Concept
Clauses Outside the Rule
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Clauses Outside the Rule
The penalty rule reaches one kind of term: a sum that becomes payable because a party broke the contract and that stands in for the damages a court would otherwise award. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) both define their subject that way. Each addresses “[d]amages for breach by either party” that “may be liquidated in the agreement,” and each condemns only a term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages.1 A charge that falls due without a breach is therefore not damages for breach, and the rule has nothing to measure.2
The first question about any money term is accordingly what event triggers it and what it buys. A payment that is the price of a permitted course of conduct, a reward for early performance, or a ceiling on recovery calls for different questions than the reasonableness comparison of the earlier sections. Even a true liquidated damages clause can fall outside the rule when its figure is too low, because the penalty sentences speak only of large sums.3
The classification matters in both directions. A clause inside the rule must pass the reasonableness test, and one that passes is a valid liquidated sum; in Rainbow Country Rentals & Retails, Inc. v. Ameritech Publishing, Inc., the court held that a non-breaching party has no duty to mitigate damages where the parties agree to a valid liquidated sum.4 A clause outside the rule skips the test altogether, which gives a drafter a reason to recast a charge for breach as the price of an option or the loss of a bonus. The three structures below each ask whether the payment truly sits beyond the rule, and the last asks what the law does when a stipulated sum is too small instead of too large.
Alternative Performance and Take-or-Pay
Some contracts let a party choose between two ways of performing, one more onerous than the other. A loan that allows the borrower either to pay over the full life of the loan or to pay early with a stated fee is the standard example. Neither choice is a breach, so no damages for breach exist, and the penalty analysis applies only if the additional charge is triggered by a breach.5
The rule stops there because it measures a stipulated sum against the loss a breach causes, and a fee for a permitted choice has no breach to measure. The party who receives such a payment has usually bought it as well, since a sophisticated party that demands a payment term presumably gives up something in price or other terms to get it.6 Viewed apart from the traditional penalty analysis, clauses that look like penalties often appear right and reasonable.7
Early-termination fees show the principle at work. In Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, the court wrote that “[w]here a contract for a specified period of time permits a party to terminate the agreement before its expiration in exchange for a lump-sum monetary payment, the payment is considered merely an alternative to performance, and not a penalty.” The fee would be inevitable for every account that was terminated at some point, so it depended on no breach, and the court called it “a deferred charge attendant to initiating the account.”8 A commission earned under the contract is another payment that no breach triggers. In Ditommaso Realty, Inc. v. Moak Motorcycles, Inc., the court treated a realtor’s commission as a debt arising when a contract term was satisfied, which made it neither a liquidated damages clause nor a penalty clause.9
Subterfuge limits the principle. A charge for breach can be phrased as a choice: instead of having an employee promise not to compete or pay a penalty of $100,000, an employer might have the employee promise either not to compete or, in the alternative, pay $100,000, and the question is whether that is a subterfuge or a different sort of agreement.10 The size of the money alternative is the natural place to look. A contract that obliges a manufacturer to deliver 500 custom chairs worth $4,000 or, alternatively, to pay $40,000 offers a choice that no one would make, so the “alternative” looks like a charge for failing to deliver.
The hinge in the two memberships is whether the contract treats the payment as the price of a permitted exit or as the consequence of a default. The first reads as an option because the contract authorizes the exit, and the second reads as damages because the contract condemns it.
Take-or-pay clauses present the same classification problem in a setting that has produced heavy litigation. A take-or-pay clause requires the buyer to accept the entire quantity contracted for at the contract price or to pay for a stipulated minimum quantity at the unit price, and the seller benefits in part because the clause avoids the need to prove damages with market measures after the buyer’s breach.11 In natural gas contracts, a pipeline typically agreed either to take a particular quantity, often seventy to eighty percent of what it had a right to take, or to pay for it, and a makeup provision gave it a period, such as five years, to take gas it had paid for but not taken.12 Pipelines offered these terms during the short supply of the late 1960s and 1970s to give producers a steady income while keeping flexibility over the volume purchased.13 The clause assures the producer a constant cash flow rather than actual purchase of the contract quantity, and it lets the pipeline pay for a specified quantity in lieu of taking it without endangering its long-term supply.14
The question for courts is whether the payment is a liquidated damages clause or part of the buyer’s obligations of performance.15 If it is performance, a buyer who declines delivery but pays arguably has not breached, and the breach comes when the buyer refuses to pay.16 Most courts have held that these contracts provide for alternative performance, and in Prenalta Corp. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. the Tenth Circuit relied on Corbin in so finding.17 One account explains this result as a refusal to consider unverifiable variables bearing on actual damages: treating the clause as performance spares the court from estimating the seller’s often-unverifiable variable costs and profit on the entire contract.18 Judge Posner, in Lake River, said that his discussion of penalties was not meant to cast a cloud of doubt over the take-or-pay clauses that are a common feature of contracts between natural gas pipeline companies and their customers.19
A court that does treat such a clause as liquidated damages has reason to be deferential. Among highly sophisticated and well-represented business entities, courts should respect a clause found to be liquidated damages, because the parties can always negotiate to a more efficient outcome and a liquidated payment wastes nothing by necessity.20 A complete answer on a take-or-pay problem therefore states the majority classification and, in the alternative, applies the reasonableness standard of § 2-718(1).
Bonus Clauses
A drafter who wants the pressure of a deadline without a sum triggered by breach can offer a bonus for early completion, and the question is whether a court should treat that structure as a penalty in disguise. Two construction terms show how close the structures can come. In the first, a $20 million contract requires completion by July 21 and pays the contractor a bonus of $100,000 for each day of early completion, up to $2 million.22 In the second, a $22 million contract requires completion by July 1 and deducts $100,000 for each day of delay, up to $2 million. The base prices differ by exactly the maximum bonus, and the payments match at every completion date:
- Completion on July 1 yields $22 million under either term.
- Completion on July 11 yields $21 million under either term, because the bonus adds $1 million to the first price and the delay charge subtracts $1 million from the second.
- Completion on July 21 yields $20 million under either term.
The contractor’s incentive to hurry and the owner’s cost are the same, yet the terms are treated differently on their face. The second is a liquidated damages clause, so its daily sum must be reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss from delay and the difficulty of proving that loss.23 The first does not specify damages for breach at all. No breach occurs on any day until after July 21, so no clause attempts to say what a breach costs, and analyzing the bonus under the penalty rule seems a stretch.24 The structure of the rule explains the difference. The rule checks the size of a remedy for a wrong, and a contractor who finishes on July 5 has performed, so the bonus is a price the owner agreed to pay for a benefit it wanted.
Whether courts should look through the structure is unsettled. The argument for doing so starts from how easily one structure converts into the other: instead of a penalty of $10,000 for each day of delay, up to $100,000, an owner might adjust the price and offer a bonus of $10,000 for each day of early completion, up to $100,000.25 Some authorities urge that the rules governing penalties should apply to provisions that might circumvent the limitations in this way, although the rationale is suspect.26 The suspicion has a source in the trigger. The penalty rule responds to breach, and a bonus is earned by performing.
A full answer on a bonus problem should therefore say that the term is not on its face a liquidated damages clause, mention the circumvention argument, and note that if a court accepted it the analysis would proceed as for any delay charge.
Unreasonably Small Amounts
The penalty rule runs in one direction. Each text condemns a term fixing “unreasonably large liquidated damages,” the Restatement as unenforceable on grounds of public policy and the Code as void, and neither addresses a sum that is too low.28 Both focus on the penal nature of unreasonably large sums and do not seem to reach unreasonably small ones; the Restatement’s Comment d states that § 356 does not apply to a term that fixes damages in an unreasonably small amount.29 The Code’s official comment adds that an unreasonably small amount “would be subject to similar criticism and might be stricken under the section on unconscionable contracts or clauses.”30 When the disproportion runs downward, the clause is not viewed as a penalty, although it may be struck down as unconscionable.31
The reason follows from the penal character of a large sum. A figure far above the loss punishes the promisor, while a figure far below it punishes no one and leaves the shortfall with the promisee. The penalty rule has nothing to act on, so the injured party’s protection comes from rules that examine how the bargain was made, and the comparison of sum against loss drops out.
A term classified as a damage limitation is treated differently from a liquidated damages provision and is not subject to the reasonableness tests of the earlier sections. Restatement § 356 Comment a, UCC § 2-718 Official Comment 1, and § 2-719 indicate that damage limitation provisions are enforceable unless they are unconscionable.32 The first move on a low figure is therefore to classify it, and a student who finds a penalty in a small sum has applied the wrong rule.
Liquidated damages clauses may intentionally underestimate damages, and burglar-alarm contracts are the standard example. They typically provide a rather small sum, perhaps $50, when the system fails to operate in its intended fashion. Such clauses are generally enforced, do not raise the problem of being a penalty, and are generally subject to attack only on grounds of unconscionability.33
Two routes remain for the party who wants out of a small sum. The first is unconscionability under UCC § 2-302. A limitation that grossly undercompensates the breach victim and deprives it of meaningful relief could be substantively unconscionable, but a harsh result is not enough. The challenger must also offer some evidence of procedural unconscionability, meaning that the unfair term was imposed through improper bargaining.34 The second route is UCC § 2-719(2), which provides that where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in the Act.35 Section 2-719 thus permits a court to disregard a damage limitation that badly undercompensates the breach victim or provides a valueless remedy, even if the elements of unconscionability are not met.36 When an apparently fair and reasonable clause fails in its purpose in particular circumstances, it must give way to the general remedy provisions of Article 2. A seller who limited a car buyer’s remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts, and excluded consequential loss, could not hold the buyer to that limit once the car proved seriously defective and could not be satisfactorily repaired.37
The $25 figure punishes the dealer for nothing, so the owner gains nothing by calling it a penalty. The argument that can succeed is unconscionability, and these facts supply both halves of it. The term was imposed on a buyer who could neither read it carefully nor shop elsewhere, and a ceiling that makes breach cheaper than performance leaves her without a meaningful remedy. The alarm cap and the tractor cap are both small, so the size of the sum cannot separate them. What separates them is the bargaining behind the term and the relief it leaves, because gross undercompensation becomes substantively unconscionable only when improper bargaining accompanies it.38
The line between small and large sums draws criticism. The Code’s comment says a small amount would be subject to similar criticism, so the Code appears uncertain whether the distinction between minimal and excessive sums is justified, and it has been suggested that the distinction is unjustified and that both kinds of clause should be enforced.39 For exam purposes the settled treatment controls. Classify the term first, decline to apply the penalty rule to a sum that is too low, and move the analysis to unconscionability and, in a sale of goods, failure of essential purpose.