Concept
The Full-Performance Exception
Restitution interest
The Full-Performance Exception
A claimant who has done everything the contract required, and is owed nothing but money, gets no restitution. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 373(2) says that the injured party has no right to restitution if he has performed all of his duties under the contract and no performance by the other party remains due other than payment of a definite sum of money for that performance.1 The subsection cuts back the general rule of § 373(1). That rule gives an injured party restitution for any benefit conferred by part performance or reliance after a total breach or a repudiation, and it is expressly made subject to § 373(2).2 Two conditions must hold together. The claimant must have completed his own performance, and the only thing the other side still owes must be a definite sum of money for that performance. A claimant who meets both is left with an action for the price, and the market-value restitution described in the preceding section is closed to him.
The exception makes sense because the contract has already valued the performance. A claimant who has finished the job and is owed a fixed sum can collect that sum, and collecting it gives him what performance would have given him. Restitution could add only two things: a figure above the price, if the market would have paid more for the work than the contract did, and a trial on what the work was worth. In John T. Brady & Co. v. City of Stamford, work on the project was 99 percent complete, and the Connecticut Supreme Court held restitution precluded by the rule that after full performance the appropriate measure of the value of the benefit conferred is the value that the parties themselves, in their contract, have assigned to that performance.3 Each condition carries part of that reasoning. Completion makes the price an accurate measure of what the claimant has earned, because a claimant who stopped partway has earned only a share of it, and the price alone does not show what that share was worth to the other side. The definite-sum condition makes sure that the contract states the value in dollars, so that no court has to supply one.
Oliver v. Campbell shows both conditions at work. An attorney agreed to defend a husband in a separate-maintenance action for a fee of $750, and the husband discharged him at the end of the trial. The attorney sued for $10,000 as the reasonable value of his services, and the California Supreme Court limited him to the $750 contract price.4 He had done the work the contract required, and all that remained owing was a dollar amount the parties had set themselves, so the contract already answered what his services were worth to the client.
A similar-looking claim came out the other way in Chodos v. West Publishing Co. An author finished a manuscript, and the publisher declined to publish it. The Ninth Circuit let the author elect quantum meruit, because the publisher's obligation to pay a percentage of revenue was not a liquidated debt.5 The lawyer's fee was a number on the page. The author's pay depended on revenue that would never exist, since the publisher's refusal prevented the sales that would have produced it. With no fixed figure in the contract, nothing had valued the performance, and restitution was the remedy that could.
The phrase definite sum therefore decides these cases. A flat fee qualifies, and so does any amount the contract's terms fix without reference to how a venture turns out. A payment keyed to future events, such as a share of sales or revenue, does not qualify, because its amount is unknown when the breach occurs and may be unknowable when the breach itself prevents those events. When a problem presents a fully performing claimant and an unpaid debt, ask one more question: did the contract fix the dollar figure?
The exception also turns on the direction in which the unperformed duty runs. It reaches a claimant who has delivered work and is waiting for money, and it does not reach a claimant who has paid and is waiting for something else. In Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast v. United States, oil companies that had paid the government $156 million under contracts concerning oil off the North Carolina coast sought restitution after the government broke its promise. The Supreme Court held that the government must give the companies their money back, whether or not the contracts would ultimately have proved financially beneficial to them. It also observed that when the United States makes contracts, its rights and duties are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals, as reflected in the Restatement.6 The companies had paid in full, but what remained due to them was the government's performance and not a sum of money, so § 373(2) would not have applied to them. A buyer who prepays for goods stands on the companies' side of the line, and a contractor who has delivered services and awaits the price stands on the other.
The exception touches the Statute of Frauds in one narrow way. The Statute of Frauds restitution section, § 375, gives restitution to a party whose contract the Statute makes unenforceable. If a party to a contract not to be performed within a year has completely performed, however, he may enforce the contract for that reason, and his right to restitution is then governed by § 373, limit included.7 The comment adds that under a statute requiring a writing for contracts not performable within a lifetime, full performance may not make the contract enforceable. The party may then be unable to enforce the contract and yet be barred from restitution by § 373(2), and the Restatement does not deal with that case.8
The exception also settles part of the dispute over the contract price as a ceiling, which the preceding section left open. Restatement (Second) § 373 states that the price is not a ceiling on restitution, while Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 38(2)(b) states that it is.9 Whichever view a jurisdiction takes, the full performer who is owed only the price cannot recover more than the price, because § 373(2) denies him restitution altogether. The exception thus works as an automatic ceiling for the full performer, even where the price is no ceiling for a partial performer. That can produce an oddity: in a jurisdiction that rejects the ceiling, a contractor who stops short may recover a market value above the price, while one who finishes recovers only the price. The oddity is why the contest over the ceiling continues.