Concept
Why Punishment Is Excluded
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
Why Punishment Is Excluded
Section 355 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the rule in one sentence: punitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.1 The bar holds even when the breach was willful, fraudulent, or malicious, and absent an independent tort the remedy stays compensatory.2 Students often find that result backward, since a promisor who breaks a promise on purpose seems to deserve more than one who breaks it by accident. Contract law answers with four reasons, each resting on a different feature of its remedial system:
- The remedy is compensatory. Damages measure the value of the promise, and punishment would carry recovery beyond it.
- Liability is not fault-based. A promisor who fails to perform is liable whether or not it was to blame, so blame should not set the remedy.
- Some breaches are efficient. Once the promisee is paid, a breach that moves resources to a better use leaves society ahead, and punishment would discourage it.
- Risk must be predictable. Parties price and allocate risk when they sign, and open-ended punitive exposure cannot be priced.
Each reason presupposes a claim that rests on the promise alone. When the same conduct also violates a duty the law imposes regardless of agreement, as fraud does, those premises no longer describe the wrong, and the tort route examined in the next part opens for that reason.
Compensation, Not Punishment
Contract damages seek to approximate the agreed-upon performance: the injured party is to receive as nearly as possible the equivalent of the benefits of performance, so the promise supplies the yardstick.3 Nothing in a promise calls for an amount keyed to how badly the defendant behaved. The yardstick is also generous. It gives the plaintiff the full expectation of gain, even a plaintiff who has not yet performed, spent anything in preparation, or relied on the contract in any other way.4 The restitution interest that contract law protects takes its shape from the exchange too. It is the interest reflected within a bargained-for exchange, which is not the same as restitution as an independent field of law with remedies of its own.5
Because the promise sets the measure, a contract recovery has a ceiling as well as a floor. Performance would have left the plaintiff holding exactly what the contract promised; damages that supply its monetary equivalent restore that position, and every dollar beyond it is a gain the contract never offered.6 A punitive award is sized by the defendant’s culpability and the need to deter, not by the plaintiff’s loss, so a sizeable one is the likeliest way to lift recovery above the net-expectation level.7 The ceiling does not fit practice exactly. A plaintiff who cannot recover the full cost of litigating the breach ends up worse off than performance would have left her, even with an otherwise fully compensatory award, and recent developments suggest that these conventional rules of nonliability are not beyond question.8 That shortfall marks one gap between theory and practice; it does not convert a punitive award into compensation.
The two measures take different inputs. The contract question asks what the plaintiff lost by not receiving performance, and the answer comes from the promise and the plaintiff’s side of the ledger. The punitive question asks what the defendant deserves, and the answer comes from the defendant’s conduct. Two buyers whose sellers failed to deliver, one through an honest mistake and one through calculation, each hold a $20,000 compensatory claim. Only the second buyer’s facts even invite talk of punishment, which confirms that the punitive figure answers a different question from the one contract damages answer.
The bar also reflects whose rights a broken promise touches. Punitive damages aim to vindicate public rather than private rights, so awarding them for a mere contract breach would not advance society’s interest in punishing and deterring the egregious behavior that supports an exemplary award; the bargain itself already reflects an expectation of performance or compensation for the damages breach causes.9 The counterparty chose the deal, priced it, and recovers expectation damages that restore the position performance would have created. Where the same conduct also violates a duty owed to everyone, as fraud does, the public interest is present, and the second clause of § 355 addresses that case.10
United States Naval Institute v. Charter Communications, Inc. shows the ceiling at work on a measure that does not look punitive. Naval Institute claimed Berkley’s profits of $724,300 as its damages. The district court found that those profits did not define Naval Institute’s loss, because many people who bought the paperback in September 1985 would not have bought the hardcover and would merely have waited for the paperback edition. It found actual damages of $35,380.50, and the court of appeals held its finding about the profits not clearly erroneous.11 The profits were about twenty times the loss. Awarding them would have given Naval Institute roughly $689,000 it had not lost, and in an action for breach that excess would have been punishment, which the contract remedy does not include.12
The profits measure is available in the manufacturer’s case because the figure equals the plaintiff’s loss, and it was unavailable in Naval Institute because the figure bore little relation to the loss. The label on a measure never decides the question. What decides it is whether the number approximates what the plaintiff lost by not receiving performance.
Liability Without Fault
The second reason concerns how contract liability arises. Contract law is a system founded not on fault but on strict liability for the consequences of breach, and since culpability plays no part in determining liability, it should play no part in fashioning the remedy.14 A promisor who fails to perform has breached whatever caused the failure, and the plaintiff never has to prove blameworthy conduct to establish the claim. A punitive award is sized by how badly the defendant behaved, and a system that never asks how the defendant behaved has nothing on which to rest one.
The Seventh Circuit spelled out the mechanism in Patton v. Mid-Continent Systems. Liability for breach of contract is, prima facie, strict liability: if the promisor fails to perform as agreed, it has broken the contract even though the failure may have been beyond its power to prevent and therefore in no way blameworthy.15 The court explained that contracts often contain an insurance component. The promisor promises in effect either to perform or to compensate the promisee for the cost of nonperformance, and one who voluntarily assumes a risk is not relieved of the consequences when the risk materializes.16 The promisor’s liability therefore comes from the unmet promise and the risk it took on, and neither involves wrongdoing. The plaintiff who sues is collecting on an assumed risk. A punitive sanction presupposes a finding of misconduct, and the contract claim contains no such finding for it to attach to.
The two sellers face identical contract liability and identical contract damages. Only the tort claim against the second seller makes culpability matter, because fault is part of that claim and must be proved before punishment is considered. A contract plaintiff who asks for punitive damages on the contract claim alone is asking the court to impose a fault-based sanction on a liability that was never built on fault.
A deliberate breach does not change the analysis, because even an intentional breach is not necessarily blameworthy. The promisor may simply have discovered that its performance is worth more to someone else, and then allowing the breach, provided the promisor makes good the promisee’s actual losses, promotes efficiency.17 The next part develops that economic point. The opinion in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. states the resulting moral view: an intentional tort is seen as reprehensible, the deliberate or reckless harming of another, while the intentional breach of contract has come to be viewed as a morally neutral act.18 It points to Justice Holmes’s remark that the duty to keep a contract at common law means “a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.”19 The same idea appears in the general statement that contract law does not inquire into subjective intent or attach moral blame for the nonperformance of promises.20
None of this makes every breach blameless. A culpable breach is a matter for tort, where fault is an element and punishment has something to attach to. In Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Judge Posner recognized that a buyer’s refusal to pay for goods it had accepted might amount to duress, yet the supplier had not charged duress or sought punitive damages, and punishment could not rest on the contract claim alone. Contract law handles a culpable breach by pointing the plaintiff to a tort whose elements fit the culpability. It does not add a fault-based supplement to a claim that never required fault.
Efficient Breach
The economic theory of efficient breach supplies the third reason, and it begins where the last part ended: even a deliberate breach is not necessarily blameworthy, because the promisor may have found that its performance is worth more to someone else. The theory turns that observation into an account of how the remedy should be priced. Properly calculated expectation damages give the other party “an incentive to break the contract if, but only if, he gains enough from the breach that he can compensate the injured party for his losses and still retain some of the benefits from the breach.”22 In E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, the court relied on Farnsworth’s observation that the notion of efficient breach “accords remarkably with the traditional assumptions of the law of contract remedies,” and on his point that punitive damages would increase damages in excess of the promisee’s expectation interest and lead to inefficient results.23 Punitive damages could thus undermine a theory that lets a breaching party pay damages while maximizing its own profits.24
The theory works in four steps. Under expectation damages the breaching party pays the promisee the value of the performance it did not receive, so the breacher bears the cost it imposes. The promisee, once paid, holds the monetary equivalent of performance and has no loss left to complain about. The breacher keeps whatever remains of its gain, so a breach pays only when the gain exceeds the promisee’s loss. A breach that clears that bar sends resources to a use someone values more. That is how the Freeman & Mills opinion describes the efficient breach, one in which the gain to the breaching party exceeds the loss to the party suffering the breach, and it warns that contract law must be careful “not to exceed compensatory damages if it doesn’t want to deter efficient breaches.”25
Patton put numbers on the idea. Suppose Mid-Continent’s franchising of Truck-O-Mat in the plaintiffs’ territory raised its own profits by $150,000 and inflicted $75,000 in damages on the plaintiffs. The court called that an efficient breach.26 Whether Mid-Continent goes ahead depends on what it expects to pay:
- With compensatory damages as the price, it pays $75,000 and keeps the other $75,000 of its gain, while the plaintiffs, once paid, are no worse off. The breach is profitable, so it proceeds.
- With $100,000 in punitive damages added, its total payment is $175,000, which exceeds its $150,000 gain by $25,000. The breach now loses money, so it stays with the contract.
The second column shows what the punitive award costs. After the plaintiffs are compensated, the $75,000 difference between Mid-Continent’s profits and the plaintiffs’ losses is a net social gain, and a franchisor who knew it would owe punitive damages on top of compensation would find the breach not worthwhile.27 The plaintiffs are made whole in either column, so the punitive award does not decide whether they are compensated. It decides whether the $75,000 gain is created at all.
The theory has a boundary, because it covers only breaches that move resources to a higher-valued use.
Breaches of that kind are opportunistic, and by definition they do not increase social wealth.28 Efficiency reasoning therefore gives the buyer no cover, and the doctrine already has a place for the seller’s claim: the tort clause of § 355 opens the door when the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.29 Nor does the theory license free breach. Its premise is full compensation, so the breacher still owes the promisee’s expectation, and the theory explains only why nothing is added on top of it.
The theory has critics, and their proposals show where pressure on the doctrine comes from. Professor Dodge agrees that punitive damages should deter opportunistic breaches. He would go further and award them even for efficient breaches, on the ground that the prospect of punitive damages would push the breacher to negotiate a release. Negotiation is likely to cost less than litigating the promisee’s damages, and it forces the breacher to share some of the gain from the new deal instead of keeping all of it.30
The doctrinal rule has held through that debate, and courts keep citing the theory in refusing punishment for breach of contract. Harris v. Atlantic Richfield Co. explains that the restrictions on contract remedies encourage efficient breaches, which increase the production of goods and services at lower cost to society.31 The Utah Supreme Court in TruGreen Companies, L.L.C. v. Mower Brothers likewise treated damages that punish a breaching party as inappropriate. On an exam, treat the economic argument as the reason for the bar. The rule itself still turns on whether an independent tort is pleaded and proved.
Predictable Contract Risk
The fourth reason looks forward to signing rather than back to breach. Contracting parties set prices and divide burdens before anything goes wrong, and they can do so sensibly only if they can estimate what a failure to perform would cost them. Contract damages are therefore generally limited to losses within the contemplation of the parties when they contracted, or at least reasonably foreseeable to them then, and consequential damages beyond the parties’ expectations are not recoverable.33 Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. is a leading statement of that principle. In Hadley v. Baxendale, a mill was shut down pending replacement of a shaft, the carrier misdirected the shaft and delayed the replacement, and the mill recovered nothing for its lost profits because they were not foreseeable.34
The limit tracks the bargain. Special or consequential damages are recoverable or not depending on whether the risks of those damages were part of the basis of the parties’ bargain. A supplier of cattle feed probably means to guarantee price, but perhaps does not mean to provide life insurance for the herd.35 A party who knows the size of a risk at signing can price it, insure against it, or write around it. That is the freedom to bargain over special risks that the restrictions on contract remedies protect, and the limit on liability to the value of the promise promotes contract formation.36
Punitive exposure cannot be fitted into that scheme. A foreseeable consequential loss grows out of facts that exist at signing, so the parties can estimate it, disclose it, insure it, or limit it by clause. A punitive award is sized after the breach by a factfinder weighing the defendant’s culpability and the need for deterrence, so nothing at formation tells either party how large it might be, and no premium, disclosure, or limiting clause can respond to a number that depends on a later judgment about conduct. A careful party facing that liability would charge more, narrow what it promises, or decline to contract, and each response leaves unmade an exchange that would have benefited both sides. Courts voice this concern when they observe that excessive liability for breach of contract might discourage people from making mutually beneficial contracts.37
The argument does not depend on punitive exposure being unforeseeable in some literal sense. Anyone can foresee that a counterparty will be upset by a breach, yet emotional distress damages do not follow from a contract claim alone, although a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could support them.38 Foreseeability here is shorthand for the scope of the bargain, and the promise did not guarantee against that kind of harm. A sanction for misbehavior was likewise never part of what either side agreed to bear.
Tort stands on the other side of this line because its duties come from the law rather than from any agreement. For the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, the measure of damages is the amount that will compensate for all the detriment proximately caused, whether it could have been anticipated or not.39 Nobody negotiates over the duty not to defraud, so there is no price to adjust and no clause that could have narrowed it. A party that commits fraud during contract formation or performance, such as a seller who knowingly conceals termite damage, exposes itself to recovery in both contract and tort.40 That seller cannot answer that it priced only the losses foreseeable under the sale contract, because the duty it violated binds it whatever it expected or agreed. The predictability rationale protects the bargain, and a tort claim rests on a duty outside the bargain.
A common exam error is to answer a demand for punitive damages on a contract pleading by asking whether punishment was foreseeable. The better question is whether the defendant’s conduct also violated a duty that the law imposes independently of the promise. If it did not, the contract ceiling holds, and the parties’ ability to price their risk is the reason the ceiling exists.