Concept
The Mitigation Principle
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
Mitigation of Damages
The Mitigation Principle
An injured party cannot bill the breacher for a loss she could have prevented. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1) says so in one sentence: damages are not recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.1 The rule is one of four limits on contract damages, alongside causation, proof to a reasonable degree of certainty, and foreseeability at the time of contracting.2 Each limit trims the expectation award, which Restatement § 347 measures as the loss in value from the other party's failure to perform, plus any other loss the breach caused, less any cost or other loss the injured party avoided by not having to perform.3
Mitigation takes that formula one step further. Expectation damages already subtract what the injured party saved by not having to perform her own side.4 The mitigation principle subtracts something different: loss she could have avoided through reasonable efforts.5
Courts and commentators call the principle mitigation, minimization of damages, or avoidable consequences. In each version the plaintiff may not recover for those consequences of the breach that she could have avoided by reasonable action.6 A defendant who shows that the plaintiff failed to make reasonable efforts to alleviate the breach's effects may reduce her recovery.7 The names for the components of an award change with context, producing a confusing array of formulae aimed at the same result, so the useful question is always the same: what part of this loss could reasonable effort have avoided?8
The label 'duty to mitigate' is common but misleading. The injured party is simply precluded from recovering for loss she could reasonably have avoided; she incurs no liability to the breacher for failing to avoid it.9 Her failure costs her only what it added to the loss. Suppose the other side repudiates. She may treat the contract as broken and sue for the profit performance would have brought, plus her other losses, and a failure to mitigate trims that claim only to the extent her own conduct increased the damages.10 She still recovers whatever she could not have avoided by good faith or reasonable conduct.11
Two justifications support the rule. The first is causation: the breacher is not the only cause of a loss the plaintiff could have prevented, because the plaintiff's unreasonable failure to prevent it is another legal cause.12 The second is waste: courts want plaintiffs to have an incentive to prevent losses when prevention is reasonable, and the rule serves a public policy against economic waste through excessive damages.13 Self-interest explains why the typical dispute rarely turns on bad faith. A rational plaintiff would rather reduce the harm than aggravate it in the uncertain hope of collecting from the breacher, so deliberate padding of a claim is rare. The usual argument asks whether her response to the breach was a poor judgment that aggravated the loss.14
The rule gives the defendant two credits, and they must be counted separately. The first covers loss the plaintiff actually avoided. The second covers loss she reasonably could have avoided but did not.15 Sorting an award into components lets a court focus on each element one at a time.16 The hazard is that a single loss can fit more than one component, so a careful count must avoid both omission and double recovery.17
A hypothetical shows both credits at work. A defendant's negligence puts a plaintiff's car out of service for four days. She would have earned $100 a day, $400 in all, but she earns only $50. Cabs at $20 a day, $80 in all, would have let her reach work without undue risk and earn the other $350. The defendant receives credit for the $50 she actually earned and for the $350 she reasonably should have earned. Presumably the second credit shrinks by the $80 it would have cost her to earn it, which leaves her an $80 recovery.18
The cost of avoiding a loss is recoverable even though the avoided loss is not. A wrongfully discharged employee who finds a substitute job replaces the lost wages, so the employer gets credit for them. The resumé printing, postage, and cab fare to interviews would not have been incurred but for the wrong, so the employee recovers them. A pedestrian hit by a car likewise may recover the cost of treatment that prevents permanent disability.19 Some call such expenses incidental damages, but the label does not change the result.20
The idea is old. In Virtue v. Bird, decided in 1678, a plaintiff who had contracted to carry goods to Ipswich waited six hours while the defendant delayed naming the place of delivery, and the plaintiff's horses, standing hot in the open air, died. The court denied recovery for that loss because the plaintiff could have taken the horses out of the cart or laid the goods down anywhere in Ipswich.21
A modern lease shows the same logic. A mall tenant abandons a four-year lease after three years, and the next day a prospective tenant offers to take the space on the same terms for the final year. The landlord's starting claim is the rent the lease promised, which is the lost benefit of her bargain.22 If she rejects a suitable replacement, the reasonable-action limit applies, and she likely cannot collect the last year's rent from the departed tenant for a loss she could have avoided.23 If the prospect is objectively unsuitable, an insolvent business for example, no reasonable action would have avoided anything. The refusal then costs the landlord nothing, and the lost benefit stays whole.24
Avoidable-consequences rules apply in contract, tort, and statutory claims, but not to every measure of damages. They generally require the plaintiff to minimize special or consequential damages and seldom affect general or market damages.25 Sales cases show why: a buyer's market damages already assume she could have avoided greater loss by buying substitute goods.26 A buyer who ignores a readily available source of substitutes therefore loses the consequential damages that a prompt purchase would have prevented.27 Tort follows the same logic. An accident victim who unreasonably fails to treat a broken leg, which then turns gangrenous and must be amputated, recovers for the broken leg but not for the amputation.28
The qualifiers in § 350(1) mark where the demand for effort ends: the plaintiff need not run undue risk, shoulder undue burden, or accept humiliation to reduce her loss.29 Subsection (2) protects the plaintiff who tries and fails. She is not precluded from recovery to the extent that her efforts were reasonable but unsuccessful.30 The next section takes up how courts judge reasonableness.