Concept
Contents or Effect Errors
Reformation
Contents or Effect Errors
A writing can misrecord an agreement in two ways, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 155 names both. A court may reform a writing that “fails to express the agreement because of a mistake of both parties as to the contents or effect of the writing,” except to the extent that reformation would unfairly affect the rights of third parties such as good faith purchasers for value.1 Once a prior agreement and an intent to record it are established, the court asks whether the writing departs from that agreement. A departure is a variance, and it takes one of two forms. In a contents error, the writing states something different from what the parties agreed. In an effect error, the writing states what they expected, but it operates to produce a legal result they did not agree to.
Both forms are mistakes in expression. One or both parties erroneously believe that the contract embodies the agreement both intended it to express, and the court may adjust the writing so that it states the true agreement.2 Because the error lies in the record and not in the bargain, reformation corrects the writing and leaves the contract alone. A Michigan court that reformed a land contract so that it covered a half undivided interest instead of the entire interest observed that the decree in no way altered the contract; it corrected the writing so that it expressed what the parties actually agreed to.3
The comparison that decides both kinds of claim is the same: the court sets the writing beside the agreement that preceded it. If the two match, no variance exists, however much one party afterward wishes the document said something else. A party who dislikes a term the parties actually chose is asking the court to rewrite the deal, and reformation corrects errors in expression without rewriting bargains.4 The first subsection takes contents errors, and the second takes errors in legal effect.
Errors in Contents
A contents error is the familiar kind: the writing contains a term different from the one the parties settled on. The court fixes the agreed term, reads the written term, and asks whether the two diverge because both sides assumed the document recorded their deal. The divergence can take almost any form. Typical examples include an incorrect description of the subject matter (street numbers, survey numbers, boundary lines), a computational error, the name of a stranger to the transaction, and language copied from a similar earlier document and carried into one where it does not belong.5 A seller who agreed to a price of $127 but, through an arithmetical error, wrote $37 can ask the court to reform the writing to state the true price, since contract law enforces the contract the parties intended to make and not the one produced by a failure to record the terms correctly.6
These claims are rare, and as a practical matter they arise when a third party prepares the writing, as when a surveyor errs in the technical description of land that was sold.7 The parties negotiate the substance, rely on the drafter to state it, and sign without checking each word against the deal.
Sikora v. Vanderploeg shows the doctrine at work. The buyer of a business sued the seller, claiming that the contract misstated the presale earnings. Both parties, however, had intended the agreement to reflect the earnings in the report, and both had overlooked the error in the agreement. The court found a mutual mistake in expression and reformed the agreement, which defeated the buyer's claim that it falsely recited the presale earnings.8 Enforcing the writing as drafted would have given the buyer a claim that neither party had bargained for.
Silsbe v. Houston Levee Industrial Park, LLC reached the opposite result on facts that look similar at first. The option holder asked for reformation on the ground that the parties had mistakenly selected a public holiday as the deadline for exercising the option. The court refused. The parties may not have realized that the deadline fell on a holiday, but it was the date they intended, so the option correctly reflected their intent, and reformation would have changed the contract rather than corrected an error in expression.9 The decisions turn on one question: whether the term in the writing is the term the parties chose. In Sikora the writing departed from the parties' choice. In Silsbe it recorded their choice, and the parties overlooked only how that choice would play out on the calendar. Surprise at the consequence of a chosen term is not a transcription error.
Proof of a variance carries a heavy burden. Because the law strongly favors the validity of written instruments, a party seeking reformation must do more than prove mistake by a preponderance of the evidence; the evidence must be clear and convincing.10 Land-description cases show the standard cutting both ways. In United Bank v. Ashland Development Corp., an Arizona court reformed deeds whose property-line descriptions resulted from mutual mistake, while in R & B Farms, Inc. v. Cedar Valley Acres, Inc., a Nebraska court denied reformation because the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that the description in the agreement resulted from mutual mistake.11 The standard separates slips from regret. A genuine slip usually leaves traces, such as an earlier draft, a surveyor's notes, or a report that contradicts the clause, while regret leaves only the claimant's testimony about a different deal.
On an exam problem that presents an unwelcome term, work in order. Ask what term the parties had agreed on before the writing was prepared. Ask whether the writing departs from that term. Then ask whether the facts show, by clear and convincing evidence, that both parties overlooked the departure. A writing that states the term the parties chose contains no variance, however harshly it operates.
Errors in Legal Effect
An effect error leaves the words intact. The writing says what the parties expected it to say, but when the law gives those words operation, they produce a legal result different from the one the parties agreed on: the agreement called for one result, and the instrument, if enforced, yields another.13 The court therefore compares two legal results, the agreed one and the one the instrument would produce, and reforms the writing when they diverge. No word-by-word comparison would find this variance, which is why section 155 names “effect” separately from “contents.”14
Parties who agree on a result commonly leave the choice of words to a lawyer, a form, or a title company. If the drafter picks the wrong label, enforcing the instrument imposes an outcome neither party chose. The rule accordingly asks whether the parties agreed on a legal result, not whether either could have named it.
A Michigan decision states the rule. Where a written instrument fails to express the parties' intention because of a mutual mistake as to the interpretation or legal effect of its words, reformation is allowed “though there is no misapprehension as to what words have been used,” and the claimant need not show “that particular words were misunderstood.”15 The court's illustration makes the point concrete. A agrees to sell, and B agrees to buy, a half interest in Blackacre, which A owns in fee. The parties agree that the incidents of a tenancy in common will follow, although they do not know the legal terminology. A executes a conveyance by which B becomes a joint tenant, and A is entitled to reformation of the deed to correspond to the agreement.16
The two forms of co-ownership carry different incidents, the most familiar being what happens when an owner dies: a joint tenant's share passes to the surviving co-owners, while a tenant in common's share passes to that owner's own successors. Neither party in the illustration used either term, so neither misunderstood a word, and a rule that demanded a misunderstood word would shut out the people who most need the remedy. They had a result in mind, and the deed missed it. The decision itself came on the sufficiency of the complaint, before any trial on the merits, so its weight lies in the rule and the illustration.17
One reported decision shows how far courts carry the idea. A woman who owned property as trustee signed a contract for its sale in her individual capacity, and because she and the buyer shared the mistaken belief that she owned it individually, the court granted reformation.18 The hornbook account of the decision warns that it pushes the boundaries of the remedy. The shared error concerned the capacity in which she held title, which resembles a mistaken belief about a fact more than a mistake about what the words accomplished, and a student who meets facts like these should expect courts to press the effect half of section 155 hardest at this edge.
Parties often dispute what the writing means, and the posture of the case reflects that dispute. A plaintiff may plead in the alternative: either the plaintiff's reading is correct and properly restates the prior agreement, or, if it is not, the writing should be reformed. Modern practice generally permits such pleading. Parol evidence comes in freely on the reformation count, but it must also satisfy the rules that govern parol evidence offered to interpret a writing.19 A later section takes up the parol evidence rule.
Reformation corrects an error; it does not add a term the parties never agreed to include, so a writing that yields the agreed result contains no variance.20
Section 155 reaches only mistakes about what a writing says or does.21 A shared false belief about the circumstances behind the deal lies outside it and belongs to the rescission analysis discussed earlier.