Concept
Breach Plus Independent Tort
Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract
Breach Plus Independent Tort
Punitive damages follow a breach of contract only when the conduct that broke the promise is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable.1 That condition has two parts, and the plaintiff must satisfy both. The conduct must violate a duty that tort law imposes apart from the contract, and the tort must be one for which the jurisdiction permits punishment. A plaintiff who proves only the first part keeps a tort claim for compensation and gains nothing punitive.
Four kinds of claim recur. Fraud and breach of a fiduciary or other special duty open the door, and so does an insurer’s bad faith refusal to pay, which many states treat as a tort. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not, because a majority of jurisdictions treat it as no more than a breach of contract.2 Each route applies the single test stated in the first subsection.
The Independent Duty Requirement
Conduct amounting to a breach of contract becomes tortious only when it also violates an independent duty arising from principles of tort law.3 That duty comes from the law’s general command that every person, without any contract, abstain from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon another’s rights.4 On any fact pattern, the question is whether the defendant violated a duty that exists apart from the promise.
The two kinds of duty differ in source and in remedy. The parties create a contract duty, and the basic remedy for its breach compensates the injured party for the benefits it would have received had the contract been performed.5 The law imposes a tort duty whatever the parties promised, and the remedy for violating it can reach beyond compensation when the violation is culpable enough. Strict products liability shows how far a tort duty can stand free of contract. Because that liability is purely one of tort, privity and contractual disclaimers do not limit it, and it protects bystanders, rescuers, and others the defect foreseeably endangers.6
The requirement keeps the bar from collapsing. If a plaintiff could turn any ordinary breach into a punitive claim by describing it in the vocabulary of malice, the rule would protect nothing. Authority from other jurisdictions supports the proposition, without exception, that punitive damages are unavailable in breach of contract actions even when the breach is willful.7 A contract can still create the relation out of which a tort duty grows, as when it prescribes a responsibility that must be performed with care. One court that recognized this denied punitive damages for a willful breach anyway, because no tort was pleaded or proved.8
When the independent duty exists, the tort claim runs beside the contract claim as a second claim. That is why the independent tort is not truly an exception to the bar. One course of conduct can give rise to alternative or cumulative causes of action in contract and in tort,9 and a breach of contract does not negate a tort that arose from the same conduct.10 Fraud is the most widely recognized example. When a party commits fraud in forming or performing a contract, the injured party may recover in contract and in tort, as in Godfrey v. Steinpress, where the defendant knowingly failed to disclose termite damage.11 The contract claim measures the lost expectation. The tort claim, if proved, carries its own damages and, if its culpability standard is met, punishment.
Labels cannot supply the missing duty. In Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chemical & Equipment Corp. the plaintiffs sued the other party to their commercial contract. Regardless of the labels they attached to the defendant’s conduct, the court held that their grievance rested on a breach of a contract that created no special relationship or duty beyond that arising out of any commercial transaction, so punitive damages were not recoverable.12 The court also refused to borrow the reasoning of claims against a third-party interloper who interferes with a contract. That claim is clearly a tortious wrong, the court said, while a claim by one contracting party against the other is only contractual in nature.13
Sandler also warned against reading the rule as purely formal. The right to punitive damages should not turn simply on whether the action is styled in tort or in contract, and an unusually aggravated set of facts might justify punishment even outside the recognized categories, though the case before the court was not one.14 Some courts in recent years have shown greater willingness to find tortious conduct accompanying a breach.15 The recognized categories remain the dependable routes, and the open possibility deserves a sentence in an answer rather than a conclusion.
Employment shows where the line runs. A discharge may be a tort that justifies punitive damages when the employer acts in retaliation for protected activity, such as reporting its illegal conduct or refusing its request to commit perjury. Some lawyers plead an ordinary discharge as intentional infliction of emotional distress to avoid the rule denying punitive damages in contract,16 but under Sandler a label alone does not supply the missing duty.
Finding the tort opens the door to punitive damages without guaranteeing them, because the tort’s own standard governs. Punitive damages are reserved for defendants whose state of mind suggests a need for deterrence or retribution. Mere negligence will not justify them; courts require some degree of reflection by the defendant. The exact boundary varies among the states.17 The tort must also be complete. Punitive damages are unavailable unless the plaintiff establishes entitlement to compensatory damages, so a defendant whose fraud caused no injury owes none.18
Fraud and Misrepresentation
Fraud supplies the independent tort most readily. A fraudulent misrepresentation violates the contractual obligation of fair dealing and is also tortious, and it can carry criminal sanctions as well.20 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 159 defines a misrepresentation as an assertion not in accord with the facts, and the misrepresentation is fraudulent when the speaker knows it is false and makes it intending to induce the other party’s agreement.21
Because the lie and the promise are different wrongs, one deal can produce two claims, and the punitive award rests on the lie. In Formosa Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. Presidio Engineers & Contractors, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court held that a claim that one party fraudulently induced the other to enter a contract states a tort cause of action that justifies punitive damages.22 In America’s Directories, Inc. v. Stellhorn One-Hour Photo, Inc., a seller falsely promised that the buyer could cancel after the first year, and the punitive award rested on that fraud and not on the broken term.
Fraud fits the punitive remedy because its elements already establish deliberate wrongdoing. A contract claim requires no showing of fault, but fraud requires proof that the speaker knew the statement was false and meant to induce agreement. Proving fraud still does not guarantee punishment: punitive damages are recoverable if the defendant’s intentional fraud qualifies as sufficiently malicious or oppressive.23 The second clause of § 355 therefore sets two tests in sequence. The conduct must be a tort, and the tort must be one for which punitive damages are recoverable.
Misrepresentations fall into three categories: fraudulent, negligent, and innocent. The severity and consequences of each depend on the speaker’s state of mind.24 A fraudulent misrepresentation is a deliberate lie told to induce agreement. The other two are not deliberate lies: the speaker made them negligently, or even innocently and without fault.25 Punishment answers the deliberate lie, which only the first category contains.
The timing of the lie also matters. Punitive damages may be awarded for fraud in inducing the contract in the first place, as distinct from a breach that is itself tortious.26 Fraud used only to carry out or cover a breach stands on weaker ground. A California opinion collected in Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. describes the traditional approach to commercial contracts as blind to the motive for breach, calls tort remedies for “bad” breaches a substantial deviation from it, and says the traditional rule applies even when the breach is accomplished in a fraudulent manner. It cites Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., which held that a wrongful termination accomplished through fraudulent misrepresentation is not independently tortious.27 Another court, by contrast, names fraud during contract formation or performance as the standard tort that accompanies a breach.28 The distinction tracks the injury. A lie that induces the deal draws the victim into a bargain on false premises, while a lie told during a breach adds nothing to the nonperformance that expectation damages already measure. Treat fraud in the inducement as the safe route and flag that jurisdictions differ on fraud in performance.
The form of relief also matters when fraud induced the contract. A court may award punitive damages on the tort claim of fraudulent inducement, but it generally cannot do so in equity through restitution. A fraud claim may also face a shorter limitations period than a quasi-contract claim in restitution.29 A plaintiff who wants punishment must therefore plead and prove the tort.
Fiduciary and Special Relationships
Punitive damages are recoverable for a breach of contract that also violates fiduciary duties, because the fiduciary violation is a tort for which punitive damages may be awarded.31 A fiduciary has undertaken to act for another’s benefit, as an agent does for a principal. The duty of loyalty comes with the relationship and does not depend on what the parties promised, so a fiduciary who breaks the contract may violate two obligations at once. The principal usually cannot watch every step or bargain for protection against every betrayal, and the law fills that gap with the duty.
Sandler explained that courts have carved out exceptions where the unusual relationship between the parties reflects a breach of trust beyond a mere breach of a commercial contract. Its examples were an action for breach of a contract to marry, in states where that action remains viable; an action against a public utility that fails its special statutory public duty; an action by a depositor against a banker; and an action by a seller against a real estate broker.32 Judge Friendly’s list, which the Delaware Supreme Court repeated in E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, also names breach of fiduciary duty, breach accompanied by fraudulent conduct, and an insurer’s bad faith refusal to settle a claim, and it calls these limited but well recognized exceptions.33 Fraud and insurer bad faith have their own subsections, so this one takes the rest.
The seller-and-broker action shows the pattern most simply. A broker retained to sell property has undertaken to act for the seller, so a breach of the agency agreement that also violates the broker’s fiduciary duties breaches a duty of trust, and Sandler placed that action among those in which punitive damages are approved.34 Public utilities and carriers may likewise face punitive damages for breach of contract, although those cases usually involve at least some tortious elements as well.35 Treat the public-duty category as another route to an independent tort and not as a freestanding license. The old rule allowing punitive damages for breach of a promise to marry belongs to history, and one treatise calls it bizarre in today’s world.36 An exam answer should mention it in a clause and build no analysis on it.
The fiduciary label opens remedies a contract claim cannot, but only for harm the fiduciary breach caused. In a lawyer-malpractice case, the court noted that, unlike a breach of contract claim, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty could support emotional distress damages. The client still lost on that point, because she had not proved that her distress resulted from the lawyer’s concealing the lapse of her claim, as opposed to the malpractice that caused the lapse.37 The rules for punitive damages run closely parallel to those for emotional distress in contract cases.38
Ordinary commercial parties lack these features. In Sandler the contract created no special relationship or duty beyond that arising out of any commercial transaction, so punitive damages were not recoverable against the breaching party.39 One party’s heavy reliance on the other does not change that.
The broker undertook to act for the seller, while the mill undertook only to ship alloy, and that difference decides the two cases. Snepp v. United States shows what a fiduciary breach can lead to when the plaintiff seeks the profits of the breach. Judge Hoffman argued that punitive damages were a speculative and inappropriate remedy for Snepp’s breach, and the Supreme Court agreed with him that Snepp breached a fiduciary obligation and that the proceeds of his breach are impressed with a constructive trust.40 The remedy the Court approved was a claim on the profits, which turns on what the breach earned and not on how culpable it was, and it approved no punitive award. A student facing a fiduciary breach should therefore ask two questions: whether the relationship supplies an independent duty, and which remedy fits. Punitive damages, where sought, still require the tort’s own standard.
Insurance Bad Faith
Many states treat an insurer’s refusal to pay claims, if made without good faith, as a tort and not merely a breach of the policy.42 A growing trend in the decisions allows punitive damages on that tort, and courts count it among the major exceptions to the rule against punitive damages in contract.43 The reasons courts give for singling out insurers also mark where the exception ends.
Courts give several reasons for treating insurance differently: the special nature of the relationship between insurer and insured, the unequal bargaining power of the parties, the adhesive nature of the insurance contract, and the insured’s expectation of coverage in the event of a loss.44 Those reasons explain why the predictable-risk rationale for the bar fits poorly here. In an ordinary commercial contract, each side can negotiate and price the risk of the other’s nonperformance. An insured accepts a standard form and buys protection for the moment of loss, when waiting is hardest, while the insurer controls the claims process. If a wrongful denial cost the insurer only the amount it already owed, delay would cost it nothing, and a punitive remedy on a bad faith tort removes that advantage. The insurance cases also draw on public interest considerations expressed in an early line of decisions that allowed punitive damages against common carriers and fiduciaries in limited situations.45
Pressman confirms the tort and its limits. The Delaware court repeated Judge Friendly’s list, which includes an insurer’s bad faith refusal to settle a claim, and it described its own decisions allowing punitive damages when an insurer acts with reckless indifference or malice toward the insured’s plight and when the insurer’s breach is particularly egregious.46 Two requirements therefore operate in sequence, mirroring the two parts of the second clause of § 355. The insured must first establish the tort of bad faith and must then show conduct culpable enough for the jurisdiction to permit punishment. Earlier insurance decisions took the same step. Sandler cited Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., in which an insured recovered exemplary damages after an insurer refused in bad faith to pay under a disability policy.47
Both defendants withheld money for the same reason, so the difference in outcome comes from the relationship in which the withholding occurred. Even inside the insurance category, finding the tort settles only one of the two requirements. An insurer that denies a claim by honest mistake has breached the policy if it turns out to be wrong, but it has not committed the tort, because the tort requires a denial made without good faith.48 Punitive damages remain reserved for defendants whose state of mind suggests a need for deterrence or retribution, and mere negligence will not justify them.49
The boundary matters as much as the rule. In Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. the California Supreme Court limited recovery of punitive damages for bad faith breach of contract to insurance contracts, and courts have been very reluctant to extend the tort beyond the insurance setting.50 Delaware showed the same caution in Pressman. It acknowledged commentators who urge wider availability of punitive damages for breach of contract and declined to depart markedly from the well-established body of law.51 A merchant’s bad faith refusal to pay a supplier therefore needs more than the label. Without another independent tort such as fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty, recovery stays at contract damages.
Employment is the only other area where a few courts have gone further. A handful of courts have allowed employees to recover punitive damages for an employer’s breach of the covenant of good faith implied in an employment contract.52 Separately, discharging an employee in retaliation for protected activity may amount to a tort that supports punitive damages, an application of the independent duty requirement.53 Both departures vary by jurisdiction, so an answer should treat insurance as the settled category and mention employment as a possibility that depends on local law.
Bad Faith Without a Tort
Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of contract, and bad faith alone does not make it more. A majority of jurisdictions hold that such a breach, under either the common law or the Uniform Commercial Code, is not a tort sufficiently independent of the contract’s obligations to allow punitive damages.55 The covenant tempts students because bad faith sounds like a wrong beyond the broken promise. The step that fails is the one from bad faith to tort. The law attaches the covenant to the contract, so breaking it leaves the plaintiff inside contract law and keeps the second clause of § 355 closed.
In Pressman, the Delaware Supreme Court declined to expand punitive damages beyond their traditional applications. It noted that some commentators urge wider availability of punitive damages for breach of contract but said it was reluctant to depart markedly from the well-established body of law, and it relied on the California Supreme Court’s statement of the reasons for caution: “Unless the bad faith rises to the level of an independent tort, which itself would support an award of punitive damages, mere bad faith on the part of a party to a contract will not give rise to punitive damages.”56 The statement concedes that bad faith can be real and sends the plaintiff to a separate wrong, such as fraud, whose own elements and punitive standard must be met.
California’s experience shows the practical difficulty. The opinion collected in Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. describes a traditional approach to commercial contracts that was blind to the motive for breach. For a time California recognized a tort for bad faith denial of a contract’s existence under Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. Freeman & Mills overruled Seaman’s, in part because the rule required courts to do the impossible and draw a principled distinction between a tortious denial of a contract’s existence and a permissible denial of liability under its terms.57 The difficulty is built into the idea. A defendant who loses a contract suit has denied a liability that existed, so a tort of bad faith denial would force courts to sort honest disputes from dishonest ones case by case. Freeman & Mills strongly suggested that courts should limit tort recovery in contract breach situations to the insurance area, at least absent violation of an independent duty arising from tort law other than denial of the existence of, or liability under, the breached contract.58
That limit marks the contrast with the preceding subsection. The insurance tort rests on features of the insurer-insured relationship: the special relationship, the unequal bargaining power, and the adhesive nature of the policy.59 An arm’s-length contract between two businesses typically lacks them, so a covenant claim between such parties carries no independent duty. Recovery of punitive damages for bad faith breach of a noninsurance contract is therefore unlikely in almost all jurisdictions. The qualification is the one that governs this whole part of the chapter: punitive damages can be recovered if the conduct goes beyond bad faith and amounts to an independent tort for which they are recoverable, and fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are the likely candidates.60 A claim that one party fraudulently induced the other to enter the contract is the example, as Formosa Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. Presidio Engineers & Contractors, Inc. held.61
The two bottlers behaved identically when they breached, and the outcomes diverge because only the second supplier located a wrong that exists apart from the promise.
A familiar exam problem tests the same limit. A married couple paid a document-preservation company $7,500 to digitize and protect irreplaceable family photographs and papers, and a flash flood destroyed everything because the company failed to take reasonable precautions. The couple sued for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence, and the facts established breach and ordinary negligence but neither intentional conduct nor gross negligence.62 The tempting argument is that a bad faith exception permits punishment. It fails because that exception has been limited to insurance contracts.63 Negligence is a tort, but mere negligence will not justify punitive damages.64 The couple may stress that the loss was foreseeable, but foreseeability is determined when the contract is made,65 and it bears on how much compensation the couple recovers. It does not turn negligence into punishable misconduct.