Concept
Contexts Limiting Expectation
Reliance interest
Contexts Limiting Expectation
Reliance damages do more than rescue plaintiffs who cannot prove lost profit. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349 offers them “as an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 347,” the expectation measure, and its text does not condition the alternative on a failure of proof.1 Courts have limited, or been invited to limit, a plaintiff who can prove the expectation to reliance in three settings: a seller who cannot deliver good title to land, a seller who warrants the impossible, and a defendant whose price is tiny beside the plaintiff's gain. In each, the question is not whether the plaintiff has evidence but whether full expectation gives too much.
The two measures answer to different baselines. Expectation puts the promisee where performance would have left them, gain included. Reliance asks where the promisee would stand had the contract never been made, so it reimburses what trusting the promise cost and adds no gain.2 A court that finds full expectation unfair therefore has a smaller figure at hand that still repays the plaintiff's change of position. The unfairness takes a different form in each setting below: a seller who could not perform and had no reason to expect a windfall claim, a promised performance that is hard to value, and a gain far out of scale with the price.
Do not confuse these settings with the fallback remedy. In the fallback, the facts leave profit unprovable and the plaintiff turns to outlays out of necessity. Here the profit is provable, and the argument for reliance is that expectation overcompensates. A fact pattern that gives the plaintiff solid proof of lost profit and then gives the defendant a reason the full measure would be harsh tests this material.
Defective Title to Land
When a seller promises to convey land but cannot deliver good title, jurisdictions divide over the buyer's remedy. The American rule awards the land's market value minus the contract price, plus a refund of any part of the price already paid, which is the expectation interest.3 The English rule instead confines the buyer to expenditures made in preparation for the transaction, such as title searches and surveys, and so denies the buyer the profit on the bargain.4 That limited recovery is a reliance measure of the kind § 349 describes, one that includes “expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance.”5
The English rule treats a mistake about title as understandable and forgivable, so a good-faith seller answers only for the buyer's wasted preparations.6 The American rule puts the risk of a failed title on the seller, so the buyer ends up where performance would have left the buyer.
That leniency is meant for sellers who acted in good faith, so it does not reach a seller who is unwilling to perform or who has made performance impossible by choice.7 Three exceptions mark that line:
- A seller who knew of the defect when contracting owes expectation damages, because a knowing promise to sell what cannot be delivered resembles a fraudulent sale.
- A seller who has good title but refuses to convey owes expectation damages, because the rule forgives inability and a seller who merely changes the decision to sell has made no mistake.
- A seller who causes the title problem, for instance by deeding the land to someone else after contracting, owes expectation damages.8
The third exception applies even when the second sale looks innocent. Whether the sale to the third party was a sham meant to defeat specific performance or a bona fide deal, often at a higher price, the buyer receives the benefit the buyer would have enjoyed had the seller performed. The seller's own act created the inability, so no honest mistake remains for the English rule to forgive. The same reasoning supports the second exception: a seller who could convey but declines would otherwise escape an unprofitable contract by paying only the buyer's search and survey costs.
The seller's knowledge is measured when the contract is made. A seller who discovers a defect after signing, through no act of the seller's own, can still invoke the English rule; a seller who knew of the defect when promising to sell cannot.
Because jurisdictions differ, an answer that cannot tell which rule governs should state both measures and then test the seller's knowledge and conduct, since the exceptions often decide the close cases. Ask of any seller who “cannot convey” why not, and whether the seller knew of the defect or caused it. If so, expectation is back in play.
Fantastic Promises
A fantastic promise is a warranty of performance the product sold could never deliver; the seller has in effect promised a product that does not exist.10 Expectation damages for breach of warranty put the buyer where she would have been had the goods been as promised.11 When the described goods exist, a court can price them. When they do not, the court must value a product nobody has made, and two difficulties follow. No market quotation exists, so the award is hard to measure. And whatever figure the court reaches may dwarf the price the seller received, so the award is hard to defend.12
Reliance answers both difficulties at once. Its baseline is a world in which the contract was never made, so it reimburses the price and the outlays tied to the purchase and contains no figure for the product as described.13 With no promised gain to calculate, nothing needs valuing and nothing can run out of proportion to the price. Limiting the buyer to reliance would therefore moderate the award exactly as the theory predicts.14
In practice the moderating limit is more theory than rule. The Uniform Commercial Code contains no provision for reliance damages, so courts often award the benefit of the fantastic bargain anyway.15 In Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp. the purchaser of a $46,000 computer was awarded over $200,000, because only computers costing that much could perform as warranted.16 The award priced the promise by the cost of a machine that would really do what the seller said, which solves the measurement problem without treating the warranty as too fanciful to enforce. Reliance would have kept the recovery near the price and the buyer's related outlays, far below what the court entered.
Two reasons explain why courts pass up the moderating limit. The Code offers no reliance alternative to switch to, and a warranty is a promise whose breach is remedied by the position the promise would have produced.17 A cap at reliance would also make extravagant claims cheap, because the worst outcome for a seller who promised the impossible would be a refund of the buyer's money. The same concern supports giving a deceived buyer the benefit of the bargain: if a refund were the most a deceiver risked, trying to deceive would cost nothing.18
If a court did adopt the reliance limit, it would carry exceptions that mirror the title cases. A party who knowingly promises an impossible result may be held to the expectation interest, because that party has in effect sold insurance, and a seller who could have supplied the fantastic product may be required to supply it or to pay the cost of fulfilling the fantasy.19 The dividing line is the one drawn in the title cases, between a seller who cannot perform and one who knew better or could have performed.
On an exam, a seller's impossible warranty of goods points toward the benefit of the bargain as the likely measure, with reliance named as the moderating theory that courts applying the Code have often not used. The buyer here can prove a figure, as the court priced one for the computer buyer, so the case for reliance rests on how large and speculative that figure is and not on any failure of proof.
Disproportionate Recoveries
Full expectation can look harsh whenever the gain the plaintiff expected far exceeds the price the defendant received.21 Price is the figure a seller or carrier uses to decide whether a deal is worth its risk. When the claimed gain runs to many multiples of that price, the defendant has in effect insured the plaintiff's larger venture for a premium that never reflected the exposure. The award may be correct arithmetic and still out of scale with the bargain.
Hadley v. Baxendale supplies the clearest numbers. The mill owner paid two pounds and four shillings to ship a mill shaft, and when delay in delivery postponed the mill's reopening, the owner sought 300 pounds in lost profits. A jury awarded 25 pounds, more than ten times the shipping price, and the award was reversed.22 Hadley is a foreseeability case, and foreseeability is one of the ways the law keeps disproportion in check. A defendant answers for losses it had reason to anticipate when it set its price, so a carrier charging a few shillings is not made the guarantor of a mill's profits.23
Foreseeability screens out losses the defendant had no reason to anticipate, but some losses are foreseeable and still enormous next to the price. For those, Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351(3) invites courts to limit disproportionately large awards to the reliance interest.24 Reliance suits that role because its baseline is a world in which the contract was never made, so it contains no promised gain and the recoverable sum is what the plaintiff actually laid out.25 An amount built from outlays cannot balloon past the scale of the deal the way a forecast of profit can. The invitation is permissive, however, and contract terms disclaiming consequential damages often do the same work by agreement.26
The same instinct appears when a physician promises a particular result and the result fails. In Hawkins v. McGee the physician was taken to have promised to turn the patient's injured hand into a good one, and the court applied the ordinary expectancy formula, which asks for the difference in value between the hand as promised and the hand after the operation.27 Other courts apply a more lenient measure under which the patient recovers expenditures and other detriment that follow proximately and foreseeably from the physician's failure to keep the promise.28 That measure goes beyond restitution because it is not confined to the fee paid and reaches costs such as medicine and nurses, yet it falls short of expectancy because it does not award the whole gap between the condition promised and the condition that resulted. Its aim is to put the patient back in the position occupied just before the parties entered the agreement.29
In Sullivan v. O'Connor the court gave reasons for choosing that intermediate measure that map directly onto disproportion.30 A recovery limited to restitution seemed plainly too meager if such agreements are to be enforced at all, while an expectancy recovery might well be excessive. The fee a patient pays for such a promise is usually far out of proportion to the putative expectancy, and valuing the condition that would have resulted had the treatment succeeded strains a factfinder's imagination.31 Where the trier has absolved the physician of negligence, an expectancy measure may be thought harsh as well.
The court also drew on Fuller and Perdue for the observation that the case for full expectancy is strongest when promises are made in a business context, concerning the production or distribution of goods or the allocation of functions in the market, and that it weakens as the setting shifts from commercial to noncommercial.32 That observation explains why disproportion is a poor fit for an ordinary sale.
The physician cases and the ordinary sale show where the argument works. A small fee set against a large claimed gain, in a noncommercial promise whose promised condition is hard to value, supports a reliance limit. A price that roughly tracks the value of the performance leaves nothing to moderate, so expectation governs. Even where the argument succeeds, it trims a particular award; it does not make reliance the general cap on expectation.