Concept
Measuring the Benefit
Restitution interest
Measuring the Benefit
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 371 tells a court how to put a price on a benefit. When a sum of money is awarded to protect a party's restitution interest, it may, as justice requires, be measured by either of two yardsticks.1 The first is the reasonable value to the other party of what that party received, in terms of what it would have cost the recipient to obtain it from a person in the claimant's position.2 The second is the extent to which the other party's property has been increased in value or the party's other interests advanced.3 Earlier sections established that a restitution award follows the benefit the recipient received. This unit shows how a court turns that principle into a dollar figure.
A single painter shows why the choice of yardstick matters. Suppose an owner hires a painter, the painter does work that would cost $4,000 to buy on the market, and the owner then refuses to pay, although the house is worth no more than it was before the first coat. The first yardstick yields $4,000, the price the owner avoided paying.4 The second yields nothing, because the owner's property has not gained a dollar. The two measures often agree, but this case pulls them apart, and the rest of the unit explains how a court chooses between them.
Measurement proceeds in two steps, and the order matters. The court first asks whether the claimant conferred a benefit at all, because restitution is available only to the extent that the claimant conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.5 Only when a benefit exists does valuation begin. Section 371 then gives the court both yardsticks and ranks neither. Commentators label the first the benefit theory (the value of the performance rendered) and the second the enrichment theory (the increase in value of the defendant's property or interests), and the court may choose between them as justice requires.6
The subsections below take the threshold first, then each yardstick, and then the most contested problem in the area: whether a restitution award can exceed what the contract itself would have paid.
The Benefit Conferred Requirement
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 370 sets the threshold that every restitution claim in this chapter must clear: a party is entitled to restitution only to the extent that the party has conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.7 The same benefit language appears in the right to restitution after a total breach or repudiation and in the right to restitution on avoidance of a voidable contract.8 Section 370 therefore works as a general condition beneath both rights, and it comes first in the order of analysis: a court prices a benefit under § 371 only after the claimant has shown that one exists.
The requirement has two parts, and each part produces its own limit. A benefit is something of value that the defendant received or consumed. It need not be a lasting increase in wealth, because a painter's labor counts even when the house gains nothing.9 The word conferred asks whether the claimant supplied that value. A claimant who fails either test may have suffered a real loss, but the defendant holds nothing that the claimant has a right to have restored.
The conferral test screens out gains the defendant makes on the side. The general rule is that restitution is not measured by the benefits a defendant obtains collateral to the breach, so a defendant who reneges in order to render the same performance elsewhere at a higher price is generally not liable for the advantage thus secured.10 The claimant lost its bargain, but the higher price came from someone else, and no value passed from the claimant that restitution could return. The rule yields when the defendant breaches opportunistically, because the restitution remedy may then strip the defendant's gain instead of valuing the claimant's performance.11
A benefit may reach the defendant by an indirect route, but the claimant's own conduct must still connect to the defendant's gain. Two unjust enrichment decisions from outside contract law mark the line. In Emergency Physicians Integrated v. Salt Lake County, a physicians group treated county jail inmates, and the county argued that the benefit went only to the inmates; the court held that the county was enriched because it had a legal duty to provide the care and the physicians discharged that duty for it. In Ashley County, Arkansas v. Pfizer, Inc., a county that paid for services to deal with a methamphetamine epidemic sought restitution from makers of cold and allergy medications used to produce the drug, and the Eighth Circuit found no link between the county's services and the manufacturers' profits. The physicians' work supplied what the county owed. The manufacturers' profits came from their own sales, and nothing the county did produced them.
The second limit concerns outlays that enriched no one, and a land purchase shows it beside the first. A purchaser contracts to buy land for $100,000 and pays the vendor $10,000 down. Before the vendor repudiates, the purchaser spends $500 on a survey, $500 on banking fees for a loan application, and, as the vendor foresaw, $1,000 on an option to buy adjoining land for additional parking.12 The $10,000 is the restitution interest, because it passed from purchaser to vendor, who still holds it. The other $2,000 is the reliance interest, and none of it put value in the vendor's hands.13
The limit follows from what restitution protects. Because restitution aims to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant, the claimant's cost of providing a benefit is not the measure of recovery, and efforts that amount only to preparation do not count as benefits conferred.14 Comment b to § 371 reaches the same result from the measurement side by excluding expenditures “to the extent that they conferred no benefit.”15 Once part performance has taken place, its cost may still furnish good evidence of what the performance was worth, so cost stays admissible as proof of value even though it is never the measure.16 The line runs between performance that reached the defendant and preparation that did not.
Outlays on the wrong side of that line are reliance claims, and the comment to § 371 keeps them out of the restitution measure. The claimant is not necessarily left empty-handed, however, because other sections of the Restatement allow a court to award reliance damages when a contract is discharged for reasons such as mistake (§ 158) or impracticability (§ 272).17
Conferring a benefit is necessary but not always sufficient. It is not enough that the claimant has conferred an uncompensated benefit, because it is not always unjust to receive a benefit without paying for it. Enrichment is unjust when the recipient obtained the benefit by improper or dishonest conduct, or when keeping it without compensating the claimant would violate principles of fairness and equity.18 Illegality supplies one example, which this unit does not develop: a party who performed under an illegal contract faces a general rule against restitution of what the party gave.19
Step two does the most work in practice. A claimant's own spending is the most visible figure in a case, yet it says nothing about whether the defendant received anything. A payment, a day of labor, and a stack of lumber in the claimant's yard are all costs to the claimant, but only the first two can be traced into the defendant's hands.
Reasonable Value of Services
Section 371(a) supplies the first yardstick: the reasonable value to the other party of what that party received, stated in terms of what it would have cost the recipient to obtain it from a person in the claimant's position.21 The wording gives two instructions. “Value to the other party” keeps the inquiry on the recipient's side of the transaction. “A person in the claimant's position” supplies the standard, which is the price that someone who does this kind of work charges for it. A recipient who wanted labor would have had to buy it, so a recipient who keeps the labor without paying also keeps the price of buying it. That avoided expense is the enrichment, and the market price puts a number on it.
This measure suits services because services seldom leave a lasting mark on the recipient's property. When the claimant's performance consists of the acts the recipient sought, a court can value it in the market for that work, and the claimant recovers that value even if the performance added nothing to the value of the house.22 The painter's $4,000 of labor is the standard picture. The owner got exactly the work the owner wanted and owes the price of it, whether or not any improvement remains. A measure keyed only to the property's value would let an owner who requested and consumed work escape payment whenever the work did not raise that value.
Because restitution aims at the recipient's enrichment, the claimant's own cost is not the measure of recovery, although once the performance has been rendered, cost can furnish good evidence of what it was worth.23 Cost and market value can diverge in either direction. Take an excavation contractor who completes two-fifths of a $230,000 job when the owner breaches, at efficiently incurred costs of $100,000, in a market where a 10 percent margin is normal. The market value of that work is $110,000, and restitution can reach it, because the price the owner would have paid a market contractor includes a reasonable profit.24 Some courts, uncomfortable with reliance and restitution producing different results for exactly the same breach, apply a version of the prorating principle to restitution and confine the claimant to the contract value of the performance when that is less than the quantum meruit measure. Here that value would be two-fifths of $230,000, or $92,000.25 The last subsection of this unit takes up that dispute.
The limit follows from the logic that allows a profit above cost. The recipient is enriched by what the work would have cost in the market, so a claimant who performed efficiently collects that price with its profit, and a claimant who performed wastefully collects no more than that price.26
Reasonable value is one of two § 371 measures, and the setting guides the choice. Two ways of measuring a benefit to a landowner predominate: the market value of the labor and materials package, meaning what it would cost the owner to buy them, and the owner's gain in asset value.27 Market value is the usual measure when the owner has breached an enforceable contract, while the gain in asset value is the fairer measure where the contractor is itself in default or the work was misdirected or unwanted.28 The division tracks the owner's position. An owner who ordered the work would have paid its going price to anyone, so the price fairly stands in for what the owner received. An owner who never wanted the work may hold something worth far less than the price, and charging the price would impose a purchase the owner never made.
Two errors recur in applying the first measure. A student who totals the claimant's invoices has computed the claimant's outlay, which is a reliance figure. A student who asks only what the property is now worth has applied the second measure to a case that calls for the first.
Increase in Value
Section 371(b) supplies the second yardstick: the extent to which the other party's property has been increased in value or the party's other interests advanced.30 Where the first measure prices the performance, this one examines the recipient's side of the ledger and asks how much better off the recipient's own property is because of what the claimant did. The painter again shows the gap. The labor was worth $4,000 on the market, but a house worth no more than before the first coat has increased in value by nothing, so the asset measure reaches nothing. The phrase “other interests advanced” keeps the measure from being confined to property values, although improvements to land are its most familiar setting.
A court needs a reason to choose between the two lenses, because each answers a different version of the question what the recipient would unjustly keep. The Restatement lists both and leaves the choice to the court as justice requires.31 The increase in the recipient's own asset is what the recipient actually holds, which makes it the fairer measure when the recipient never chose the work.32 The increase can also exceed what the services were worth in the market. If the claimant's work added more value to the house than the same services would have cost, a court may award the more generous figure when that comports with its judgment about the justice of the case.33
Improvements made on land the claimant must give back show the measure at work. A party who avoids a contract and returns land may recover the reasonable value of improvements made in reliance, and § 371(b) supplies that value.34 The Restatement's illustration of an oral contract to sell land runs the arithmetic. A agrees orally to sell a tract to B for $100,000, B pays $50,000, takes possession, and makes improvements, and A then refuses to convey. B recovers the $50,000, plus $20,000, the reasonable value of the improvements, less $5,000, the value to B of the use of the land, for a total of $65,000.35
Each term does its own work. The $50,000 is money A holds for land A never delivered. The $20,000 is a second benefit B conferred: the improvements are fixed to land A still owns, so B cannot take them back, and A holds a tract that has gained value. The $5,000 subtraction runs the other way, because B enjoyed A's land during possession, and a recovery that returned the price and the improvements but ignored that occupancy would let B keep a free benefit. The deduction survives even when the seller is the wrongdoer. A buyer fraudulently induced to purchase who disaffirms and tenders back the land recovers the $100,000 price plus $20,000 for improvements, less $5,000 for use of the land, or $115,000.36
Rescission for mistake shows the increase measure setting a limit. Buyers who rescinded a land purchase asked for their down payment and the $229,649.84 they had spent developing the land. The court allowed the down payment plus the amount by which the buyers' development work had increased the land's value, less the fair rental value of their tenancy, and it refused the development spending itself. Awarding all of it would shift the entire risk of the mistake onto the sellers, which is incompatible with equitable rescission.37 Under § 371(b), the improvements are worth what they added to the land, so the sellers pay for the enhanced land they now hold, and the rest of the buyers' spending stays with the buyers.
The two yardsticks fix an amount and say nothing about how the claimant collects it. An equitable lien, a close cousin of the constructive trust, serves as an alternative restitutionary remedy in situations where a constructive trust may be inappropriate.38
Losing Contracts and Price Ceilings
Section 371 defines neither yardstick by reference to the contract price,40 and that silence leaves open the most contested question in measuring restitution. An injured party who has performed in part may have been headed for a loss, because the work was costing more than the price would repay, and the other side's breach then ends the job. The question is whether the award can exceed what the contract would have paid for that work, or whether the price acts as a ceiling.
The question arises only after the injured party has cancelled the contract and chosen restitution. Without an effective cancellation, the contract continues to bind both parties, and the injured party may recover damages for partial breach but not restitution. Once cancellation is effective, the party must generally elect between restitution (quantum meruit) and damages.41 A party who elects restitution takes a claim that follows what the defendant received, as the figures in the next example show.
The first figure is the ordinary expectation calculation, which leaves the contractor exactly where performance would have left it. The other two figures are the competing answers to this section's question, and courts divide between them.
Most courts reach the second figure. To the extent that the breaching owner has actually benefited, courts generally hold the owner liable for the value of those benefits, even if that liability puts the contractor in a better position than full performance would have.42 In one leading case the contractor recovered over $250,000 in restitution, although the contract payment apparently would have been about $20,000. Some courts might invoke the proportion-of-the-price measure as a ceiling that would prevent such a recovery, but allowing restitution without the ceiling is more common.43 Southern Painting Co. v. United States, 222 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1955), is cited as authority that the price is not a ceiling.44 In the grading example, the award is therefore $40,000 whatever the contract price said. The measure looks to what the developer received, which is a half-graded site that would have cost $40,000 to prepare. The contractor's underestimate of the rock concerns only the contractor's own costs, which restitution never asks about.
A minority treats the contract as a ceiling. Johnson v. Bovee is cited as authority for that position,45 and some courts reach the same place by carrying the prorating principle over from reliance, confining the claimant to the contract value of the work done when it is lower than the market measure.46 The excavation example puts the split in numbers, with $110,000 of market value on one side and a prorated $92,000 on the other. In the grading example, the prorated form yields $30,000, half of the $60,000 price.
Two concerns drive the ceiling view. Without a ceiling, partial performance can pay better than full performance: the grading contractor that stops at half collects $40,000 and breaks even, while one that finishes collects $60,000 and loses $20,000.47 And the contract price is the value the parties themselves put on the work. A ceiling does not spare the court the valuation task, however, because the benefit conferred must still be measured, at least in principle, before anyone can tell whether the ceiling has been reached.48
The ceiling view stands on its firmest ground when the claimant has done nearly everything. In John T. Brady & Co. v. City of Stamford, work on the project was 99 percent complete, and the Connecticut court held restitution precluded, because after full performance the value of the benefit conferred is the value the parties assigned to that performance in their contract.49 The decision sits close to a separate limit. Under § 373(2), an injured party who has performed all of its duties, and is owed nothing but payment of a definite sum of money, has no right to restitution.50 The two rules ask different questions. The exception decides whether restitution is available at all, and the ceiling decides how much a partial performer may recover. The grading contractor that stopped at half is a partial performer, so its claim survives and only the amount is disputed. The next section develops § 373(2) in full.
The Restatements themselves divide on the amount question. Restatement (Second) § 373 states that the contract price is not a ceiling, and Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 38(2)(b) states that it is.51 Because allowing restitution without a ceiling remains the more common approach,52 the Third Restatement is best treated as a competing authority and not as settled law.
Steps one and two are common ground, and step three is where the courts part company. Step one deserves care, because entitlement and measure are separate questions and the measure comes second. One appellate court sent a case back because the trial court had rested its decision on the common-law rule and never considered whether the appellant was entitled to restitution under Restatement (Second) § 374(1).53 An answer that reaches the dollar figure under both rules, and says which one applies by default, shows the examiner that the split has been spotted and handled.