Concept
Restitution Under Section 374(1)
Restitution for the party in breach
Restitution Under Section 374(1)
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 374(1) gives the party who is himself in breach a working test for restitution. Subject to the exception in subsection (2), the rule provides that when a party justifiably refuses to perform on the ground that his remaining duties of performance have been discharged by the other party's breach, the party in breach is entitled to restitution for any benefit he has conferred by way of part performance or reliance, in excess of the loss he has caused by his own breach.1
That one sentence holds three requirements, and a problem under it is solved by taking them in order. The other party must have justifiably refused to go on; that is the threshold, and it decides whether any claim exists. The breacher must have conferred a benefit by part performance or reliance; that decides what the claim is for. The recovery is then the benefit in excess of the loss the breach caused, so the innocent party's damages come off before the breacher collects anything; that decides how much the claim yields.
Unjust enrichment explains the rule but does not decide cases by itself. It is a principle underlying many particular rules rather than an operative rule, and taken as a rule it would be both too broad and too narrow.2 Section 374(1) supplies the operative test, and the remedy it grants is restitution, which is not really a measure of damages at all. Restitution seeks to put the other party in the position it would have occupied if the contract had never been made.3
The section builds on § 357 of the First Restatement but, in the words of the reporter's note, “is more liberal in allowing recovery in accord with the policy behind Uniform Commercial Code § 2-718(2).”4 Because the benefit and the measure matter only after the threshold is crossed, the threshold comes first.
Justified Refusal by the Other Party
The first requirement looks at what the innocent party has done, not at what the breacher has done. A buyer who falls behind on installments has breached, but that breach alone does not satisfy the rule. The question is whether the seller has refused to go on, resting that refusal on the ground that the breach discharged his remaining duties.5 Until he does, the rule is not triggered.
The threshold tracks what restitution corrects. A seller who stays ready to close, and who can compel the buyer to finish through specific performance (a court order requiring a party to do what the contract promised), still holds the bargain he made, and the payments he has received are credited toward a price he is still owed. Only when he treats the contract as over does the contractual basis for keeping those payments disappear. Once a contract has been terminated following breach, the breach victim's contractual right to retain any benefit the breacher conferred falls away, and the breacher has a cause of action in unjust enrichment to recover the benefit or its value.6
Quillen v. Kelley shows the threshold at work. The vendors there, answering interrogatories (written pretrial questions) nearly three years after the default, denied that the buyers had any further rights under the contract, and the court thought that denial was justified under the circumstances. The record nonetheless did not show that the vendors had refused to perform, and they might still have been ready and willing. The buyers had not brought themselves within the factual situation on which the doctrine they invoked is predicated, so they could not rely on it.7
Quillen applied § 357 and assumed, without deciding, that the section correctly stated the law.8 That caveat does not weaken the case on this point. Section 374(1) is based on § 357, and § 357(1) likewise begins with a defendant who fails or refuses to perform and is justified in doing so by the plaintiff's own breach.9
The Restatement's own illustration puts both outcomes inside a single contract. A contracts to sell land to B for $100,000, payable in $10,000 installments before title passes. After B has paid $30,000, B stops paying, and A sells the land to another buyer for $95,000. B recovers $30,000 in restitution less the $5,000 of damages caused by the breach, or $25,000. If instead A does not resell and obtains a decree of specific performance against B, B has no right to restitution.10 The arithmetic shows why the resale makes the difference. After it, A holds B's $30,000 and the new buyer's $95,000, which is $25,000 more than the $100,000 A bargained for, and the award returns exactly that surplus. A decree of specific performance leaves A with the price he bargained for, with B's $30,000 credited toward it, so no surplus exists to return.
The word “justifiably” adds a second condition. The refusal must rest on the other party's breach as its ground, so a party who walks away from a contract the other side has not breached has not refused on that ground.11
Benefit Conferred by the Breacher
Restitution reverses a transfer, so the second requirement asks what the breacher actually put into the other side's hands. Section 374(1) answers in terms of a benefit the breacher “has conferred by way of part performance or reliance.”13 A person is enriched if he has received a benefit and unjustly enriched if retaining it would be unjust. The benefit element therefore identifies the enrichment, and the remaining requirements decide whether keeping it is unjust.14
Money is the plainest case. Cash paid toward the price leaves the payer's control and sits with the payee, so a default that ends the deal leaves the payee holding the payer's value with no remaining bargain to justify the holding. The Restatement illustration treats installments toward land this way: a buyer who promised $100,000 in $10,000 installments and stopped after paying $30,000 recovers those payments, less the seller's loss, once the seller has resold.15 A lump sum at signing and a series of installments fit the element alike, because each is value the buyer moved to the seller by performing part of the bargain.
Promises are different. A promise to build an addition, to stay out of a competing business, or to complete the purchase delivers nothing to the other side until someone performs it, and a promise never performed has put no value in anyone's hands. The element turns on what was delivered, not on what was undertaken.
The benefit must also be one the breacher conferred. A seller who resells at a profit holds a gain, but the gain came from the market and the new purchaser, not from the first buyer's performance.
The words “or reliance” reach value that changes hands outside the contract's own payment terms, as when a party improves the other side's property in preparing to perform. The limit stays the same: reliance counts only to the extent it benefited the other side. The comment to § 371 says as much when it excludes expenditures “to the extent that they conferred no benefit.”16 Spending that went to third parties, or was simply lost, gives the other side nothing to give back.
Showing a benefit establishes only that a claim may exist. The amount depends on the loss the breach caused, which the next subsection takes up.
Benefit in Excess of Loss
The third requirement supplies the arithmetic. The breacher recovers the benefit he conferred “in excess of the loss that he has caused by his own breach.”18 Two figures therefore enter the calculation: the benefit he put into the other side's hands, which the previous subsection identified, and the loss his default cost the other side. The loss is subtracted before the claimant collects anything, so the innocent party's protection sits inside the formula, and a court applying it never has to choose between a forfeiture and a full refund.
The land-sale illustration shows the subtraction one step at a time. B conferred $30,000, the payments A holds. A's loss is the gap between the $100,000 the contract promised and the $95,000 the resale brought, which is $5,000. Subtracting the loss from the benefit leaves $25,000, and that is what B recovers.19 The result checks from A's side. A keeps $5,000 of B's payments, adds the $95,000 from the resale, and ends with $100,000, exactly the price he bargained for. Under the forfeiture rule A would have kept all $30,000 and ended with $125,000 for land that fetched $95,000 on the market, a surplus no bargain entitled him to.
Deducting the innocent party's damages keeps a breach from being free. Whatever the default cost him, whether a lower resale price or a higher cost of finishing the work, is charged against the claimant's recovery, and restitution returns only what the other side holds beyond its own harm.
How the benefit is valued is a separate question. Section 371 provides that in an action for restitution a court may, “as justice requires,” measure recovery either by the value of the performance rendered (the benefit theory) or by the increase in the value of the defendant's property or interests (the enrichment theory).20 The two measures can differ, and the choice between them is the court's.
The First Restatement added a ceiling that § 374(1) does not repeat in its text. Under § 357(1), the recovery could in no case exceed a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation.21 The text of § 374(1) states no comparable limit.22
The subtraction can consume the entire benefit. Restitution cannot fall below zero, because the claim exists to return a surplus the other side holds, and a claimant whose breach cost more than he conferred has left none. A subcontractor's claim in Denver Ventures, Inc. v. Arlington Lane Corp. ended this way: the damages from its breach exceeded the benefit it had conferred, so quantum meruit gave it nothing.
Even a claimant who meets the other requirements carries the burden on the amount. After holding that the buyers could not invoke the doctrine, the court in Quillen gave a second ground: they could not recover unless they affirmatively showed that the vendors received more from the buyers' part performance than the vendors lost, so that letting the vendors keep the excess would unjustly enrich them.23 The court was assuming without deciding that § 357 stated the law, but the excess of benefit over loss it required is the measure § 374(1) uses.24 Placing the burden on the claimant fits his position. He is the one asking relief from a contract he broke, and he is the one who knows what he delivered.
The arithmetic does not end the inquiry. In Lancellotti v. Thomas, the court found that the facts reasonably supported an inference that the party in breach learned the hoagie business, benefited from the trade and goodwill at the other side's place of business, and then ran the business at its own pizza shop the next season. Restitution in that instance, the court said, would be “a wholly unmerited reward for bad faith,” a result it did not consider consistent with the intent of law or the expectations of equity.25 The case went back to the trial court because that court had rested its decision on the common-law rule and never considered restitution under § 374(1).26 Willful breach, the subject of the next section, takes up that concern in full.