Concept
Working Through a Clause
Limitation of Remedies
Working Through a Clause
Section 2-719 controls a remedy clause in three ways, and each control asks a different question. Subsection (1) validates a substituted or limited remedy, such as repair or replacement, and makes a stated remedy optional unless the parties expressly agreed that it is exclusive.1 Subsection (2) restores the Code's remedies when circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose.2 Subsection (3) permits an exclusion of consequential damages unless it is unconscionable. It treats a limit on consequential damages for personal injury from consumer goods as prima facie unconscionable and a limit on commercial loss as not.3 The first control looks at what the parties agreed, the second at what happened in performance, and the third at whether a term is fair. A buyer who blends them, by arguing that an exclusion is unconscionable merely because the repair promise later failed, offers second-control facts as proof of the third. Taking the questions in order keeps each argument tied to the facts that can support it.
The Order of Questions
The first three questions screen the clause in sequence. Only the fourth turns on the jurisdiction.
The Controls Applied to a Software License
At the first question, the license calls repair the broker's sole and exclusive remedy, so the exclusivity requirement is met, and subsection (1)(a) validates the substitution of repair for the Code's remedies.7 Had the license said only that the vendor would repair defects, repair would have been one choice among several. The broker could then pursue the Code's remedies without proving that repair had failed, though the separate exclusion of consequential damages would still need an answer. On the actual license, the broker must attack the clause by another route.
The second question is where the broker's case is strongest. A repair-or-replace promise exists to leave the buyer with software that works, and patch after patch left this broker with software that never ran reliably, so the broker can argue that the remedy failed of its essential purpose.8 The defects were also latent: they surfaced only after the broker had integrated the software at great cost. Section 2-719(2) reaches latent defects that cannot be discovered before the buyer has suffered damages, and one court denied a software company's motion to dismiss on comparable facts.9 Because the broker asserts the failure, its counsel should assemble the repair history: each defect reported, each patch, and each wait.
The exclusion of consequential damages then meets subsection (3). The broker's lost shipper contracts are a commercial loss, so no presumption of unconscionability helps it, and it must prove the exclusion unconscionable.10 A licensee may do that by showing an unfair bargaining position (procedural unconscionability) and that enforcement would deprive it of any remedy (substantive unconscionability).11 The second showing is hard on these facts. Success at the second question returns the broker to the Code's remedies, so the exclusion strips away lost profits but not every remedy. The repair failure is evidence for the second question, and it supplies none of the bargaining facts the third question needs.
The fourth question decides whether the lost contracts are recoverable at all. A court following the dependent approach treats the exclusion as having fallen with the repair clause, so the broker may claim lost profits as consequential damages, subject to proof of the loss. A court following the independent approach enforces the exclusion unless the broker proved it unconscionable at the third question, which it probably did not, so recovery stays within the Code's other remedies. A court following the case-by-case approach asks whether the parties allocated the risk of repair failure to the broker. Evidence of that allocation would decide the point, and the facts above supply none.
Changing the Facts
The same walk can end at the second question. Suppose a bottler buys labeling equipment under a clause limiting its remedy to repair, replacement, or return of the price, and the contract also excludes consequential damages. The seller works on the equipment for several months and, when the problems persist, takes it back and refunds the price as the clause provides. Every promise the clause made has been kept, so the remedy delivered what it was designed to deliver and did not fail of its essential purpose.12 The bottler gets nothing from subsection (2), and the third and fourth questions never arise. The broker's license offered repair alone, with no refund or other fallback, and the repair never worked. The two cases part ways at the second question, on whether the remedy produced what it promised.