Concept
The Move Toward Restitution
Restitution for the party in breach
The Move Toward Restitution
The modern rule lets a party in breach recover for what he has already given the other side. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374(1) provides that when a party justifiably refuses to perform because the other side's breach has discharged his remaining duties, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any benefit he conferred by part performance or reliance, in excess of the loss his own breach caused.1 Restitution here means recovery of the value of a benefit the other side received and would be unjust to keep, so the inquiry turns on what the innocent party now holds. The formula also protects that party: because only the excess over his loss is recoverable, his damages come off before the breacher collects anything. Courts and drafters reached the formula in stages, and each stage answered a specific objection to the forfeiture rule.
The first stage was Britton v. Turner (N.H. 1834), which arose on facts nearly identical to those of Stark v. Parker. A laborer hired for a year at $120 left after about nine and a half months, without the employer's consent and without good cause, and the employer offered no evidence of damage beyond the unfinished term. The jury valued the labor to the employer at $95.2 The court was struck by the arithmetic of the old rule: the employer would keep nine and a half months of labor, nearly five-sixths of a full year's value, without paying, a windfall out of all proportion to any harm from the missing two and a half months.3
The court kept the premise of the old rule and rejected its conclusion. Because the work had never been fully done, the laborer could not sue on the contract.4 He could still recover in quasi-contract, a theory called quantum meruit, for the reasonable value of the labor he actually performed, less any damage the employer suffered from the incomplete performance.5 The court rested that result on the injustice of letting the employer keep the benefit without paying and on the community's general understanding that services actually rendered should be paid for.6
Britton thus pulled apart two ideas the old rule had joined. The old rule reasoned that no contract claim meant no claim at all. Britton accepted that the contract claim failed, but it held that the employer's retention of a benefit supports a separate claim, and it answered the laborer's breach by subtracting the employer's damages from that claim. If the employer had to pay a replacement more than the contract rate, the extra expense reduces the laborer's recovery; if the early departure cost the employer nothing, he pays the full reasonable value of what he received.7 Once the breach is handled by subtraction, forfeiture is no longer needed, and every later development builds on that separation.
For land contracts, the pressure for change came from a systematic survey of decided cases published in 1931. It found that courts had allowed defaulting buyers to recover installments in so many decisions that default alone could not be treated as a bar to recovery,8 and it described a seller's retention of the buyer's part performance, with no repayment of any part of its value, as a penalty or forfeiture imposed on the contract breaker.9 The first Restatement of Contracts then adopted § 357 (1932), which let a plaintiff in default recover the net benefit of his part performance: the benefit in excess of the harm his default caused the defendant, never more than a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation.10 A ratable proportion is a pro rata share of the contract price for the work actually done. The cap keeps the breacher from collecting more than the bargain itself would have paid him for that work.
Section 357 came with limits that later law relaxed. A willful and deliberate breach barred recovery unless the defendant, knowing of the breach, assented to the part performance or accepted its benefit. The section also protected a defendant who, under the contract, was to keep earnest money or other performance on default, unless the retention was so far beyond his harm as to be a penalty.11 Later, UCC § 2-718(2) gave a defaulting buyer of goods a right to restitution, in line with the trend Britton had set.12 The Code's policy of allowing recovery even by a buyer who defaults willfully was apparently one reason the Second Restatement dropped the willfulness exclusion and wrote § 374 more liberally than § 357.13
Section 374 accordingly recasts the earnest-money limit as a liquidated-damages test. Subsection (2) denies restitution to the extent the parties' manifested assent lets the other side keep the performance, if the value of keeping it as liquidated damages is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulty of proving loss.14 Courts remain divided over whether a deliberate breach should still defeat restitution.15 Later sections take up that question, the retention clause, and the Code in full.
The modern rule can do without forfeiture because the innocent party keeps four protections:
- The damages the breach caused come off the top of the breacher's recovery.
- The recovery reaches only the benefit the other side actually received, and the breacher must show that benefit exceeded the other side's loss; the first Restatement also capped it at a ratable share of the price.16
- A valid liquidated-damages provision lets the seller keep the payment.
- A decree of specific performance for the innocent party ends any claim to restitution.17
Each protection answers a distinct objection. The offset answers the worry that a breach would go unpunished, since the breacher bears the loss he caused. The enrichment limit and the ratable cap answer the worry that a breacher might profit, since he can never recover more than the other side received or more than the contract would have paid. The liquidated-damages provision respects the parties' own advance allocation of the risk of default. The specific-performance bar follows because a seller who collects the whole price has received exactly what the contract promised. The Restatement's land-sale illustration shows the first and last protections at work. A buyer promised $100,000 in $10,000 installments and defaulted after paying $30,000, and the seller resold for $95,000. The buyer recovers $30,000 less the seller's $5,000 loss, or $25,000. If the seller instead obtains a decree of specific performance, the buyer recovers nothing.18
Courts have since adopted § 374 in a growing number of jurisdictions. In Lancellotti v. Thomas (Pa. Super. 1985), a buyer who had paid $25,000 on signing a contract to buy a luncheonette business defaulted. The court rejected the forfeiture rule in favor of § 374 and remanded so the trial court could decide whether restitution was due.19 In Kutzin v. Pirnie (N.J. 1991), the state's highest court overruled its earlier decisions adhering to the common-law rule and adopted § 374(1). Defaulting land purchasers, it held, may recover the benefit they conferred in excess of the loss they caused, and they bear the burden of proving unjust enrichment. The contract said nothing about liquidated damages, and the $36,000 deposit was under ten percent of the $365,000 price.20 Courts in North Dakota, Arkansas, and New Mexico have also followed § 374, and a federal court applying Pennsylvania law held that a boiler-installation subcontractor could recover in restitution for the benefit it conferred in excess of the other party's harm even if it had breached.21 Lancellotti came from an intermediate appellate court, and Pennsylvania's highest court has not resolved the question. When it raised whether to adopt § 374, in Sevast v. Kakouras (2007), it decided the dispute on other grounds.22
Resistance concentrates where settled practice gives the seller a predictable right to keep what was paid. In Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo (1986), New York's highest court declined to overrule Lawrence v. Miller as applied to real-estate down payments of about ten percent. It reasoned that the long-established usage of letting a seller keep such a deposit was no worse a rule than restitution, and it reserved judgment on larger payments.23 The appeal of that usage is predictability: a customary deposit fixes both sides' expectations at signing, whereas restitution requires proof of the seller's actual loss after each default. Connecticut reached a similar result by a different route in Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc. The court recognized that a buyer whose breach is not willful has a restitutionary claim to recover money that unjustly enriches the seller. It then held that the seller could keep a 10% down payment designated as liquidated damages, because such a clause is presumptively a reasonable allocation of the risks of default, a presumption the buyer may rebut.24 Construction cases show resistance too. Massachusetts allows quantum meruit only on proof of substantial performance and a good-faith effort to perform fully, and a federal court applying New York law denied a builder who had not substantially performed recovery on either the contract or quantum meruit.25
Lancellotti and Maxton Builders mark the two sides of the line. A buyer who defaults after paying $25,000 toward a business in a jurisdiction that has adopted § 374 earns a hearing on whether the seller was enriched beyond its own loss. A buyer who defaults after paying a customary ten percent real-estate deposit in New York recovers nothing, because the seller's right to keep that deposit rests on long-established usage. The outcomes differ because of each jurisdiction's choice of rule and, for the New York deposit, the weight it gives to custom. That is why the modern rule is a strong trend rather than a universal one. The Restatements, the Code, and a growing body of decisions point toward restitution, while New York and Massachusetts remain clear exceptions. Wherever the trend has taken hold, offsets protect the innocent party in place of forfeiture.