Concept
Restitution After Rescission
Rescission
Restitution After Rescission
Rescission decides whether a deal comes apart; restitution decides what each side must hand back when it does. The second question carries the money, because the rescission is not the restitution that follows, and it is the restitution that is remedially important.1 A buyer who rescinds a sale is left holding goods while the seller holds the price, and a bare declaration that the contract is gone moves neither of them. Restitution moves them.
Three questions organize what follows. How do the performances travel back to the parties? What must the rescinding party restore, or offer to restore, before it can claim what it gave? And how is recovery measured when a benefit, such as a year’s use of land, cannot be handed back? Whether a party with good grounds can still lose the remedy is a separate inquiry, taken up in the next section.
Returning Performances
Restitution after rescission usually takes the form of a money judgment, but the form is open. A court that grants rescission could as easily order the specific return of goods or land, and the same result can be reached through a constructive trust.2 Whatever the form, the target is the same: rescission for fraud, for example, aims to restore both parties to their pre-contract position.3 A land sale shows what that restoration demands of each side.
The refund is the half that students see; the rental payment is the half they miss. Renner v. Kehl, taken up under Measure of Recovery below, supplies the rule. The Arizona Supreme Court required the rescinding party to return, or offer to return, the interest in property it received, and it added reimbursement for the fair market value of the use of that property.4 Two months of occupancy cannot be handed back like a key, so K returns their worth in money. As the Arizona court states the rule, it looks to what the rescinding party received. On that reasoning, L’s breach explains why K may rescind but does not make the occupancy free. Without the payment, K would leave the failed deal with two months of rent-free housing that the contract never promised.
Delivery of a deed narrows the remedy. Once a land sale contract is executed by delivery of a deed, its provisions merge into the deed, and the vendor’s liability, if any, rests on the deed covenants and not on the original contract.5 A breach of those covenants alone is not usually remedied by avoiding the transaction and giving restitution, and the purchaser is limited to damages.6 Fraud by the vendor is the exception, because it may justify rescission (or a constructive trust) with a restoration of both parties.7 The rule is hard on purchasers, since damages for breach of a deed covenant are hardly adequate, and it may reflect a strong policy favoring security of transactions once a deed has been delivered.8
Rescission is not the only road open to a buyer wronged in a land deal. Specific performance orders the breaching seller to perform, and it is usually the best remedy for breach of a land sale contract because it gives the non-breaching party exactly what she bargained for.9 Restitution gives less: a return to the starting line. Because the two roads lead in opposite directions, a party that has taken one may find the other closed, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 378 states when. A party with more than one remedy who manifests a choice of one, by bringing suit or otherwise, is not barred from another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance on the manifestation.10 Both conditions must be present. Rescission is inconsistent with an effort to enforce the contract,11 so for a party who has rescinded, reliance decides the question. The manifestation need not be a lawsuit, and a letter declaring rescission can serve as one, but it bars nothing unless the other side relies on it.
The Election of Remedies section develops this rule more fully.
Restoration and Tender
Restitution runs in both directions, so a party who rescinds must usually restore what it received, or offer to, before it collects what it gave. Restoration is the actual return; a tender is an offer of that return, which the other side may accept or refuse. Where the claim is “at law,” restoration, or a tender followed by the defendant’s refusal, is normally required, simply because it would be unfair to insist that the defendant give up what it got without any assurance of getting back what it gave.15
How strictly the requirement applies has depended on the court. In the “at law” procedure, the plaintiff effects the rescission, and the court, which does not effect it, enters an ordinary judgment for restitution by way of replevin or what used to be called assumpsit.16 At common law the plaintiff had to tender back all tangible benefits received under the contract as a condition of starting the action. Equity was more flexible: actual tender was not always required, because a court of equity could condition its decree on the plaintiff’s making restitution or could offset the value of the benefits the plaintiff kept.17
The divide between law and equity is eroding. A good number of jurisdictions have adopted the equity rule at law, and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment goes furthest by eliminating the earlier requirement that the claimant tender restitution as a precondition of rescission.18 Old habits persist, however, and some jurisdictions keep the historical prerequisites by common law or by statute.19 Three positions therefore coexist, and an answer should say which one the jurisdiction follows:
- The traditional law rule demands that the plaintiff restore what was received, or tender it and meet a refusal, before suing.
- Restatement (Second) § 384 asks only for an offer to restore, not an actual tender, and softens even that through a number of exceptions.
- The equity rule, adopted at law by many jurisdictions and carried furthest by the Restatement (Third), makes tender no precondition and lets the court condition its decree or offset the value of what the plaintiff kept.
Where an offer or tender is still required, its quality matters, because the defendant can rely only on an offer it could actually accept.
Each quality answers a doubt the defendant would otherwise have.20 The defendant must know that a real offer is on the table before deciding whether to accept it, which is why an unequivocal offer and an overt act count for more than words. An offer that the plaintiff cannot carry out, or makes in bad faith, assures the defendant of nothing. A plaintiff who sells the goods after making the offer has withdrawn the one thing that made it worth accepting, which is why the tender must be kept good. The conditional offer fits the rule’s purpose, because the point is mutual security: a plaintiff forced to hand over the goods before seeing the money would face the very unfairness the rule is meant to spare the defendant.
The first buyer holds both the van and a claim to the price, which is the lopsidedness the rule prevents. Under the equity rule, the missing offer would not by itself keep the first buyer out of court. The court would still have to account for the van, either by conditioning its decree on restoration or by offsetting the value of what the buyer kept.21
Measure of Recovery
Renner v. Kehl shows how a court computes restitution when the rescinding party has both occupied and improved the land. The buyers had contracted to buy land, paid a down payment, taken possession, and spent $229,649.84 developing the property. The rescission rested on mutual mistake, and the Arizona Supreme Court held that the buyers were entitled to rescind but not to recover their development costs as consequential damages, which are expenses a plaintiff incurs in reliance on the contract.23 The court’s rule was that, absent proof of breach for fraud or misrepresentation, a party who rescinds may not recover consequential damages.24 Its reason was that mutual mistake implies freedom from fault on both sides, and awarding the development spending would shift the entire risk of the mistake onto the sellers, which is incompatible with equitable rescission.25
What the buyers did recover came from restitution, which the court built in three moves.
Each move guards against a different way one side could end up ahead.26 The first undoes the exchange itself: the sellers hold the down payment under a contract that has been unmade, so the land and the money change places in a conditional swap, the same kind of mutual security the tender rules protect. The second charges the buyers for a use they enjoyed and cannot hand back. The third credits them for what their work added to the sellers’ land. That credit follows the increase in value, not the buyers’ outlay, and the two figures can differ, since a dollar spent on development may add less than a dollar of value. The buyers therefore recover their down payment, plus the amount their efforts increased the value of the property, minus the fair rental value of the land during their occupancy. The usual exam errors are to substitute the amount spent for the enhancement and to forget the rental charge.
Renner’s qualification, “absent proof of breach for fraud or misrepresentation,” marks where the measure changes.27 A contract induced by fraud is voidable, not void, so its victim may elect either to rescind it or to keep it in force. A victim who keeps the contract is entitled to damages for the difference between the actual value of the performance and the value it would have had as represented.28 A victim who rescinds may have the restoration supplemented by incidental damages, which make up for value that cannot be fully returned or reflect costs incurred in reliance on the transaction, and some jurisdictions allow punitive damages in an appropriate case.29 The law also limits what the party who committed the fraud can claim in return: doubts about the value of that party’s performance are resolved against it, and the victim need not return property, or its value, to the extent the property was worthless when received or deteriorated because of its own defects.30
The contrast follows Renner’s own reasoning. The court refused reliance expenses on the ground that a no-fault mistake should not shift its whole risk onto the sellers, and that rationale does not reach a seller who committed fraud or misrepresentation, a case the holding by its terms excludes.31
Remedies cannot always be stacked. Rescission is obviously inconsistent with a claim for expectation damages, which seeks to enforce the contract, and rescission for fraud is often held inconsistent with a claim for tort damages as well. Claims for breach of contract and for tort damages are not inconsistent with one another, and usually may be advanced together at trial without an election, so long as the plaintiff can recover under one theory or the other, but not both.32 Whether an inconsistent choice bars the other remedy is Restatement (Second) § 378’s question: a manifestation of choice, by suit or otherwise, is no bar unless the remedies are inconsistent and the other party materially changes position in reliance.33 A defrauded buyer who sues to rescind and later prefers expectation damages is therefore not barred merely by having sued; the bar requires the seller’s material change of position as well.