Concept
Meaning and Methods
Rescission
Rescission and Election of Remedies
Meaning and Methods
Rescission unmakes a contract. An action for rescission operates typically as a complete avoidance of the agreement, and the avoidance may be accomplished at law or in equity.1 Because it attacks the bargain itself, courts will not order partial rescission unless the contract is divisible and the parties can fairly be returned to their original positions.2 The remedy matters most where the plaintiff has a choice. A buyer misled into a purchase may be able to choose between rescission and damages, and rescission carries a distinctive consequence: the parties must make restitution of the benefits they exchanged.3
Two neighboring ideas resemble rescission, and they differ in what happens to the contract. Reformation leaves the contract standing and corrects the writing so that it matches the parties’ original understanding. The standard case is a mutual mistake of material fact about the description or quantity of the subject matter, and the court may correct the errors in the integration to conform to the parties’ reasonable expectations.4 Reformation repairs the writing; rescission ends the deal. Termination under the contract’s own terms is different again. A lessor who ends a lease for nonpayment of rent brings future obligations to a close, but the termination is not necessarily a rescission: there is no restitution for past performances, and the landlord may be entitled to damages.5 Rescission, by contrast, calls off the deal. The restitution that follows is a separate step, and it is the restitution that matters remedially.6
Three routes lead to rescission, and each works differently. The parties may agree to cancel their remaining obligations. A party with adequate grounds may instead rescind at law by giving notice of the intent to rescind, offering restitution of the benefits received, and demanding restoration of the benefits conferred. Or a claimant may ask a court of equity for rescission, typically to recover specific or unique property.7 The first route, in which both sides want out, comes next. The other two arise when only one side does. None of the three supplies a reason for rescinding. A party who wants the contract set aside needs legal grounds, and later sections take up those grounds and the restitution that follows.
Mutual Rescission
Parties who make a contract together can unmake it together. Two parties may discharge their respective duties, which means extinguish them, by agreeing to rescind, so long as the agreement does not affect a third party’s vested rights.8 The rescission is itself an agreement, so it can be formed as any agreement can, including by conduct. An insurer that mails a premium refund with a statement that it is rescinding the policy for misrepresentation, and an insured who cashes the check, have created a mutual rescission.9
An agreement to rescind needs consideration like any other, and it has it whenever duties remain executory on both sides. Each party gives up the right to receive the other’s performance and receives release from its own duty to perform.10 Neither hands over anything for nothing, which is the fact the consideration requirement exists to confirm.
The analysis changes when one party has already fully performed, because only the other side still owes anything. A release in that setting runs in one direction, and a “mutual rescission” of that kind raises a consideration issue at common law.11
When both sides have performed in part, the consideration analysis does not change, because each still owes something and trades what remains for release from it. The harder question is what becomes of the work already done. Suppose X agrees to harvest 1,000 acres of wheat for Y at a stated price per acre, and after X has harvested 50 acres the parties rescind by agreement and say nothing about payment. Under the prevailing common law view, there is no presumption or inference that X preserved the right to collect the contract price for the work performed. X may still recover in restitution the reasonable value of the benefits conferred, even though the parties preserved no rights under the rescinded contract.12 For goods, the UCC takes a different course: when the parties mutually terminate a contract, or when either party puts an end to it for the other’s breach, remedies for breach are preserved unless a contrary intention clearly appears.13
Must a mutual rescission be in writing? At common law, ordinarily not. The majority rule is that an executory contract that satisfies the Statute of Frauds may be rescinded orally.15 Under the general common law rule, a rescission need be in writing only if it would produce a transfer of title to land, such as the surrender of a long-term interest in the property, and for leases, real property law determines what suffices to surrender a leasehold.16 State statutes providing that a written contract may be modified only by another writing have usually been held to reach modifications and not rescissions, and at common law a contract may be orally rescinded even though it says it can be modified only in writing.17 That default has led drafters to write clauses that purport to forbid oral rescission.18
In sales of goods, the UCC gives such clauses force. Under § 2-209(2), a signed agreement that excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot otherwise be modified or rescinded. Except as between merchants, however, such a requirement on a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the other party.19 The clause enforces a safeguard the parties chose for themselves, and it keeps casual claims that a deal was called off from displacing a signed contract. A failed oral cancellation is not necessarily without effect, though. Section 2-209(4) can give an attempted modification effect as a waiver, and the question is how far that goes. In Wisconsin Knife Works v. National Metal Crafters, Judge Posner resolved the tension between § 2-209(2) and § 2-209(4) by holding that an attempted modification is effective as a waiver only if there is reliance.20 The reliance requirement keeps the waiver provision from swallowing the signed-writing clause.
A mutual rescission also stops at a third party’s vested rights. The contracting parties may rescind by agreement only so long as those rights are not affected,21 and what has vested in someone else is no longer theirs to cancel.
Unilateral Rescission at Law
A party wronged in the making of a contract does not always need the other side’s agreement, or a court’s order, to escape it. With adequate grounds, the party may rescind unilaterally, alone and against the other side’s will, by declaring the transaction rescinded, offering to return what was received, and demanding back what was given.23 The standard illustration is a buyer who paid $1,000 for goods and then discovered that the seller fraudulently misrepresented their character. The buyer declares the sale rescinded, offers to return the goods, and demands the money back. With those steps the rescission is complete.24 Because the injured party carries out the process without a court, it is called rescission at law, in contrast to the judicial rescission in equity that the next section takes up.
Each step has its own reason. The declaration comes first because it accomplishes the rescission: at law, the rescission takes place when the plaintiff makes a proper offer to restore the defendant and demands rescission, not when a court later says so.25 The offer to restore travels with it because the other side is being asked to give up what it got under the contract, and it would be unfair to insist that it do so without any assurance of getting back what it gave. For that reason, restoration by the plaintiff, or a tender of it that the defendant refuses, is normally required.26 The demand then asks for the performance the rescinding party conferred, which the other side now holds with no contract left to justify holding it. What counts as a sufficient offer to restore belongs to the later discussion of restoration and tender.
What happens next depends on the other side. If the defendant complies, rescission is accomplished by agreement of the parties.27 If the defendant refuses, the rescission still stands, because the plaintiff’s own steps accomplished it, and only restitution is in dispute. The plaintiff must sue to recover the money, but equity need not intervene: the plaintiff may sue at law for the price paid, which ought to be returned now that the contract is rescinded.28 In the older vocabulary, that suit was in assumpsit, based on quasi-contract, and a plaintiff seeking particular goods back could proceed by replevin.29
The court’s part in this route is narrow. The plaintiff effects the rescission, and the court enters an ordinary judgment for restitution if the plaintiff was right in thinking that grounds for rescinding existed.30 The defendant’s refusal to hand back the money therefore disputes only the restitution. It does not undo the rescission.
That narrow role puts the weight on the grounds. Self-help rescission works only for a party who has a mistake, a misrepresentation, or some other recognized defect to rely on.31
Nothing else screens a unilateral declaration. The rescinding party acts alone, and the other side has no chance to object before the contract is declared over. The protections against an unfounded exit are the requirement of adequate grounds and the offer to restore, which assures the other side of getting back what it gave.
A declaration of rescission is also a choice among remedies. An injured party who could either rescind or keep the contract and sue for damages has picked one by rescinding.32 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378 addresses whether that choice binds. A party’s manifestation of a choice among remedies, by bringing suit or otherwise, does not bar another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on the manifestation.33 Rescission is inconsistent with enforcing the contract, so reliance decides whether a declarant may change course. A seller who has done nothing since receiving the declaration has lost nothing by it. A seller who has resold the goods the buyer returned has changed position, and the buyer cannot now reverse course. The later discussion of election of remedies develops this rule in full.
Rescission in Equity
Rescission at law cannot do everything. When effective restitution requires the cancellation or amendment of a document, the rescission is normally effected in equity.36 The two methods differ in who accomplishes the unmaking. At law, the rescission takes place when the plaintiff makes a proper offer to restore and demands rescission, and the court later enters an ordinary judgment for restitution. In equity, the rescission does not take place until the court declares it.37
A negotiable note shows why a document can matter. Suppose a buyer paid with a note and then rescinds for the seller’s fraud. If the seller negotiates the note to a holder in due course, a good-faith purchaser for value, the buyer may be unable to resist payment even though the sale is rescinded. A money judgment against the seller does nothing to stop the paper from circulating, whereas a court of equity can order the document cancelled. That is why rescission that requires cancelling a document is the province of equity.38
Equity is also the usual route when the plaintiff wants specific or unique property back and money will not do. A seller defrauded into parting with land is the paradigm. A court that grants equitable rescission may convey the property through a restitutionary remedy such as a constructive trust.39 Avoiding the deal and choosing the form of restitution are separate steps. Rescission calls off the transaction, and the court then selects how the benefits come back, whether by a money award, a return of goods or land in kind, or a constructive trust.40
The procedural history explains one remaining difference. At law, a party had to show that she had tendered any money or property received before bringing the action, while in equity tender was unnecessary. With the merger of law and equity in the nineteenth century, the difference between legal and equitable rescission has become relatively unimportant, but it still matters in some situations.42 A party who complies with the requirements of legal rescission, including tender, is entitled to avoid the contract. A court, however, may refuse equitable rescission if it concludes that fairness does not warrant undoing the transaction.43 Because the court itself declares the rescission in equity, its decision turns on whether justice favors unwinding the deal.
Filing the equity suit is also a manifestation of choice among remedies. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378 treats it like any other: the choice bars another remedy only if the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on it.44 The plaintiff’s choice therefore stays open to revision until inconsistency and reliance both appear, a rule the later discussion of election of remedies develops in full.