Concept
Deposits and Forfeitures
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Deposits and Forfeitures
A deposit that the recipient may keep after a default is a liquidated damages term, and it meets the same ceiling as any other sum fixed in advance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) allows damages to be liquidated only at an amount reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proving it, and it makes a term fixing unreasonably large damages unenforceable as a penalty on grounds of public policy.1 UCC § 2-718(1) applies the same limit to sales of goods, adds the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy as a third factor, and declares an unreasonably large term void as a penalty.2 Both rules look to function, not label. Money paid at the start and kept after a breach does the work of a sum chosen in advance for breach; it is simply paid ahead of time instead of owed afterward.
Deposits reach courts from the opposite side from the clauses studied earlier in this chapter. There the promisee sued to collect a stipulated sum and the promisor resisted. Here the recipient already holds the money, so the party who defaulted must sue to get it back and must persuade the court that keeping it is a penalty. The test is the same. The court asks what loss the default was likely to cause, how hard that loss would be to prove, and whether the amount kept bears a sensible relation to it. A deposit that is a modest share of the price and was fixed before anyone knew what a default would cost fits under the ceiling; a forfeiture far larger than any plausible loss does not.
Land sales, sales of goods, and leases each add a wrinkle to that shared question.
| Setting | Governing text | What decides how much the recipient keeps |
|---|---|---|
| Land sale | Restatement § 356(1) | Whether the forfeited earnest money is a reasonable forecast of the seller's loss; about 10 percent of the price is the benchmark |
| Sale of goods | UCC § 2-718(2) to (4) | The sum a valid clause allows or, with no clause, the smaller of 20 percent of the price or $500, adjusted for the seller's offsets |
| Lease | Restatement § 356(1) | Whether the payment is security, prepaid rent, or liquidated damages, and, for forfeitures and acceleration, whether the sum is reasonable |
The breach that causes no loss, discussed earlier in this chapter, runs through all three settings. A seller who keeps a deposit and resells at a gain has lost nothing, and courts that look to actual loss take notice. Land sales come first, because the deposit and the forfeiture clause are most familiar there.
Earnest Money in Land Sales
Restatement § 356(1) supplies the test for a land buyer's forfeited deposit. Land is not goods, so UCC § 2-718(1) stays out of the analysis, and the Restatement's two factors, anticipated or actual loss and difficulty of proof, control.3 A land sale contract typically requires earnest money at signing and often lets the seller keep it if the buyer materially breaches. Courts treat that provision as a liquidated damages clause whatever label the parties gave it, and they uphold it if it is a good-faith, reasonable pre-estimate of the seller's actual compensatory damages.4 The deposit qualifies because it fixes in advance what the buyer loses on breach. The seller holds the money, so the defaulting buyer sues for its return and must convince the court that the forfeiture is a penalty.
Most modern decisions put the question through the older two-part formulation: actual damages must be difficult or impossible to measure, and the sum must have appeared, when the contract was made, a reasonable estimate of them.5 The two parts sit awkwardly together, since a loss that cannot be measured is hard to estimate reasonably, and in practice courts assume or ignore the first part and concentrate on the figure.6 A deposit usually passes because of when it was fixed. At signing no one can say what a failed closing will cost the seller, who may hold the property off the market while the buyer is bound, carry it for months, and then resell in a market that has risen or fallen. A modest percentage of the price is a rough stand-in for that loss, and a rough stand-in is all a forecast made under such uncertainty can be.
The benchmark is about 10 percent of the price. The traditional 10 percent down payment is widely accepted as reasonable; where a seller keeps a deposit with no clause at all, most courts cap the sum at 10 percent or less, and a seller with an express liquidated damages clause has somewhat more leeway.7 In Palmieri v. Partridge, a Pennsylvania court enforced a clause forfeiting a $225,000 deposit on a $2,250,000 price, a deposit of exactly ten percent, and held that a seller with a valid clause has no duty to mitigate.8 The customary percentage gives the court something outside the parties' own say-so against which to measure the figure.
A deposit well above the custom loses that anchor. Unusually large earnest money deposits are commonly recoverable by purchasers, and a vendor who overreached may end up with only actual damages after the trouble of proving them.9 If the court finds the clause unreasonable, the seller must prove actual damages and refund any excess earnest money.10 The 10 percent figure guides courts without binding them. In Uzan v. 845 UN Ltd. Partnership, a New York court let a seller keep a 25 percent deposit where the record showed no disparity of bargaining power, duress, fraud, illegality, or mutual mistake.11 The buyer had contracted for penthouse condominiums atop Trump Tower and withdrew after September 11, claiming that Trump knew of the danger to residents of so prominent a building, so those unique facts may explain the result.12 Palmieri sits at the customary percentage and needs no special explanation; Uzan went well beyond it on a record free of bargaining defects, which makes it better treated as an exception than as a new ceiling.
A deposit of customary size can still draw a second look when the seller turns out to have lost nothing. The Restatement's own phrase, anticipated or actual loss, is the root of the split. The traditional view tests reasonableness as of the time of contracting, but courts grow uncomfortable when the property's value has risen sharply and the seller's damages are small or zero. Some recent decisions refuse enforcement if the forfeiture would give the seller a substantial windfall measured at the time of breach; others hold that a deposit reasonable when made may be retained even though the seller's damages are much smaller or nonexistent.13 The Restatement's commentary supplies the argument for the first group. The greater the difficulty of proving loss, the more latitude the estimate receives; the slighter the difficulty, the less; and where it is clear that no loss at all has occurred, a provision fixing a substantial sum is unenforceable.14 A minority of decisions end the split by refusing forfeiture altogether and letting the buyer recover whatever part of the deposit exceeds the vendor's actual damages.15
When the contract says nothing about the deposit, there is no clause to test, and courts divide over whether a breaching buyer may recover any of the money. Many courts allow no recovery at all, and North Carolina follows that common-law rule in Star Financial Corp. v. Howard Nance Co.16 New York reaches a similar result through Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, which lets a seller rescind and keep the down payment even with no liquidated damages provision, because actual damages are hard to estimate and the traditional 10 percent down payment is generally accepted as reasonable.17 That rule is the clause analysis supplied by default: the customary deposit stands in for the seller's loss whether or not the parties wrote it down.
New Jersey rejects that result. In Kutzin v. Pirnie, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a defaulting buyer may recover restitution of the deposit in excess of the seller's damages: "[w]henever the breaching buyer proves that the deposit exceeds the seller's actual damages suffered as a result of the breach, the buyer may recover the difference."18 The court thought the traditional rule unjustly enriches the seller and is economically inefficient.19 The reasoning starts from what the seller is owed, which is compensation for the loss the breach caused and nothing beyond it. Keeping the excess rewards the seller for a breach that cost less than the deposit. The price of the rule is proof: the buyer must establish the seller's actual damages, so the work a clause is meant to eliminate returns to the case.
The two rules give different answers on the same facts. A buyer contracts to purchase a house for $365,000, pays a $36,000 deposit, and breaches. The contract has no liquidated damages clause, and the seller's actual damages are $17,000.20 Under the New York rule the seller keeps all $36,000, a deposit near the customary 10 percent; under the New Jersey rule the buyer recovers $19,000, the amount above the seller's loss.21 The courts disagree about what a deposit is: an agreed estimate the seller may keep, or money the seller holds only to the extent of its actual loss. In a state that follows the restitution approach to silent contracts but judges written clauses at formation, a clause for a customary deposit protects the seller in a way silence does not, because it moves the dispute from what the seller lost to whether the figure was reasonable when set.
Buyer's Restitution Under the UCC
For goods, the Code answers the deposit question by statute where land sales leave it to the courts. Under UCC § 2-718(2), when the seller justifiably withholds delivery because of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitution of any amount by which its payments exceed one of two figures. The first is the amount the seller may keep under terms liquidating its damages in accordance with subsection (1). The second applies in the absence of such terms and is twenty percent of the value of the total performance for which the buyer is obligated, or $500, whichever is smaller.23 Restitution is the return of value one party has conferred on another, so the subsection gives a defaulting buyer back whatever the seller is not entitled to keep. The word 'justifiably' sets the trigger. The subsection operates when the buyer's breach entitles the seller to stop performing and the seller does so; a seller who withholds delivery without that justification is itself in breach and is not the party the subsection addresses.
The rule exists because a deposit is usually fixed before anyone knows what a default will cost the seller, and it can easily exceed the loss. If the seller kept the whole sum regardless, the buyer would forfeit money that compensates for nothing, which is the overreaching the penalty rule forbids. The statute therefore treats the deposit as a fund the seller may keep only up to the amount it is entitled to, and its two figures rest on different reasons. The first defers to the parties' own advance estimate: the seller keeps what a reasonable clause allows, and the buyer recovers the surplus. The second supplies a modest default for contracts in which the parties made no estimate, which lets the seller keep a small sum without proof while requiring proof of actual damages to keep more.
The first figure counts only if the clause is valid. Subsection (2)(a) refers to terms liquidating damages in accordance with subsection (1), and subsection (1) permits liquidation only at an amount reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy, while declaring an unreasonably large term void as a penalty.24 A down payment of $100 under a clause fixing liquidated damages at $80 therefore returns $20 to the buyer, the amount by which the payment exceeds what the seller may keep.25 A buyer who pays $3,500 toward a $35,000 machine under a reasonable clause setting damages at $3,500 recovers nothing, because the payment does not exceed the sum the seller is entitled to.26
Where the contract has no clause, the statutory default controls. For the same $35,000 machine and $3,500 deposit, with no clause and no actual damages, twenty percent of the price is $7,000, the smaller of $7,000 and $500 is $500, and the seller keeps $500, so the buyer recovers $3,000.27 The identical deposit thus produces no refund with a reasonable clause and a $3,000 refund without one, and that gap is the practical reason a seller drafts a defensible figure. The words 'whichever is smaller' matter mainly on small contracts. On a $500 purchase with a $150 deposit, twenty percent of the price is $100, which is less than $500, so the seller keeps $100 and the buyer recovers $50.28 Once the price passes $2,500, twenty percent exceeds $500 and the $500 figure controls. The customary ten percent deposit from land sales has no role in this arithmetic. For goods, the clause or the formula, and not a trade custom, decides what the seller keeps.
Subsection (3) qualifies the buyer's right. Restitution is subject to offset to the extent the seller establishes a right to recover damages under Article 2 apart from the liquidation clause, and the amount or value of any benefits the buyer received, directly or indirectly, by reason of the contract.29 Each offset closes a gap the default formula would leave. The $500 default stands in for proof, so a seller whose real loss is larger should not be capped at that figure, and the damages offset lets the seller prove the loss and keep that much of the deposit. The benefits offset keeps the buyer from recovering payments that bought something the buyer actually got.
The damages offset produces a puzzle in the lost-volume situation. A lost-volume seller would have made both the sale to the defaulting buyer and a later sale to someone else, so resale to the replacement buyer does not reduce its loss. Suppose the $35,000 machine is resold for $35,000 and the seller's profit on each machine is $3,000. The seller keeps the $500 default and also offsets $3,000 of proven lost profit, so a literal reading lets it keep $3,500, which is the entire deposit and leaves the buyer nothing.30 That total is $500 more than the seller actually lost.31
Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. 1972), avoids that result. The breaching buyer there had deposited $4,250 and the seller proved lost-volume damages of $3,253, and the court held that the buyer could recover the difference between the deposit and the seller's actual damages, without deducting a further $500 as statutory liquidated damages.32 The logic follows from what the default is for. The $500 exists as a substitute for proof of loss, and once the seller proves its loss there is nothing left for the substitute to do, so the seller's retention is capped at its actual damages, in keeping with the compensatory purpose of contract remedies. Applied to the machine, the seller keeps $3,000 and the buyer recovers $500. Because little case law addresses the point, an exam answer should present the literal reading, explain the overshoot, and then adopt the Neri approach.33
The benefits offset in subsection (3) closes a different gap, because payments may have purchased something the buyer received and kept.
The statute reaches benefits received directly or indirectly by reason of the contract, so the offset is not confined to delivered goods.34
Subsection (4) addresses a buyer who pays in goods rather than money, such as a trade-in. The reasonable value of those goods, or the proceeds of their resale, is treated as a payment for purposes of subsection (2), so the buyer's payments in the restitution arithmetic include the value of what the buyer handed over.35 If the seller has notice of the buyer's breach before it resells goods received in part performance, the resale is subject to the conditions the Article lays down for an aggrieved seller's resale in § 2-706.36 The condition presumably guards against a seller who, knowing of the default, resells the buyer's goods cheaply and so shrinks the credit the buyer receives.
Only a clause that satisfies subsection (1) fixes what the seller may keep. A term that fails the reasonableness test is void as a penalty, and the seller must then rely on the default amount and on whatever actual damages it can prove through the offset.37 The consequences of a failed clause are taken up later in this chapter.
Lease Deposits and Acceleration
A lease conveys an interest in land and is not a sale of goods, so Restatement § 356(1), not UCC § 2-718(1), tests a sum that the landlord claims was fixed in advance for the tenant's breach. The amount must be reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proof, and an unreasonably large sum is unenforceable as a penalty.39 Two lease devices bring that test into play. One is the deposit the tenant hands over at the start; the other is a clause that makes all the remaining rent fall due when the tenant defaults. The deposit adds a threshold question that land-sale and goods deposits did not, because money paid at signing can be any of several things, and the penalty test governs only one of them.
Landlords commonly require a deposit as security for the tenant's lease obligations. A specialized form is the damage deposit, which covers the cost of repairing physical damage or extraordinary cleaning, and many leases use one deposit for both rent and other damages.40 Lease clauses usually set up one of three mechanisms. Under the first, the tenant deposits a sum against which the landlord may draw to cover a default or damage. Under the second, the tenant forfeits the sum on default. Under the third, the tenant makes a payment called prepaid rent, usually for a period at the end of the term.41 Each mechanism answers differently the question whether the landlord may keep the money, so classification comes before any arithmetic. Classification turns on what the parties intended, and a court construes an ambiguous lease against the landlord.42 A landlord cannot settle the matter by choosing a caption, because the court asks whether the sum is truly a security deposit.
A true security deposit is a fund held to cover the tenant's proven defaults. When the tenant's breach ends the lease early, the landlord is entitled to only so much of the deposit as is needed to cover accrued unpaid rent and damage to the premises for which the tenant is responsible, and any excess goes back to the tenant, as in Heyman v. Linwood Park, Inc.43 The reason follows from what the money was paid for. It protects against loss, so a landlord who keeps more than the loss has collected a sum that compensates for nothing and can justify keeping it only by showing that the payment was something other than security. A statute may displace these common-law rules, and residential deposits in particular are commonly regulated, so an apartment problem calls for a check of local law.44
Landlords have tried to avoid the security-deposit rules by renaming the payment, and each new name works only when it fits the transaction. A deposit characterized as consideration for granting the lease tends to stand when no lease term requires its return, but if the lease requires return at the end of the term, most courts treat the sum as security and give the tenant an accounting.45 A payment characterized as prepaid rent has been more successful. At common law, a landlord who re-enters and terminates the lease for the tenant's breach ends the tenant's liability for rent that would have accrued afterward, so rent already received protects the landlord against that rule, and courts willing to categorize a sum as prepaid rent have generally let the landlord keep it on re-entry.46
The third characterization, in which the landlord keeps a forfeited deposit as liquidated damages, is the one § 356(1) governs directly. The approach that reconciles most of the decisions applies the ordinary reasonableness test: stand in the parties' position when they signed, and ask whether the sum bore a reasonable relationship to the damages that might then have been anticipated.47 Some courts have upheld such a provision when the amount was reasonable and approximated the landlord's probable damages. Others, more often, have treated it as a penalty, mainly because the landlord's damages were readily ascertainable or the sum was unreasonable in light of the probable damages.48 A landlord's lost rent can usually be worked out from the lease and the market for replacement tenants, so the difficulty-of-proof factor gives a lease forfeiture less cushion than it gives a clause covering speculative harm.49 One clause failed on its own terms. The lease treated a $33,000 deposit as security and said the landlord could retain it as liquidated damages but could collect more if greater damages were proved. Because the provision reached past the deposit, the parties plainly did not intend to liquidate their damages, and the clause was in the nature of a penalty; the tenant recovers the deposit at the end of the term less the damages the landlord actually proves.50 That is the fixed-sum-plus-actual-damages defect again, in lease form.
A rent acceleration clause applies the same advance fixing to the rent itself: on the tenant's default, all rent for the entire term becomes due at once.51 Because it sets the amount due on breach in advance, it is a form of liquidated damages, and courts police it as one.52 Some courts enforce it because the parties agreed to it but refuse enforcement when it is a penalty or unconscionable, and a clause that is not a reasonable estimate of the actual damages the landlord is likely to suffer is a penalty, as in Cummings Properties, L.L.C. v. National Communications Corp., a Massachusetts decision.53
The measure of damages without a clause explains why courts watch the clause. A landlord whose tenant abandons recovers the agreed rent minus what a replacement tenant would pay, plus the cost of finding the replacement and rent lost in the meantime, so the loss shrinks once the space is re-let. If the rent is at or below the market price, damages are zero apart from the cost of locating the new tenant.54 Accelerated rent ignores that shrinkage, and if the clause is enforced, it lets the landlord collect the remaining rent and also rent the premises to someone else.55 That pays the landlord twice for the same months, which is the overcompensation that marks a penalty.
A majority of courts nonetheless accept acceleration, at least for a default in paying rent as opposed to other breaches, and when rent is accelerated the landlord usually cannot take possession as well.56 Landlords sometimes use the clause to contract around the duty to mitigate, but most courts, though not all, refuse to let it waive that duty.57 That position follows from the penalty analysis. Whether the sum approximates the loss depends on what re-letting would recover, and a clause that shuts re-letting out of the picture is hard to defend as a forecast.
The baseline duty to mitigate varies by jurisdiction. When a tenant wrongfully abandons, the landlord may accept a surrender and release the tenant, retake possession to mitigate damages, do nothing and sue for rent as it comes due, or sue at once for damages on a theory of anticipatory breach.58 Where the common-law rule survives, the landlord may let the premises lie idle and sue for rent as it falls due, but a growing number of courts and statutes require reasonable efforts to re-rent.59 A later section takes up the general rule that a valid liquidated damages clause relieves the plaintiff of any duty to mitigate. An acceleration clause is the harder case, because its validity is tested against a loss that re-letting reduces.