Concept
When Mitigation Begins
Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
When Mitigation Begins
The duty to avoid loss starts late: it begins only after a breach or a repudiation. A repudiation is a prospective breach, a refusal to perform that comes before performance is due and that the repudiating party may retract until the other side has accepted it or taken substantial action in reliance on it.1 Before either event, the injured party owes no effort to limit loss. It is not required to anticipate a harm; the law demands reasonable conduct only once the injury or breach has occurred.2
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350(1) states the rule in terms that presuppose an injured party: damages are not recoverable for loss “that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.”3 The purposes of the doctrine fit the same starting point. It holds a breaching party or tortfeasor liable only for damages its own conduct caused, not for losses that reasonable care would have avoided. It lets the innocent party take reasonable steps after the wrong, such as seeking substitute employment or buying replacement goods, to secure its justified expectations. And it keeps excessive damages from producing economic waste.4 Each of those goals is served by steps taken in response to a wrong already done.
Precautions Before the Breach
A defendant sometimes argues that the plaintiff should have begun limiting the loss before the wrong occurred. Avoidable consequences does not reach that far. Its duty arises only after a breach of contract or the occurrence of harm from tortious conduct, so one timing rule governs contract and tort alike.5 Avoidance also differs from entitlement. Whether the plaintiff may recover at all for a breach or injury is one question; how much of the resulting loss it should have avoided is another.6
A party who doubts the other side's performance has a better tool than a duty to cut back. It may demand adequate assurance of performance and, if the assurance does not come, treat the contract as repudiated.7 The demand converts suspicion into a repudiation, and the duty to avoid loss begins there.
Waiting After Repudiation
A repudiation puts the aggrieved party to a choice. It may treat the repudiation as a total breach and sue at once, or it may urge retraction and wait. The injured party need not sue immediately, but failure to do so creates the risk of the repudiation being retracted.10 Waiting is possible because a prospective breach can be withdrawn before performance falls due, so long as the aggrieved party has not accepted it or taken substantial action in reliance on it.11 The freedom has a price. A wait that aggravates the loss shifts that loss to the waiting party, and the law must say when a wait has gone on too long.
Hochster v. De La Tour shows the first road. A courier had been engaged under a contract set to begin June 1, and the defendant renounced it, declaring that he would never act under it. The court relied in part on mitigation. Instead of “remaining idle and laying out money in preparations which must be useless,” the courier was “at liberty to seek service under another employer,” and that service would “go in mitigation of the damages to which he would otherwise be entitled.”12 The court was not swayed by the point that the courier's inability to perform the June 1 contract left the defendant no chance to change his mind. A defendant who renounces a contract and absolutely declares that he will never act under it, the court said, cannot be heard to object that his assertion was believed.13
For sales of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code sets the limit by statute. Section 2-610(a) lets the aggrieved party await the repudiating party's performance for a commercially reasonable time, and Comment 1 adds that a party who waits beyond that time cannot recover resulting damages it should have avoided.14 The general common-law rule is that the injured party must act promptly after learning of the repudiation. The UCC provision was apparently written to overcome decisions that let the aggrieved party ignore an anticipatory repudiation until actual nonperformance.15
The Cleaver–Televicious problem shows where the limit falls. Televicious repudiated its contract with Cleaver, and Cleaver chose to await a retraction rather than accept the repudiation. Substitute employment on a safari was open to him, and he did not take it. Had he accepted the repudiation, he would no longer have had to hold himself available to Televicious, and he could have sued at once for his loss on that contract, offset by what he earned in the substitute work. He would have owed Televicious no notice of the new job, because a repudiation cannot be retracted once the repudiated party commits elsewhere in reliance on it.16
The risk lies in the decision to keep waiting. If Cleaver is found to have acted unreasonably in continuing to await a retraction, his recovery from Televicious is reduced to the extent that he should have acted to avoid the loss, that is, by what he could have recouped by resigning himself to the repudiation and going on the safari.17 The crucial question is therefore whether his waiting was reasonable, a matter for the reasonable-efforts standard discussed earlier in this chapter. Televicious carries the burden on it. Televicious must show that the wait was unreasonable and how much of the loss reasonable efforts would have avoided; the second requirement protects a plaintiff whose efforts would have been futile.18 If the wait was reasonable, nothing is subtracted.
The End of the Election Theory
The waiting rules above displaced an older view of the aggrieved party's options, the election theory. Bernstein v. Meech and the election theory behind it have been strongly criticized.20 The weight of authority, the Restatements, and the UCC take a position contrary to the decision. The UCC states specifically that the non-repudiating party may “resort to any remedy for breach . . . even though he has notified the repudiating party that he would await the latter's performance and had urged retraction. . . .”21 Urging retraction, in other words, forfeits no remedy.
The theory's other application matters more for mitigation. May a promisee who faces a repudiation elect to carry on with performance? A number of earlier American cases said yes. The modern cases, which represent the overwhelming weight of authority, hold that the duty to mitigate damages overrides the election, so the promisee may not continue to perform if performance would enhance damages.22 A contractor whose owner repudiates therefore cannot keep building and charge the owner for work that adds to the loss. The rule runs both ways: if the contractor repudiated, the owner must mitigate, for example by securing another contractor.23
The policies behind mitigation explain the override. After a repudiation, preparations “must be useless,” as the court said in Hochster.24 The doctrine aims to hold a breacher liable only for damages its own conduct produced and to avoid the economic waste of excessive damages.25 If election survived, a plaintiff could insist on performance, run up the full cost, and then claim the full price. The plaintiff would fix the size of the liability, and the work would be waste.
Because the rule works by subtraction, the plaintiff loses only the part of the loss that stopping would have prevented. The same rule recurs in construction and manufacturing contracts, treated later in this chapter.