Concept
Special Enforcement Contexts
Specific performance and injunction
Special Enforcement Contexts
Specific performance is one of the basic contract remedies, alongside damages and restitution, and each carries limits of its own.1 For the decree, the limits begin with Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 357(1), which makes specific performance a matter of the court’s discretion, subject to the rules stated in §§ 359 to 369.2 Those rules are the screens taught in the preceding sections: damages must be inadequate, the order must be one a court can define and supervise, and neither public policy nor the equities may counsel refusal. Three settings leave the screens in place but change how one of them works or add a question the general framework does not answer.
Land sale contracts come first, because the decree has long been available to land buyers and the adequacy screen is easiest to pass there. Part performance comes second. It lets a contract for the transfer of an interest in land be specifically enforced despite a failure to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the rule that certain promises must be in writing, when the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the contract and on the other party’s continuing assent, has so changed position that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement.3 Third-party beneficiaries come last. Section 307 provides that, where specific performance is otherwise an appropriate remedy, either the promisee or the beneficiary may sue to enforce a duty owed to an intended beneficiary.4 The words “otherwise an appropriate remedy” state the pattern for all three settings. Each adjusts one element and leaves the other screens standing, so the decree stays discretionary under § 357(1).5
Land Sale Contracts
Damages are the preferred remedy for breach of contract, and a court turns to specific performance when money cannot right the wrong.6 Sometimes the amount of damages is uncertain.7 Sometimes money is no adequate substitute for having the bargain carried out.8 The traditional account treats land sale contracts as meeting both conditions, which is why the adequacy rule of § 359(1), denying a decree when damages would protect the expectation interest, seldom obstructs a land buyer.9
Courts have long treated every parcel of land, however ordinary, as unique.10 The usual rationale is that the location, size, amenities, appearance, and condition of a particular parcel cannot be duplicated, so a buyer awarded only money could never purchase an identical replacement.11 A buyer whose seller defaults is therefore presumed unable to find a substitute, and the buyer need not prove anything special about the tract. The remedy has traditionally been available to nonbreaching purchasers, although courts retain discretion to decide whether to grant it.12
That discretion is controlled by settled principles of equity and not by caprice. A Virginia opinion states the standard: where a contract is unobjectionable in its nature and circumstances, it is as much a matter of course for equity to decree specific performance as for a court of law to award damages for breach.13 A second authority, quoting Pomeroy’s treatise, adds that once the essential fairness of the contract and the adequacy of the consideration are found, the fact that the subject is real estate answers any question about the adequacy of the legal remedy.14 A land buyer’s showing is therefore short: a fair contract, supported by adequate consideration, and a seller who has breached. The seller’s answer lies in the equitable objections taught earlier, not in the claim that the buyer can buy elsewhere.
Two different supports sit behind the presumption. The first is valuation. On one account, the point at which breach should be redressable by decree lies not in physical uniqueness but in the uncertainty of valuing the subject matter, which depends on how much reliable information exists about substitutes.15 Some interests in land are also not reasonably measurable in money damages.16 The second support is enforcement. Courts may feel more comfortable ordering a land transfer because title can usually be transferred without the contempt power.17
The blanket quality of the presumption is hard to defend today. Each rural parcel in medieval England may well have been unique, but many modern parcels are not: unit 10C of a condominium building may be identical for practical purposes to adjacent unit 10D. Courts still follow the traditional rule uniformly, without asking whether the particular property is in fact unique, so a buyer can compel specific performance of a contract to purchase unit 10C even though unit 10D is available at the same price.18
The presumption bends when the buyer’s interest in the land is only financial. A buyer who is a dealer and wants to resell at a profit may be held adequately protected by a money judgment, while a buyer who planned to occupy and farm the tract can readily show that it was unique and irreplaceable.19 The opinion in Loveless v. Diehl reasons in the first way. It awards the Diehls $1,000, the amount they would have realized by buying the property from the Lovelesses for $21,000 and selling it to Dr. Hart for $22,000, and it concludes that, on the situation as it stood in December 1959, that judgment gave them all the relief a deed would have given.20 A deed would have delivered the land only to be resold, so the money did the same work. A resale-minded buyer fared the same way in Meikle v. Watson.
Sellers also receive decrees, which is harder to explain, because a seller’s only entitlement is money.21 Equity granted vendors relief even though the case for it was less compelling than the buyer’s.22 The traditional basis is that the doctrines of equitable conversion and mutuality of remedies, together with the uniqueness of land, permit either party to seek specific performance against the other.23 The leading modern justification is practical: the seller may be unable to prove damages with reasonable certainty, because the fair market value of land is hard to determine, or may have trouble reselling quickly and so lose the chance to invest the proceeds productively.24 That justification weakens when the seller can prove damages easily, as a developer selling many near-identical units can. See Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag.
A decree reaches only what the seller can deliver. The buyer can compel performance only against a seller who is legally capable of performing, and if the seller owns a smaller interest than promised, the buyer may demand performance of the part the seller owns.25 How far the court will go depends on how serious the shortfall is. A discrepancy too small to impair the contract substantially may be treated as no breach, with a decree and no adjustment in price. A slight defect supports a decree with an abatement, a reduction of the price proportionate to the deficiency. A substantial defect, whether in quantity or in quality, points toward damages or rescission and restitution, and a decree is inappropriate if it would require a major rewriting of the contract.26 Abatement keeps the exchange fair in both directions: the buyer receives what the seller owns and pays only for what arrives. In one condominium dispute the seller owned only a half interest as a cotenant with an estranged wife who refused to convey, and the court ordered the seller to convey his half and abated half of the price.27
A buyer who prefers money may sue for damages instead. For a seller’s breach of an executory contract to convey, the benefit of the bargain is the difference between the contract price and the land’s fair market value on the date of breach, plus expenses incurred and reduced by benefits received or expenses saved, and the buyer may also recover lost profits.28 The measure divides courts when title fails through no fault of the seller. About half of the states limit a buyer to lost expenses and the return of earnest money where the seller acted in good faith, and the other half also allow loss-of-bargain damages. Nearly all states allow loss-of-bargain damages when the failure of title was in bad faith.29
Part Performance and Land
An oral contract for the sale of land that the Statute of Frauds would otherwise defeat can still be enforced under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 129. The section provides that a contract for the transfer of an interest in land may be specifically enforced despite noncompliance with the statute if the party seeking enforcement, in reasonable reliance on the contract and on the continuing assent of the party against whom enforcement is sought, has so changed position that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement.33 Because the rule is written in terms of the decree, it ties the Statute of Frauds to the rest of this chapter. Real estate treatises reflect the tie, treating the Statute of Frauds, part performance, damages, liquidated damages, and specific performance as neighboring sections of a single chapter on contracts for the sale of land.34 The relief land buyers routinely obtain because each parcel is unique also answers the buyer who relied on a promise nobody put in writing.
The exception exists because the writing requirement has a cost as well as a purpose. A writing lessens the danger of perjured testimony, makes the parties reflect on the importance of the agreement, and helps distinguish enforceable agreements from unenforceable ones.35 The cost is that the statute sometimes enables a promisor who made an otherwise enforceable oral agreement to escape it.36 That cost bites hardest after the other side has acted on the promise, and part performance answers it by substituting conduct for the missing document: the real question is whether the purchaser’s actions tend to show that the parties really made a contract.37
The exception grew out of the equity courts. Disputes over land typically came before equity, which took jurisdiction and awarded specific performance, and the part performance exception to the statute developed there.38 One court states the doctrine this way: where an oral contract not enforceable under the statute has been performed to such an extent that denying it effect would be inequitable, equity may treat the contract as removed from the statute and decree specific performance.39 The tie to the decree still shows in how courts treat claims for money. In suits for damages on an oral land-sale contract, courts have been reluctant to apply the exception, so the statute may bar money damages even when the injured party has partly performed.40
The UCC rule for goods works differently. Section 2-201(3)(c) enforces an unwritten contract “with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted,” and only to the extent of that performance, so a buyer who has paid for one of three pianos can enforce the contract as to that piano alone.41 Section 129 speaks of any change of position and does not turn on payment or receipt of goods.
Each part of § 129 does its own work. The contract must be one for the transfer of an interest in land, which keeps the exception inside the setting where equity has long decreed performance. The reliance must be reasonable and must rest on the contract and on the other party’s continuing assent, because a claimant who acts after the owner has backed away acts at the claimant’s own risk. The change of position must be such that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement, which makes the decree a last resort for a claimant whom no other remedy would restore. And the claimant must prove the facts: in Beaver the trial court found the oral contract established by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.42
Beaver shows how the pieces fit. The trial court found that the sellers had contracted to sell specific land to the buyers and that both sides had substantially performed in reliance on the contract. The sellers argued that the buyers’ part performance could easily have been compensated with money. The court answered that the buyers had not sought damages for it; they relied on their own part performance, and on the sellers’, to compel specific performance, and land is assumed to have a special value that money does not replace.43 In affirming the decree, the court referred to the presumption that land is unique.44 Two questions received two answers: part performance answered the Statute of Frauds, and the uniqueness of land answered the adequacy screen.
Land litigation also involves choices outside the doctrine. In Bowlin v. Keifer, the plaintiff’s lawyer recalls that, because of earlier transactions and statements between his original client and the other heirs, the client conveyed his interest to his brother-in-law, Jack Bowlin, so that the suit could be brought in Bowlin’s name.45
The requirement of continuing assent is easy to overlook in a fact pattern full of expenditures.
Step five does the real work. A buyer who is limited to a refund can be returned to the starting position, so the statute causes no injustice that a refund cannot cure, while a buyer who moved onto the land and built on it cannot be so restored. Satisfying § 129 overcomes only the writing requirement. The decree stays in the court’s discretion and must still pass the screens taught earlier in this chapter.46
Third-Party Beneficiaries
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 307 carries the remedies taught in this chapter into contracts made to benefit someone who is not a party. Where specific performance is otherwise an appropriate remedy, either the promisee or the beneficiary may sue to enforce a duty owed to an intended beneficiary, meaning a person the contract was made to benefit.49 The rule gives two plaintiffs a path to one order, the promisee who bargained for the promise and the beneficiary who was to receive the performance. It gives neither a stronger claim than ordinary contracting parties would have, because everything turns on the condition that specific performance be otherwise appropriate.
The rule matters most when the contract was made to confer a gift. The promisee’s own loss from nonperformance may then be slight, so a rule that let only the promisee sue could leave the person who actually lost the performance without an effective remedy. Specific performance suits that problem because the court orders the performance itself, delivered to the beneficiary, and § 307 lets either plaintiff ask for that order.
A beneficiary who may sue still takes the contract as it is. The beneficiary’s rights derive from the contract, so any defense arising out of the contract limits them. Under Restatement (Second) § 309, unless the contract makes clear that it confers rights free of defenses, the promisor may raise against the beneficiary any defense that would have been available against the promisee. Those defenses include defects in formation such as lack of consideration, fraud, duress, or noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds, the promisee’s own breach, and post-formation events such as supervening impracticability.50 The Statute of Frauds point links this section to the last one: a promisor who could invoke the statute against the promisee can invoke it against the beneficiary.
The same logic governs the screens in the rest of the chapter. Section 307 adds plaintiffs and relaxes no screen, so a performance that a court would refuse to compel between the original parties stays uncompelled when the beneficiary asks for it. The limit on personal service shows the point most sharply.
The refusal follows from the rule that a promise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced, and that rule applies however the suit arrives and however strong the showing of inadequacy.51 The violin contract differs in the facts that matter, because the performance is a single delivery that a court can order and check easily, and nothing in the equities stands in the way. Section 307 supplies the route for the student, and the ordinary framework supplies the result.
A question on this topic will usually ask who may sue, and § 307 answers that the promisee and the intended beneficiary both may. The next question is whether a decree is appropriate under the general framework of adequacy, practicality, and equity. An answer that stops at standing has not reached the remedy, and one that treats the beneficiary’s status as a reason to relax the practical limits has misread the section.