Concept
Practical Limits on Relief
Specific performance and injunction
Practical Limits on Relief
A claimant who proves that damages are inadequate has cleared only the first gate. Equity's remedies were historically “extraordinary,” and the adequacy test grew out of the jurisdictional struggle between the chancellor and the common-law courts.1 Other gates remain. Under the traditional views, specific relief is denied when the legal remedy is adequate, when hardship to the defendant outweighs the plaintiff's legitimate interest, when the equities favor the defendant, and when specific performance is impractical because it would require too much judicial supervision or for other reasons.2 This unit takes up that last gate. Even where damages fall short, can the court frame an order that the defendant can understand and that the court can realistically police?
The question arises from the way equity enforces its orders. A decree is a personal command to the defendant, and a defendant who disobeys can be punished for contempt, with imprisonment as the extreme sanction and fines and sequestration of goods as supplements.3 Equity's characteristic orders either require the defendant to act or forbid a course of conduct.4 A more rational basis for the reluctance to grant specific relief than its history, one commentator suggests, is the severity of those contempt sanctions, and the current trend clearly favors extending specific relief.5 An order that leaves the defendant guessing what it requires, or that no one can check for compliance, invites contempt charges that cannot be resolved fairly.
Three practical limits follow, and they differ in force. The supervision burden is weighed against the claimant's need for a decree. Definiteness asks whether the contract supports a clear order at all. The rule against compelling personal service comes close to a categorical refusal. All three operate within the discretion that Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357(1) gives courts over specific performance, subject to the rules in §§ 359 to 369.6
Supervision Burdens
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 366 states the supervision limit as a proportion: a promise will not be specifically enforced if the character and magnitude of the performance would impose on the court burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate to the advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from its denial.7 The rule describes a scale with two pans. On one side sits the work the decree would create for the court. On the other sit the claimant's gain from performance and the harm the claimant would suffer if the court refused. The court withholds a decree only when the first pan is disproportionately heavy.
Supervision burdens grow with the complexity of the performance. A sale of land is the easy case: each parcel is considered unique, so a vendor's default leaves the purchaser unable to find a substitute, and a decree ordinarily issues.8 Specific performance is almost routinely available to enforce land purchases, and little remains for the court to watch once the conveyance is made.9 Other performances are complex enough to need judicial monitoring, because a reluctant breacher may give a grudging performance that falls below the contract's reasonable standards. That need does not by itself defeat relief, however, for a court will not refuse specific performance just because it requires supervision.10 The concern sharpens when a decree would order complex operations over a long period, such as requiring a contractor to build a building or a railroad to install a station and provide service. Courts traditionally anticipated that new disputes would arise constantly and sap judicial resources, and perhaps feared that constant supervision would turn them into administrators.11
Grossman v. Wegman's Food Markets, Inc. shows the burden at its heaviest. The plaintiff sought an injunction requiring the defendant to occupy leased premises and operate them as a retail grocery store. The court refused, noting the potential for additional disputes and observing that “courts of equity are reluctant to grant specific performance in situations where such performance would require judicial supervision over a long period of time.”12
Denying the positive order does not necessarily leave the plaintiff without help. A court that will not order the Grossman defendant to keep the store open might still prohibit it from opening a competing store nearby.13 The substitute works because the two orders ask the court to watch different things. An order to operate demands continuing judgment about the quality of the defendant's effort. An order to refrain turns on a fact the court can check at a glance, namely whether the forbidden store has opened. A later section on injunctions against breach develops when courts enforce duties of forbearance directly.
Building contracts show how the scale shifts. Courts have been reluctant to order specific performance where difficulties of supervision or enforcement are foreseen, as when a builder is asked to repair a house.14 The reluctance once carried a load of snobbery, expressed in distaste for menial tasks, and today courts more often justify it as a way to avoid conflict and unfairness where no clear standards can be framed in advance.15 That justification points to its own limit: when the parties' documents supply the standards, the objection loses force.16
City Stores Co. v. Ammerman illustrates the limit. A department store sued the developers of a shopping center over their promise to build it a store and lease it space, and the court ordered performance, reasoning that construction contracts should be specifically enforced unless the difficulties of supervision outweigh the importance of performance to the plaintiff. Two features tipped the balance. The building was to rise on land the defendants controlled, so the plaintiff could not hire another builder, and the leases the developers had given other anchor tenants set standards for construction and design in enough detail that approving the plaintiff's store was a fairly simple matter. For disagreements that remained, the court said it would appoint a special master, an officer who answers to the court, unless the parties preferred arbitration. Other courts have followed similar reasoning. Franklin Point, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank held that a trial court erred in treating specific performance of a construction contract as barred as a matter of law, because an architectural review board named in the agreement might keep the court out of ongoing construction disputes. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc. v. State of California Employees' Retirement System went the other way and denied a tenant specific performance of a lease because the court would have to supervise future performance.
The other pan of the scale holds the claimant's need, and the adequacy cases show what raises it. In the Kaiser cryolite dispute, the buyer could have covered, though only at cost and with difficulty, yet the court treated difficulty in covering as enough to find “other proper circumstances” warranting specific performance under UCC § 2-716(1).17 In Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep, a cotton buyer won a declaration that it was entitled to specific performance of its contracts with farmers, and the farmers were enjoined from violating them, because the cotton was “unique and irreplaceable because of the scarcity of cotton.”18
Strong need can justify very heavy supervision. Courts have issued structural injunctions that regulate prison conditions and desegregate public schools, and some of these decrees have lasted for years. In Jefferson County, Kentucky, the courts supervised school desegregation for twenty-five years, dissolving school district lines and imposing mandatory busing, and in Kansas City, Missouri, the court in Missouri v. Jenkins imposed a magnet school and capital improvements program costing hundreds of millions of dollars.19 These decrees, which Professor Owen Fiss called structural injunctions, restructure public institutions to bring them into conformity with constitutional demands, and where defendants are recalcitrant and the alternatives ineffective, the demand on judicial resources is worth the cost.20 The fear of long supervision is probably overdone, and it states no rule of law, only a guide to the chancellor's discretion. The stronger the need for coercive relief, the more willing the chancellor is to grant it, and some cases order performance of contracts that call for continuing work and relationships.21
Answers most often stop short at step four. A conclusion that a decree would require supervision fills only one pan of the scale, and the analysis is complete only when that burden is set against the claimant's need, as the court did in City Stores.
Definiteness of Terms
A decree must tell the defendant what to do, so the contract must be clear enough to supply the words. The contract's terms must be clear, definite, and certain for a court to issue a specific performance order, and that is a higher level of certainty than the law requires to find that a contract exists and to award damages at law.24 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 362 states the same condition: the terms must be sufficiently certain to provide a basis for an appropriate order.25
Two reasons support the higher bar. The first is notice. A court will not make a vague order, because its command must tell the breacher clearly what it must do to obey and to avoid contempt sanctions.26 Certainty also aids the court in framing the decree and ensures that the enjoined party understands the nature of the obligations expected.27 The second reason is fidelity to the bargain. Courts are reluctant to invent contract terms for the parties, and a decree built on invented terms would enforce a deal the parties never made.28
Because the two levels of certainty differ, a contract can clear the first and fail the second. Even when uncertainty is not severe enough to defeat the claim that a contract was made, it may leave the contract too unclear to support an order of specific performance.29 In practice the gap may be narrower than the doctrine suggests. If a contract is not certain enough to order performance, it probably is not certain enough to permit a good calculation of damages either, so the certainty rule may apply to damages claims as well and operate as a substantive rule more than a remedial one.30
Open terms do not end the inquiry. If significant terms are vague or ambiguous and cannot reasonably be interpreted through extrinsic evidence, the court will decline equitable relief, but terms that extrinsic evidence can resolve do not defeat a decree.31 Suppose a restaurant repudiates a pianist's contract to play nightly, and the contract does not state the fee. A court can fix the fee by reference to the market and can resolve any gaps in working conditions by customary or reasonable standards. The definiteness principle asks whether the order specifies the restaurant's duties precisely enough that it knows what it must do to avoid contempt, and with the fee fixed and the conditions detailed, the court can frame a clear order.32
The limit appears when the open terms are the substance of the deal. In Honolulu Waterfront Ltd. Partnership v. Aloha Tower Development Corp., a four-page letter agreement for a real estate development was held to be a binding agreement, yet it left so many material matters to future agreement, with virtually every provision contemplating further negotiation, that it could not be specifically enforced. A missing fee that market rates can supply is a gap a court can close. A deal in which every provision awaits negotiation would require the court to do the negotiating.
Filling a gap is also limited by the method the parties chose. In Porter v. Williamson, a shareholder repurchase agreement set out a process for valuing the shares, and the trial court ordered specific performance but valued the shares by a different method. The appellate court reversed the award because the valuation method was inconsistent with the process set forth in the agreement.33 A decree that improves on the contract has stopped enforcing it.
Step two does the real work, because the usual route to a decree runs through an outside standard that makes an apparent gap disappear. Students most often stop at formation. A contract can be definite enough to support damages and still too vague to support a decree, so a complete answer addresses the decree-level question separately.
Personal Service Contracts
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 367(1) states this limit without qualification: a promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced.36 Section 366 asks the court to weigh burden against need, while § 367(1) strikes no balance. The traditional rule in equity is that courts will not order specific performance of contracts for personal services, such as contracts with professional athletes or artistic performers, and three policy considerations support it: an adequate remedy at law exists unless the services are unique, such orders are difficult to supervise and enforce, and the Constitution prohibits involuntary servitude.37 Only the last two reasons survive a showing that the services are unique, which is why the rule reaches athletes and artists. The hypothetical below shows how the rule behaves when the claimant has no substitute.
The school's showing satisfies the adequacy inquiry taught earlier in this chapter, but the court still refuses, because the strong policy against forcing an individual to work against his will outweighs the school's interest in performance.38 An answer that reasons from no substitute, to inadequate damages, to a decree has skipped the limit, which operates after adequacy and overrides it.
The first reason is the command itself. A decree is a personal command enforced by contempt, which can reach imprisonment.39 Applied to labor, that leaves the court with confinement as its lever for extracting the work, and courts therefore equate compelled personal service with involuntary servitude, which the Constitution prohibits.40 A star football player who refuses to play for the team holding his contract has announced his unwillingness, and an order sending him onto the field would extract labor from someone who has said he will not give it.
The second reason is the difficulty of policing the order. A decree enforced by contempt must be specific enough that the defendant knows what obedience requires, and that is hard to achieve for a task whose quality turns on skill and effort.41 If the football player is ordered back and plays badly, the court must decide whether it was an off day or contempt. The parties are already in conflict, and parties ordered to keep dealing with each other tend to produce further disputes.42 In De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, a New York chancellor refusing a decree against an opera singer remarked that no officer of his court had the command of Italian or the trained ear to appreciate the performance. A court that cannot tell a good performance from a poor one cannot say whether its order has been obeyed. This is the supervision burden of § 366 at its most acute, and it explains why a building contract with written standards may be enforced while a promise to sing or teach is not.
The third reason concerns what a decree would deliver. A court can compel attendance but not effort. A performer working under threat of jail is likely to perform grudgingly and to require careful court supervision, and courts are disinclined to force someone to work in a hostile environment.43 The promisee would receive a performance worth less than the bargain and would pay for it with continuing litigation over its quality, while damages deliver value without either cost.
The limit protects the person who would have to labor, so its force changes when the roles reverse.
When an employee sues an employer for specific performance, the policy against forcing an individual to work against his will is not implicated, and orders of reinstatement are common.44 Supervision may also be manageable, because the court can leave the employee to report any violation and then hold a show-cause hearing on contempt.45 Yet employers are rarely required to accept personal services tendered under a contract unless a statute, such as a fair employment act, or a collective bargaining agreement requires it.46 In Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State University, a tenured professor could not obtain reinstatement on a breach of contract claim because equity does not specifically enforce personal service contracts. The servitude reason therefore belongs to the service provider alone, while supervision and friction can still trouble an order against the employer.
Refusing to compel performance leaves the promisee's other remedies in place. Damages for the breach remain available, and a court that will not make the performer work may forbid the performer from working for a rival. In Lumley v. Wagner, the Lord Chancellor conceded that the court could not compel an opera singer to sing for the plaintiff's theater but enjoined her from performing for the competing theater, reasoning that she had no cause for complaint if the court compelled her to abstain from an act she had bound herself not to do.47 A negative order avoids the servitude and supervision concerns because it asks the performer to refrain, and the court need only check whether the forbidden performance occurs. Injunctive relief of this kind may be available against employees whose services are not easily replaceable, such as athletes, artists, or media personalities, particularly when the employee plans to work for a competing enterprise, while courts will likely deny it if the services are not unique.48 Section 367(2) adds its own limit: an injunction will not issue where its probable result would be to compel an undesirable continuance of personal relations or to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.49 A later section on injunctions against breach teaches how those limits operate, and the rule taught here concerns only the order to perform.
Step two does the real work, because one contract can produce different answers depending on which party asks for the decree. Answers most often go wrong at step three, since the uniqueness of a performer, which makes damages inadequate, supports a negative injunction and does not move a court to compel the performance.