Concept
The Common-Law Forfeiture Rule
Restitution for the party in breach
Restitution for a Breaching Party
The Common-Law Forfeiture Rule
At common law, a party who quits a contract partway through collects nothing for the work he has already done. The court in Britton v. Turner stated the rule flatly, then went on to attack its result: a party “who voluntarily fails to fulfill the contract by performing the whole labor contracted for, is not entitled to recover anything for the labor actually performed, however much he may have done towards the performance.” The court called this “the settled rule of law upon this subject,” and it rested on Massachusetts, New York, and English decisions.1 Lawrence v. Miller is among the New York cases that follow it.
The word “anything” closes every route. The breaching party cannot enforce the contract price, and he cannot recover the value of the work he delivered either. A court that rests on the common-law rule never reaches the question of restitution. In one case the trial court did exactly that. It decided on the rule alone and never asked whether the breaching party was entitled to restitution under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374(1), so the appellate court remanded.2
Stark v. Parker supplies the reason. The law, that court said, “will not admit of the monstrous absurdity, that a man may voluntarily and without cause violate his agreement and make the very breach of that agreement the foundation of an action which he could not maintain under it.”3 The breacher’s claim feeds on his own wrong, since the only reason he has anything to ask for is that he walked away. The limiting words matter. The rule reaches a departure that is voluntary and without cause, so the first question in any problem is who breached and whether the departure was justified.
The rule is not limited to wages. In Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., purchasers of a condominium decided not to take title because the husband’s employer transferred him to New Jersey, and they told the seller so by letter dated January 4, 1974. The contract of sale designated a sum as liquidated damages. No claim was ever made that the seller had failed in any obligation under the contract.4 The buyers alone were in default. That is the position of the “plaintiff in breach” to whom the traditional approach denies any remedy.
Critics call the rule punitive without being rational about whom it punishes. The penalty is not fashioned to the wrong. Its size turns on the fortuity of how far performance had gone, and the more the defaulting party performed, the greater the forfeiture and the greater the unearned enrichment of the other side.5 Britton v. Turner put numbers on the paradox. The plaintiff had worked nine and a half months, and the jury found the labor worth $95 to the defendant. If the defense succeeded, the employer would receive nearly five-sixths of the value of a whole year’s labor because of the worker’s breach. That sum was utterly disproportionate to any damage from his failure to work the last two and a half months, and it exceeded any damage the employer could have recovered had the worker done nothing toward performance.6 The court in Vines made the same point from the other side: denying every remedy punishes the partial performer, often one acting in good faith, more severely than the party who disregarded his obligations from the start.7
Stark probably still reflects the weight of authority. Even so, the contrary reasoning of Britton “continues to make converts and to influence legislation.”8 The next section follows that contrary line.
The instinct behind the old rule has not disappeared, even where restitution is on the table. One court was asked to award restitution to a breaching party. The facts reasonably supported the inference that the party had learned the hoagie business at the other side’s place of business, benefited from its trade and good will, and then run the same business at its own pizza shop the following season. The court called restitution on those facts “a wholly unmerited reward for bad faith.”9 The later discussion of willful breach returns to that line.