Concept
Reliance as a Fallback Remedy
Reliance interest
Reliance as a Fallback Remedy
Expectation damages ask what the plaintiff would have gained from performance, and sometimes no evidence can answer that question. Lost profits must be proved with reasonable certainty, a rule that sometimes prevents recovery of future profits altogether.1 A new venture shows the difficulty: its profits depend on events that have not yet happened, so the plaintiff cannot prove what the breach took, and a rule that demanded that proof would leave the plaintiff with nothing.2
Reliance damages meet the difficulty by aiming more modestly. Instead of protecting the expectancy, they prevent losses. A developer who promises to design custom software spends time and money on it, and if the developer cannot sell the software elsewhere, the damages rest on those expenditures. A plaintiff may opt for reliance when consequential expectancy damages cannot be proved with reasonable certainty, though limitations apply.3
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 states the rule. As “an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347,” the injured party may recover damages based on the reliance interest, including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any loss that the breaching party can prove with reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.4 Expectation stays the starting point, since profits lost to breach are ordinarily recoverable; reliance takes over where anticipated profits are too speculative to determine.5 The second half of the section protects the breaching party: it may reduce the award by whatever loss it can prove.
Expenditures can substitute for profit because they are easy to prove. Money the plaintiff spent before the breach on preparation and part performance has a fixed amount, and the fact that profits are too uncertain to recover does not prevent a judgment for those expenditures.6 The award also rests on a modest assumption: a profit of zero seems as good an assumption as a loss, absent evidence to the contrary.7 The plaintiff recovers expenses instead of nothing, with no profit and no loss, which puts the plaintiff as close to the expectation interest as the evidence allows.8
Wartzman v. Hightower Productions, Ltd. shows the fallback at work. The principals in that case anticipated a “snowballing” effect from commercial enterprises as the project progressed, with no substantial monetary commitments for about six months.9 Profits that rested on such an expectation were too speculative to be determined, and the court turned to the plaintiffs’ expenditures instead. Profits lost to breach are ordinarily recoverable, it explained, but “[w]here anticipated profits are too speculative to be determined, monies spent in part performance, in preparation for or in reliance on the contract are recoverable.”10 The plaintiffs were awarded $170,000. The notes after the case observe that the defendants’ legal fees were obviously far smaller and ask whether that disparity should bear on the availability of reliance damages, a question the ordinary limits on reliance, taught below, help answer.11
The court also quoted Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co. on why the risk of uncertainty falls where § 349 puts it. When the value of a performance is hard to learn, it is “a common expedient, and a just one,” “to put the peril of the answer upon that party who by his wrong has made the issue relevant to the rights of the other.” The promisee may therefore recover the outlay, subject to the promisor’s privilege to reduce it by as much as the promisor can show the promisee would have lost had the contract been performed.12 Uncertainty becomes the breaching party’s problem instead of the plaintiff’s.
Wartzman also pointed to the court’s earlier decision in Dialist Co. v. Pulford, which upheld an award of development costs that included out-of-pocket expenses, telephone installation, office furniture, two months of forfeited salary, and the value of lost medical insurance. The court there treated those expenditures as made not in preparation for or part performance of a contract, but in reliance upon it.13 The description matters because reliance reaches beyond the cost of getting ready to perform: forfeited salary and lost insurance are not preparation costs, and the section on recoverable expenditures sorts these categories.
Courts explain why such outlays can stand in for profit by describing what the breach did to them. Such expenditures “are not brought about by reason of the breach. They are induced by reliance on the contract itself and rendered worthless by its breach.”14 The plaintiff spent because of the promise, and the breach stripped that spending of the performance that would have repaid it. One quoted statement of the point calls expenditures in preparation and part performance “an alternative measure of gains prevented by the breach.”15 The subtraction in § 349 fits that logic: if the contract would have lost money, the outlay overstates the gain the breach prevented.
Courts apply the fallback to new commercial ventures generally. In Hollywood Fantasy Corp. v. Gabor, a promoter of “fantasy vacations” for movie fans recovered out-of-pocket expenses from a breaching celebrity despite being unable to prove lost profits for the new venture. In World of Boxing LLC v. King, Russian boxing promoters could not prove with certainty the profits lost to an American promoter’s breach, yet could recover their out-of-pocket expenses. In each case the missing proof was profit and the available proof was spending, and the plaintiff’s usual fallback in such a case is reliance damages.16 The Restatement adopts the same rule in § 349.17
The choice among measures also arises when the promise is a service and the result disappoints. In Sullivan v. O’Connor, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts reviewed a jury verdict awarding contract damages to a self-styled professional entertainer after a plastic surgeon’s unsuccessful effort to shorten the plaintiff’s nose. The procedure was expected to take two operations, but the result was so disappointing that a third had to be undertaken to undo the effects of the first two.18 A claim of that kind presents the choice this section frames: measure recovery by the value of the promised performance, or by what the injured party spent.
The fallback also reallocates the burdens of proof. The plaintiff proves what was spent and that the contract induced the spending, but need not prove profit at all.19 The breaching party, if it wants a reduction, must prove with reasonable certainty the loss the plaintiff would have suffered had the contract been performed.20 A plaintiff who tries to prove profit and fails does not forfeit the outlays, because the right to recover them never depended on the profit evidence.21
The exam question is usually which of two plaintiffs may fall back on reliance, and the answer turns on whether the lost expectation can be computed.
Marcus fits the fallback. His commissions turn on sales no one can forecast, so a court would likely call his expectation claim too speculative, and the salary he gave up supplies a concrete basis for reliance damages. Any recovery remains subject to an offset for reasonable mitigation, a limit taught later.22 Lena does not fit. Her expectation can be calculated from the contract, so expectation is the proper measure; reliance is the alternative for when anticipated gains are too speculative to determine, not a second route to a figure she prefers.23
Because § 349 frames reliance as an alternative to expectation, a plaintiff who cannot prove profit with reasonable certainty may claim it instead.24 The usual error is to treat reliance as a measure a plaintiff picks because it yields a bigger number. Reliance damages are expenses, which assume a profit of zero, so when profit can be proved expectation ordinarily yields more.25 The subtraction clause of § 349 also lets the breaching party keep a losing contract from returning the full outlay. The sections that follow take up the losing-contract offset and the ordinary limits on reliance: causation, foreseeability, reasonable certainty, and mitigation.