any of a variety of different breaches, some major and some minor.6 A lease shows the difficulty. A lessee may promise to pay rent, maintain fire insurance, and keep the corridors lighted, and the landlord carries covenants of its own, as the restaurant tenant in Berg v. Wiley showed by winning a jury verdict against its landlord for wrongful eviction.7 A clause that fixes one sum as liquidated damages for breach of the lease, or that forfeits one security deposit, cannot be a reasonable pre-estimate of the loss from breach of each covenant, and it will be deemed a penalty.8 The treatise calls this a Shotgun Clause, since it fires one charge at every target.
A sum detached from the particular breach is better explained by deterrence than by compensation. If the same figure falls due whether the lessee leaves a corridor dark or stops paying rent, it far exceeds the injury in the minor case, and a sum far above the injury supports the inference that the parties meant to frighten the promisor into performing.9
Kemble v. Farren, the old English case, arose from a contract of this mixed kind. The manager promised to pay the actor £3 6s 8d every night the theatre opened, with a benefit night each season, and the actor promised to perform as a principal comedian for four seasons and to conform in all things to the theatre's regulations.10 Any single sum sized to an actor who walks out of a four-season engagement would dwarf the loss from one missed £3 6s 8d payment or one broken house rule.
Courts do not press the objection to its logical end. Even the major covenant can be broken in varying forms, and a rule that demanded a separate figure for each variation would invalidate every liquidated damages clause.11 Two routes save a clause with this defect. A court can often read it as confined to breach of the major covenant, and it then stands if the sum reasonably pre-estimates the loss from that breach. Under the modern view it also stands if the sum is reasonable in light of the actual harm the breach caused.12 The second route follows the Restatement, which accepts a sum reasonable either at formation or in light of the actual loss.13 It helps a landlord whose tenant abandoned the premises and stopped paying rent, but it does nothing for the landlord in the stairwell, because $24,000 is not a reasonable measure of two dark days. An answer should therefore lead with the traditional objection, flag the modern alternative, and ask what breach actually occurred.
Ignoring Costs Saved
A formula that awards the full unpaid contract price on breach, with no credit for the costs the promisee saves by not performing, necessarily pays more than the loss. The baseline comes from ordinary expectation damages. A promisee who has fully performed before the other side repudiates is owed the full unpaid balance, because the repudiation saves her no costs. A promisee stopped short of full performance is not. In one textbook problem, Dinah had spent $20,000 on a job when Cliff wrongfully repudiated, but she had not yet detonated $100,000 worth of explosives or incurred the $5,000 cost of the detonation, so she could not recover the full contract price.15 A liquidated damages clause that pays the full price on an early breach builds that overpayment into the contract.
Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co. puts numbers on the flaw. Carborundum guaranteed that it would ship 22,500 tons of Ferro Carbo for Lake River to bag. Demand for the product collapsed after the contract was signed in 1979, and by the time the contract expired in late 1982 Carborundum had shipped only 12,000 tons. Lake River had bagged those tons and been paid for the bagging, but the minimum-guarantee formula still gave it $241,000, the $533,000 contract price for the full tonnage less what Carborundum had paid for the bagging it received.16
The court tested the formula by asking what Lake River would gain from a breach at different points. Suppose the breach had come the day after Lake River bought its new $89,000 bagging system and before any shipment. Carborundum would owe $533,000, and Lake River's costs to that point would total only $89,000, so its net gain would be $444,000. That is more than four times the $107,000 profit, 20 percent of the contract price, that Lake River expected from performance, and the court called it a huge windfall.17
The excess does not depend on that choice of date. A breach at any point, early or late, spared Lake River the labor and materials of bagging from then on, so a formula built on the full price compensated it for costs it would never incur. Damages so calculated must exceed the actual loss, and the earlier the breach, the greater the excess.18 That defect made the formula a penalty.
Carborundum was a substantial corporation, and the court said it might have been inclined, if it thought itself free to do so, to question whether a modern court should refuse to enforce a penalty clause against a signatory well able to avoid improvident commitments. A penalty clause, the court observed, provides an earnest of performance, and this one showed that Carborundum was willing to pay the full price even if it shipped nothing.19 Sophistication did not rescue the clause, because the formula still overpaid.
The cost question carries over to other full-price terms. In Barrie School v. Patch, the enrollment agreement required a $1,000 non-refundable deposit and the $13,490 balance of tuition in two installments, allowed the parents to cancel by certified letter received before May 31, 2004, and made the full tuition due if they missed that deadline.20 Whether such a term overpays the school depends on what the school saves when a family withdraws late. If its expenses fall with each departing student, the term repeats Lake River's flaw. If its expenses are fixed once the year's roster is set, a late withdrawal saves little, and the full tuition tracks the loss.
Goods contracts show the same flaw in cleaner form. Suppose agreed damages equal the full contract price of goods the buyer never takes. The seller's actual loss would equal that sum in only two situations, and both are unlikely. In the first, the seller's costs are zero and it has lost volume, so its lost profit equals the whole price. In the second, the seller cannot resell at all and the goods spoil and must be discarded, so it loses the entire price. Sealed packages of ketchup probably have a distant expiry date, which gives the seller ample time to resell.21 A court applying a two-step test therefore finds that the clause fails the first step, because the sum was not a reasonable forecast of harm when the contract was made. It also fails the second step, because a comparison with actual damages shows that the sum invariably exceeds any loss the seller suffered.22
A take-or-pay clause calls for a different analysis. Such clauses appear in long-term supply contracts where the supplier incurs the bulk of its costs at the outset, and the buyer's commitment to pay for a minimum quantity is justified because the supplier needs it to recoup those costs. Those facts were absent in the ketchup problem, where the clause was described in the contract as, and functioned as, a liquidation of damages.23 A later section treats take-or-pay terms.
Fixed Sum Plus Actual Damages
Some drafters name a sum payable on breach and then add that the promisee may recover greater actual damages if it can prove them. The treatise calls this a Have Cake and Eat It Clause. Courts have struck it down because it is not a reasonable attempt definitively to estimate the loss.25
The defect follows from what liquidation means. To liquidate damages is to estimate the loss definitively, so that the sum stands in for the loss. A sum the promisee may exceed by proof is instead a floor. If the actual loss is lower, the promisee still collects the sum, and if it is higher, the promisee collects the greater amount. A promisee who believed the sum approximated the loss would have no need to reserve the right to prove more, so the reservation shows that the figure is a minimum charge and not an estimate. A sum the promisee collects whether or not the loss is that large can also exceed the injury, the feature that supports an inference of deterrence.26
Leases show how such clauses arise. A landlord whose tenant wrongfully abandons already has choices without any clause. It may accept a surrender, retake possession to mitigate damages, do nothing and sue for rent as it comes due (the majority rule, though a growing minority requires the landlord to mitigate), or sue at once for anticipatory breach.27 A clause that adds a fixed deposit to those options while reserving the right to prove more gives the landlord the floor and the full remedies together.
The vice lies in reserving the option on the very loss the sum was meant to settle. A clause that liquidates some items of prospective damage and leaves others to ordinary proof is a different thing, and it is valid if the liquidation meets the standard criteria.28
The rule has critics. Striking the clause is a logical deduction from the definition of liquidated damages, yet it is hard to see how enforcing such a clause is in any sense a penalty, and the decisions can be seen as unwarranted infringements on freedom of contract.29 The promisor knew when it signed that the sum was a minimum and that more could follow. The case for striking the clause rests on the same structure: a sum the promisee collects in full when the loss is small, and exceeds when the loss is large, can pay more than the breach cost.
Installment land contracts carry the question into another setting. A purchaser may take possession under a contract that requires a small initial down payment and monthly payments over twenty years, and the deed passes only on the final installment. Interest runs on the unpaid balance as on a mortgage loan, so the contract works as a financing device.30 The later discussion of deposits and forfeitures asks how the penalty test applies when a seller keeps what a buyer has already paid.
This question differs from the one the consequences section takes up, which is whether a valid clause that is silent on the point bars other remedies. There the clause is conceded to estimate the loss reasonably. Here the clause on its face reserves a right to more, and the issue is whether it estimated the loss at all.