Concept
Injunctions Against Breach
Specific performance and injunction
Injunctions Against Breach
An injunction orders the breacher either to perform a specified act (a mandatory injunction) or to refrain from one (a prohibitory injunction), and an order of specific performance is really just a form of injunction.1 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357(2) says when a court may issue one. Subject to the rules in §§ 359 to 369, the court may, in its discretion, enjoin a party who has committed or is threatening to commit a breach of a contract duty in either of two situations: the duty is one of forbearance, or the duty is one to act and specific performance would be denied only for reasons that are inapplicable to an injunction.2
The rule’s opening qualification, “subject to the rules stated in §§ 359-69,” keeps every earlier screen in place. Because specific performance is a form of injunction, the two remedies share their standards. A court will not compel or enjoin the breacher’s conduct unless the claimant shows that damages are inadequate and that its need to protect its contract rights outweighs any hardship to the breacher, any problems of supervising the order, and any harm to innocent third parties or the public interest.3 The Restatement states the adequacy rule for both remedies in one sentence: specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest.4 A claimant who asks for an injunction therefore clears the same screens as one who asks for a decree, and § 357(2) adds one more question: whether an injunction is a fitting form of relief for the particular duty that was broken.
Beyond those rules, the decision is a weighing. Courts deny most injunctions only because the costs, including intangible costs, are thought to outweigh the benefits, and they make that judgment case by case, although a few classes of cases regularly tend toward a negative assessment.5 Specific performance, likewise, is not the norm; courts reserve it for unusual cases in which damages cannot adequately compensate the breach victim.6
The direction of the command still matters, because it changes what the court must do after the order issues. An order to act has to be watched while the performance unfolds, and § 366 withholds specific enforcement when the burdens of enforcement or supervision would be disproportionate to the advantages of enforcing and the harm of denying.7 An order to refrain asks only whether the forbidden act has occurred. In Walgreen’s suit against its landlord, Sara Creek, which had promised not to let space to a competing pharmacy, the court of appeals affirmed an injunction against the letting, noting among other things that it was a simple prohibition that required no court supervision.8 That difference explains why a court that declines to compel a performance may still forbid conduct.
The three subsections that follow track the rule. Duties of forbearance come first, because a promise to refrain is enforced by an order that simply forbids the act. Duties to act come next, where the question is which reasons for refusing a decree also bar an injunction. The last subsection addresses personal service, where a court will not compel the work but may restrain the promisor from working for a rival.
Duties of Forbearance
Restatement § 357(2)(a) names the first situation: the duty that has been or is about to be broken is one of forbearance.11 A duty of forbearance is a promise to refrain from acting, such as a promise not to compete, a landlord’s promise not to let space to a rival, or a seller’s promise not to sell to anyone else. An injunction suits these promises because the decree repeats the promise. The court tells the promisor to abstain from what the promisor agreed not to do, so the order adds no term the parties did not choose, and enforcing it asks only whether the forbidden act has occurred. Walgreen’s injunction had both features. It was a prohibitory form of specific performance, an order that held the landlord to its promise, and it required no court supervision.12
The forbearance label settles the form of relief and leaves every other requirement in place. The claimant must still show that damages would not adequately protect the expectation interest,13 and that its need for relief outweighs the hardship to the breacher, the supervision problems, and the harm to third parties or the public.14 The court of appeals in Walgreen began from the premise that damages are the norm in contract cases and usually the most efficient remedy.15 Adequacy then turns on how well money can measure the loss. What matters is “the volume, refinement, and reliability of the available information about substitutes for the subject matter of the breached contract,” and when that information is thin and unreliable, the risk of error in a damages award is substantial.16
Walgreen met that standard. The lease ran for many years, and Walgreen would have had great difficulty proving its lost profits and goodwill over that term. The injunction would harm neither Sara Creek nor the competing pharmacy unduly, and the court of appeals affirmed it.17 Scarcity can produce the same result. In Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep, a federal district court enjoined farmers from violating their contracts to sell cotton to a buyer, finding the cotton unique and irreplaceable because cotton was scarce.18 The reverse also holds: where money gives the claimant everything performance would have given, equity has nothing to add. In one land-sale dispute the court awarded the buyers $1,000, the profit they would have made by buying at $21,000 and reselling at $22,000, because that sum gave them all the relief a deed would have given.19
The Walgreen order also left room to bargain. Once enjoined, Sara Creek could negotiate with Walgreen for a release of the contract prohibition. Walgreen would not take less than its expected lost profit, and Sara Creek would not pay more than the value to it of getting Phar-Mor into the mall, so the parties should reach a price at which the “sale” of the injunction leaves both better off, much as any other property right would be sold.20 The injunction therefore protects the exclusivity promise without freezing a use that is worth more to the landlord than the exclusivity is worth to Walgreen.
A covenant not to compete is also a forbearance duty, and the injunction must still clear the public policy screen. Section 365 withholds specific performance or an injunction if the act or forbearance that would be compelled, or the use of compulsion, is contrary to public policy.21 California, for example, has taken a policy position strongly in favor of a former employee’s ability to pursue a trade or profession, and its statute rejects a test of reasonableness and makes noncompete covenants void except in limited situations.22 Where the covenant is void, no duty of forbearance exists for an injunction to enforce.
A claimant must also find a promise that the defendant’s conduct violates. In Division of Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp. a service station operator sued to stop an oil company from ending his franchise. The contract allowed the franchisor to cancel, and the court denied the injunction because cancelling under that clause was not a breach of the franchise obligations. The opinion suggested in dictum that a franchise agreement is analogous to an output contract and therefore an appropriate subject for injunctive relief, so the denial turned on the contract’s terms and not on any lack of equitable power.23 A forbearance duty reaches only as far as the promise does. When the contract allows the conduct, the promisor has promised no abstention, and an order forbidding the conduct would give the promisee a term the parties never agreed to. The Walgreen lease and the franchise part company on that point: the lease prohibited the letting, and the franchise permitted the cancellation.
Even a clear breach of a clear forbearance promise can fail the adequacy screen, as the next hypothetical shows.
Both promises in the hypothetical are promises to refrain, and what separated the outcomes was how reliably money could measure the loss. Because the forbearance label settles only the form of relief, the analysis is best run as a short sequence that tests everything else.
Step four does the real work in most problems, because the forbearance label suggests an easy injunction while the adequacy rule still decides the result. Step two is the quieter trap: a contract that permits the conduct leaves the claimant without a breach, however valuable exclusivity would have been. When the broken duty is one to act, the order compels and must be watched, so a different question arises, and the next subsection takes it up.
Duties to Act
Restatement § 357(2)(b) reaches promises to do something instead of promises to refrain. It allows an injunction when the duty is one to act and specific performance would be denied only for reasons that are inapplicable to an injunction.26 A forbearance promise gives the court something to repeat, but a promise to act gives it nothing, so the question changes. The court must ask why it would refuse the decree and whether that reason also stands in the way of a prohibitory order, which forbids conduct instead of commanding it. The word only controls the answer, because a single surviving reason is enough to defeat the injunction.
The reasons for refusing a decree fall into two groups, and the Restatement’s own wording shows the division. Sections 359(1) and 365 refuse “specific performance or an injunction” together, the first when damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest and the second when the act compelled, or the use of compulsion, is contrary to public policy.27 Sections 366 and 367(1) speak only of specific enforcement. A promise will not be specifically enforced when the burdens of enforcement or supervision would be disproportionate to the advantages to be gained and the harm to be suffered from denial, and a promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced at all.28 The first pair of reasons goes to whether the claimant deserves any coercive order, so each defeats an injunction as it defeats a decree. The second pair goes to the means of compulsion. A prohibitory order needs no ongoing supervision, as Walgreen showed,29 and it commands no one to work, which is the target of the strong policy against forcing an individual to labor against his will.30
The concert singer reverses the result. In the standard illustration, a singer contracts with a promoter to perform, then receives an offer from a second promoter to perform at a much more prestigious venue on the same night, accepts it, and repudiates the first contract. A court will not order the singer to perform for the first promoter, but it may enjoin the singer from performing for the second.31 The order works on motive. If the purpose of the breach was to take a better engagement, forbidding that engagement removes the advantage of breaching and invites the singer to retract. The promoter must still show that damages are inadequate, and a performer’s special skills supply that showing, since the harm is hard to measure and no suitable substitute performer can be found.32 Both the coach and the singer owe personal services, so the labor does not separate them. What separates them is what stands behind the labor: a replacement coach is available for $300 more, while the singer’s engagement cannot be replaced with money.
Some states have written a different rule into statute, and the contrast shows why the sorting question matters. A Montana statute provides that an injunction cannot be granted “to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced.”33 That language asks only whether the decree is available, while the Restatement asks why it is unavailable and lets a prohibitory order go forward when the reason does not reach it. California took a different course. Its legislature modified § 3423 to allow an injunction to enforce a negative covenant where the promised service is of a unique character, the loss of which cannot be adequately compensated in damages.34
Passing the sorting question does not guarantee the injunction, because the order must still survive the remaining screens. For personal service those screens include § 367(2), taken up in the next subsection.
Step three does the real work. Students lose points by reasoning that a personal service contract can never be enforced by injunction, and equally by reasoning that a performer’s uniqueness automatically produces one. Uniqueness answers only the adequacy question, and the injunction still depends on every other reason for denying the decree falling in the first group.
Personal Service Injunctions
A promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced,37 and the policy behind the rule is strong: a court will not force an individual to work against his will.38 Yet the injunction finds its leading use in this setting. When a performer promises to work exclusively for one employer and then takes an engagement with a rival, § 357(2)(b) permits an injunction if specific performance would be denied only for reasons that are inapplicable to an injunction.39 Section 367(2) draws the boundary. An exclusive-service promise will not be enforced by an injunction against serving another employer if its probable result will be to compel a performance involving personal relations whose enforced continuance is undesirable, or to leave the employee without other reasonable means of making a living.40 The remedy traces to Lumley v. Wagner.
Johanna Wagner had engaged to perform at the plaintiff’s theatre for three months and then threatened to sing at a rival theatre. The court conceded that it could not enforce specific performance of the whole contract so as to compel her to sing. But in sound construction and according to the true spirit of the agreement, it held, the engagement to perform at one theatre for three months must necessarily exclude the right to perform at another theatre at the same time. She was to exert her vocal abilities to the utmost to aid the theatre to which she had attached herself, and if she sang elsewhere, even without a negative stipulation, she would break the spirit and true meaning of the contract as surely as by engaging with a rival theatre.41
The court then met the objection that the injunction would not make her sing. “It is true I cannot compel her to sing,” it said, “but she has no cause of complaint if I compel her to abstain from an act which she bound herself not to do, and thus possibly cause her to fulfil her engagement.” The order imposed no new duty on her; it held her to a term she had accepted. The court added that restraining her from singing elsewhere might also blunt the vindictive damages a jury could award if she sang at the rival theatre, and it disclaimed “doing indirectly what I cannot do directly.”42
The order works on the performer’s motive, because a breach undertaken to take a better engagement loses its point once the better engagement is forbidden.43 It also escapes the objections that defeat a decree to perform. The court need not judge anyone’s singing or force anyone onto a stage, since it need only check whether the forbidden appearance has occurred.44
The relief depends on a promise of exclusivity, which § 367(2) assumes when it speaks of a promise to render personal service exclusively for one employer.45 Lumley found that promise in the contract’s terms and in its true spirit, and a court today asks whether the contract promises exclusivity during the term, expressly or by clear implication. See also Clarke v. Price and American Broadcasting Cos. v. Wolf. A court with no such promise to enforce would add a term the parties never made, and the order would operate as compulsion to work.
Exclusivity gets the claimant past the form of the order but not past adequacy. Negative injunctions protect the bargain only because damages in these situations are an inadequate remedy, and the inadequacy lies in the difficulty of measuring the harm and the inability to obtain a suitable substitute performer because of the special skills involved.46 Courts therefore tend to deny the request if the services are not unique, and they may grant it against employees whose services are not easily replaceable, such as athletes, artists, and media personalities, particularly when the employee plans to work for a competing enterprise. Lumley was such a case, and a federal court in Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction against a boxer under contract to a promoter, finding unique talent and a risk of irreparable injury.47 The standard draws criticism. One commentator observes that the cases speak of exceptional knowledge, skill, or ability yet ignore the limits inherent in that language, apparently because courts assume without proof that professional athletics would collapse if injunctions against breach were not issued.48
Section 367(2) adds two limits that apply even when exclusivity and uniqueness are established. The first concerns personal relations. An order that leaves the employee no practical choice but to return to a relationship the court would not enforce directly reaches by prohibition what it would not order outright, so the rule withholds it when the enforced continuance of that relationship is undesirable.49 The second concerns livelihood. An order that bars the employee from serving anyone else and leaves no other reasonable means of making a living works as compulsion by idleness, and the rule withholds it for that reason.50
An injunction against working for a rival must clear the ordinary equitable screens and the special limits of § 367(2), so it is best analyzed as an ordered series of questions.
Step three is where answers most often go wrong. A performer’s uniqueness supplies only the adequacy showing, so an answer that stops there skips the exclusivity promise at step one and the livelihood and personal-relations limits at step four. Step two matters as well, because a court that will not order the work may still forbid the rival engagement, and the reverse error is to conclude that the refusal of a decree ends the claimant’s remedies.