Concept
Remedy Clauses and Equitable Relief
Specific performance and injunction
Remedy Clauses and Equitable Relief
A contract can fix the price of breach in advance, and sooner or later the drafter of that term must ask whether the price replaces the performance. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 361 says it does not: specific performance or an injunction may be granted to enforce a duty even though the contract provides for liquidated damages for breach of that duty.1 A liquidated damages clause is a term that fixes in advance the sum one party will pay if a particular breach occurs, so that a court need not work out the loss from evidence.
The rule leaves the court's discretion intact. Section 357(1) makes specific performance discretionary and subject to the rules in §§ 359-69, a range that includes § 361, so a claimant who invokes § 361 must still clear the adequacy, practicality, and equitable screens taught earlier in this chapter.2
Two kinds of payment term follow, and the difference between them decides the outcome. An ordinary liquidated damages clause attaches a sum to a breach and leaves the decree available. A true alternative performance gives the obligor two ways to do what the contract requires, and once the obligor pays, equity withholds relief. The question that sorts any clause is whether the stated sum is the price of a breach or one of two performances the obligor was entitled to choose between.
Liquidated Damages Clauses
Section 361 addresses only what a liquidated damages clause does to equitable relief. Whether the clause is itself enforceable is a separate question, because courts scrutinize such terms and enforce one aimed at compensation while refusing one intended to penalize.3 A clause that fails as a penalty also leaves the decree available, although the result then follows from the clause's ineffectiveness and not from § 361.4
The rule rests on two ideas, and the first concerns what a stipulated sum reveals about the parties' intent. By agreeing on a figure, the parties are not taken to have fixed a price for the privilege of not performing.5 A promisee who negotiates a fixed sum usually guards against the trouble of proving loss later and does not mean to let the promisor pay and walk away. One might object that a fallback sum shows the parties cared more about money than about the thing promised. The better view is that a fixed sum is a prudent provision to have at signing and fits comfortably with a genuine wish to enforce the contract for its unique qualities.6
The second idea ties the clause to the adequacy inquiry. Parties liquidate damages because the loss is hard to measure, and that same uncertainty argues that the money remedy the clause provides may be inadequate.7 Difficulty in proving damages with reasonable certainty is one of the circumstances that bear on adequacy.8 A court that grants a decree despite the clause therefore follows the reasoning that justified the clause, and the clause itself becomes evidence of how hard the loss is to measure.
Illustration 1 to § 361 shows the rule at work. Three veterinarians, A, B, and C, form a ten-year partnership. Each promises that if the other two continue the practice after the partnership ends, he will not practice veterinary medicine in the same town for up to three years, and each promises to pay $50,000 as liquidated damages for breach of that duty. A leaves, the practice continues, and A at once opens a practice in town. B and C sue for an injunction and damages, and A is enjoined in spite of the clause.9 Lost clients are hard to trace to a competitor, which explains why a fixed sum is attractive to draft and why money is a poor substitute for the promised abstention. Courts apply the same reasoning in commercial disputes. In one, a doctor sued the buyer of his former practice for money owed, and the court held that the trial court erred in denying the buyer's motion to enforce the doctor's covenant not to compete, because a liquidated damages clause did not preclude a finding that the buyer's remedy at law was inadequate.10
The tempting exam argument runs backward from the clause to adequacy: the parties priced the breach at $50,000, so money is the remedy and damages must be adequate. That argument treats the sum as the cost of breaking the promise, a reading § 361 and its rationale reject. The question remains whether damages would protect the promisee, and the clause enters only as evidence of how hard the loss is to measure. The claimant still carries the other screens, since the decree stays discretionary under § 357(1) and the clause earns no automatic relief.11
The exception comes from the parties' own words. A clause that names a deposit or stipulated sum as the sole remedy, or declares that payment ends the parties' obligations, leaves the promisee with money alone, and the promisee can no more demand a decree than demand actual damages.12 The same holds for a clause meant to let the defendant buy out of the contract at the stated price.13 Whether the parties meant either result is a question of interpreting the contract. Land sale contracts illustrate the point, and a real property treatise lists liquidated damages and specific performance among the separate remedies for breach of such a contract.14 A clause that limits one side's liability does not necessarily limit the other's, so a land buyer whose only exposure on default is losing the earnest money may still seek specific performance against the seller unless the agreement limits the seller's liability too.15
Equitable relief and damages can appear in the same judgment, and the clause shapes the damages half. A court that grants a decree may also award damages for breach that has already occurred, ordinarily limited to the actual loss unless the clause offers a suitable basis for calculating it.16 In the veterinary illustration, B and C may not recover the stipulated $50,000 under the clause, but they may recover damages for any actual loss A's breach caused, up to $50,000.17 The limit follows from what a decree does. A decree gives the promisee the performance itself, and the promisee should not also be paid for the value of the promise, so a decree is generally inconsistent with damages for total breach, and collecting the stipulated sum on top of the decree would pay the promisee twice.18 What the decree does not repair is the loss between the breach and the order, and an injunction against breach of a valid covenant not to compete is ordinarily coupled with damages for that interval.19 A payment term that gives the obligor a genuine choice between performing and paying presents a different problem, taken up next.
True Alternative Performance
Comment b to § 361 recognizes an exception that rests on the parties' freedom to write their own bargain. Parties who merely provide for liquidated damages are not taken to have fixed a price for the privilege of not performing, yet nothing prevents them from fixing such a price if they choose. When a contract provides for payment of that price as a true alternative performance, specific performance or an injunction may properly be granted on condition that the alternative performance is not forthcoming, but if the obligor chooses to pay the price, equitable relief will not be granted.22 The ordinary clause leaves the decree available, and this exception marks the point at which a payment term removes it. What differs is what the term promises. A liquidated damages clause attaches a sum to a breach, while a true alternative gives the obligor two ways of doing what the contract requires, and paying is one of them.
The exception honors what the promisee bargained for. Under a true alternative, the promisee bargained for either the performance or the price, and the contract treats the two as acceptable equivalents. An obligor who pays has delivered one of the two things promised, so the promisee holds exactly what the bargain entitled it to receive. A decree compelling the other performance would take from the obligor a choice the contract conferred and would give the promisee more than it contracted for. Relief on condition that the alternative is not forthcoming preserves that choice: the order carries the contract's own either-or, and the obligor ends it by paying. The parties have also already answered the question behind the adequacy rules taught earlier, whether money can stand in for the performance, because they wrote the sum into the contract.
Illustration 2 to § 361 shows the exception at work. A sells his grocery business to B for $200,000, of which $100,000 is payable at once and $100,000 at the end of a year. A promises not to engage in a business of the same kind within a hundred miles for three years unless he reduces the balance from $100,000 to $50,000. Before the year ends, A writes B that the balance is reduced to $50,000 and immediately opens a competing business. A will not be enjoined.23 The $50,000 reduction is the price B agreed A could pay for the freedom to compete, and A paid it by giving up half of what B still owed. B's protection against competition was conditional from the start, so no unconditional promise was broken for a court to enforce by decree.
The veterinary partnership in Illustration 1 looks alike on the surface and comes out the other way. Each partner promises not to practice in the same town for up to three years and promises to pay $50,000 as liquidated damages for breach, and when A leaves and at once opens his own practice, he is enjoined despite the clause.24 Both illustrations involve a covenant not to compete, and the figure is $50,000 in each, so neither the covenant nor the dollar amount explains the difference. The grocery covenant carries its own exit, because A may compete if he reduces the balance, which makes the reduction one of two performances the contract allows. The veterinarians' promise not to practice is unconditional, and the $50,000 falls due only if the promise is broken, so it is what A owes for breaking the promise and does not buy him the right to practice. B and C bargained for the abstention with a sum to fall back on, while the grocery buyer bargained for the abstention or the price.
Whether a payment term is a price for not performing or an ordinary liquidated damages clause is a matter of intent, read from the drafting. A court asks whether the contract fixes a price as a true alternative or only fixes the damages that follow a breach, and the amount of the sum does not answer that question.
Step three tracks the rule that a clause bars a decree only when the parties intended it as an exclusive remedy or as a buy-out option, and that otherwise specific performance remains open to the promisee.25 Step one does the most work on an exam. A fact pattern will often mention a fixed sum and invite the conclusion that the parties priced the breach and so removed the decree, and the right response is to read the clause for the choice it gives. A sum due only after a breach is the consequence of breaking the promise, and a sum the obligor may tender in place of performing is the price of not performing.