Concept
Burden of Proof
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
Burden of Proof
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1) bars recovery for loss the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation, but its text addresses what comes off an award and not who must show that something should.1 That task falls on the breacher. The plaintiff must prove damages in the first place, while the defendant usually must prove that the plaintiff did minimize, or should have minimized, them.2 The defendant's burden covers two things: the failure to mitigate and the money value of the additional harm that failure caused.3 Procedurally, avoidable consequences is an affirmative defense, so the defendant must plead it and then prove it.4 A defendant who wants a subtraction from a loss the plaintiff has already established must supply the facts that justify the subtraction.
The first showing, unreasonableness, applies the standard developed earlier in this chapter. The question is not whether the plaintiff's response turned out, with hindsight, to be a wrong judgment, or whether a different response would have been preferable. It is whether the plaintiff acted reasonably, judged from the plaintiff's perspective at the time of the breach. The wronged party need not take unduly burdensome or risky action, explore every conceivable possibility of avoiding loss, or try methods that reasonably appear to be futile.6
The second showing supplies the arithmetic. A court can cut an award only by a figure, and the figure must come from proof of what reasonable effort would have saved. A defendant might prove that doing nothing was unreasonable, but if reasonable efforts would not have reduced the loss at all, the plaintiff still recovers the full loss.7 That requirement protects a plaintiff whose efforts would have been futile.
For the same reason, the plaintiff's inactivity settles less than it first seems to. Courts sometimes state the rule too broadly, saying that the plaintiff must make a diligent effort and that recovery must be denied wherever no effort is shown. The narrower view fits the causal logic of the doctrine. It treats diligence, or reasonable effort, as only evidence, because the ultimate issue is whether damages could have been minimized by that effort, and the plaintiff's lack of effort becomes unimportant if effort would not have successfully reduced damages.8 A failure to try therefore helps the defendant on the first showing and does nothing on the second.
The plaintiff's side of the ledger is not empty, because the doctrine also credits what the plaintiff actually saved. The first rule reduces damages by all amounts the plaintiff actually saved by minimizing, or received in obtaining a replacement for the defendant's performance, most commonly a new job after a wrongful discharge. If the plaintiff actually earns income from a new job, the defendant is entitled to credit even if the job is so unsuitable that the plaintiff could not have been expected to take it in order to minimize damages. Work consistent with the original job, such as part-time, at-home work, produces no reduction.9 Some authorities suggest that in certain situations the plaintiff must prove at least the actual earnings she received in substitute employment, or that her failure to seek work made no difference because no jobs were available.10 The second suggestion would move part of the availability question onto the plaintiff. Treatises advise breaking a damage award into components so that each element can be examined, while warning that a loss can fit more than one component and so be omitted or counted twice.11 Keeping what the plaintiff actually saved apart from what the plaintiff could have saved applies that discipline here. The plaintiff's own evidence will usually establish the first, and the defendant must prove the second.
The defendant also controls which fight the court will referee. In the Bloomer Girl dispute, the defendant raised no issue about the reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts to find other work. The sole question was whether her refusal of its substitute offer, a role in a western, could be used in mitigation, and if that offer was of different or inferior employment, there was no further question whether she acted reasonably in refusing it.12 The court found that the western role was both different from and inferior to the Bloomer Girl lead, because it was a poorer vehicle for her talents and the substitute contract eliminated her rights to approve personnel and screenplay. Although the victim of a breach must take reasonable steps to mitigate, she is not required to suffer undue burden or prejudice.13
Discharge cases show the allocation at work. In Maness v. Collins, the plaintiff had sold his manufacturing business to the defendants and agreed to stay on as a management-level employee under a three-year employment agreement. A few months later the new owners terminated him for not fulfilling his job duties, and he sued for breach of the agreement.14 The court analyzed mitigation under the employer's two-part burden: proof that suitable, comparable substitute employment was available, and proof that the employee lacked reasonable diligence in pursuing it. Without proof of comparable work, a court has no basis for computing a reduction.15 Other decisions treat the employer's burden as the ordinary rule. Howard University v. Roberts-Williams treated mitigation as an affirmative defense resting on the employer,16 and Delliponti v. DeAngelis likewise places the burden on the employer.
Taken literally, the defendant's burden has an odd consequence in some wrongful-discharge cases. The employer cannot show what jobs the plaintiff will be likely to have in the future, so it may be unable to prove the amount that could have been minimized. The wrongly discharged plaintiff may then recover lost income for the rest of her life, an essentially speculative sum amounting to a lifetime guaranteed wage without the work.17 The cost of requiring proof of an amount is that a defendant who cannot supply it pays in full.