Concept
Critiques and Trends
Liquidated Damages or Penalty
Critiques and Trends
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356(1) and UCC § 2-718(1) share a structure: the parties may liquidate damages, but only at a reasonable amount, and an unreasonably large sum is unenforceable as a penalty.1 Defenders of the rule start from a simple observation. Public law, not private law, ordinarily defines the remedies for breach, and a stipulated damages clause lets private parties do what a court would otherwise do, which is compensate the nonbreaching party. Courts therefore check that the private remedy stays close to compensation. A sum far above the injury may suggest unfair bargaining, or an in terrorem agreement meant to deter breach, secure performance, and punish the breacher if deterrence fails.2 Critics accept that such abuses exist. They deny that the abuses justify the rule where it is most often invoked, a clause negotiated between capable businesses.
One critique begins with credibility. A promise backed by a penalty clause is easier to believe, because the promisor has shown it will pay dearly to break it, and that added believability may be essential to inducing some value-maximizing contracts to be made at all.3 A rule that voids the clause can therefore prevent the very deals the parties would otherwise have made.
The critique then meets the main objection to penalty clauses, that they discourage efficient breach. Parties who are fully competent, it answers, weigh the gains of a penalty clause against its costs, including the chance of discouraging an efficient breach somewhere down the road, and they include the clause only if the benefits exceed those costs and all others.4 The efficient-breach objection also fits the law poorly. If the penalty rules existed to prevent compulsion to perform, penalties would be permitted whenever specific performance is, since the two remedies are merely different forms of compulsion, yet they are not. Some economic writers who favor efficient breach think it at least equally efficient to let sophisticated parties contract freely for liquidated damages.5 The remaining objections fare worse. A penalty clause raises the cost of breach, which increases the risk to the breacher's other creditors and the risk of bankruptcy, and it could amplify the business cycle by multiplying bankruptcies in bad times. The critique dismisses these points as makeweights, because little effort is made to keep businesspeople from assuming risks.6
A related argument concerns the party who must invest before the other side performs. Agreeing to a liquidated damages clause, even one that overcompensates the investing party, may be commercially rational for the non-investing party, because it signals that the non-investing party will not threaten to breach. A court that refuses to enforce the clause denies the parties a term that was reasonable for them.7
The two views part over the $1 million above the documented loss. The reasonableness test asks whether $3 million is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulties of proof, so the gap invites scrutiny.8 The test already bends with the difficulty of proof. Where damages are hard to estimate, a clause may be reasonable even if it seems to miss the actual loss by a relatively large margin, and where they are easy to calculate, the clause must come much closer.9 The critics would go further and say that the excess is what bought the assurance, and that refusing to enforce it strips the parties of a term they had good reason to adopt.10
A further critique targets the timing of the court's inquiry. Judging reasonableness after breach requires the court to have all the information about the injured party's damages and to assess it without error. Yet some elements of damages, such as non-pecuniary losses, production costs, market demand, and consequential damages, depend on variables that are hard to prove. A court unpersuaded by the evidence may find damages lower than they are, which leaves the injured party at risk of undercompensation even when the court weighs the difficulty of proof as § 2-718(1) requires.11 The intent test that some courts apply has a different weakness. If a clause that looks excessive when made shows an intent to penalize, the test could reject a clause that captures the actual loss quite well, on the strength of an imputed intent.12
The weighing argument assumes parties who are fully competent, and it fits less comfortably when the promisor is a family. In one dispute, parents who enrolled their daughter in The Barrie School signed a re-enrollment agreement stating that, if they withdrew her after a specific date, they would owe tuition for the entire academic year as liquidated damages.13 Whether a court should leave that term to the parents' own weighing is a harder question than whether it should leave a negotiated clause between two corporations to theirs.
Two jurisdictions show what departure from the default looks like. In Commercial Real Estate Investment, L.C. v. Comcast of Utah II, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court abandoned the rule against penalties and asks instead whether a liquidated damages term is unconscionable. Its footing was in part a reading of its own precedent: the court concluded that two earlier decisions, Johnson and Perkins, did not support the proposition that it had officially adopted the Restatement's test.14 Unconscionability asks how the bargain was made as well as what it says. Where a jurisdiction uses it, the bargaining-context facts, such as adhesion and unequal positions, do the work that the comparison of sum to loss does elsewhere.
California reached a different place by statute. Civil Code § 1671 makes a liquidated damages provision valid unless the party seeking to invalidate it establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances existing when the contract was made, and the statute does not apply against a consumer or in certain other situations.15 The statute places the burden on the challenger and fixes the inquiry at formation, while the consumer exception means its presumption of validity does not operate against a consumer. The question pressed by both the statute and the critiques is whether penalty terms are more onerous than other terms, and so deserve special scrutiny from courts.16
On an exam, treat these arguments as policy, not as the rule. A problem that places a negotiated clause in an unnamed jurisdiction calls for the reasonableness test of Restatement § 356(1) for contracts generally or of UCC § 2-718(1) for goods, and a sum far above an easily measured loss is the kind that test voids.17 Reserve Utah's unconscionability standard and California's presumption of validity for a problem that places the facts in those states.