Concept
Retention Clauses and Deposits
Restitution for the party in breach
Retention Clauses and Deposits
Section 374(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts cuts back the restitution right that § 374(1) grants. When the parties' own agreement says that a party's performance will be kept if that party breaches, the breacher gets no restitution so long as the value of the retained performance, treated as liquidated damages (a sum the parties fix in advance as the measure of recovery for breach), is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulty of proving it.1 A deposit or down payment that the contract lets the seller keep on default is therefore tested as an advance estimate of the seller's loss.
Subsection (1) opens with the words “Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2),” so the limit works from inside the restitution claim.2 A court asks whether subsection (2) takes away a claim that subsection (1) would otherwise allow; subsection (2) never awards anything itself.
Manifested assent is what lets a clause justify keeping more than the subsection (1) arithmetic would allow. Without an agreement, a seller who holds payments beyond its own loss is simply enriched, and restitution returns the surplus. With an agreement, the seller keeps the money under a term the buyer accepted at signing, and the term serves both sides: the loss from a default often depends on how long a resale takes and where the market moves, and a sum fixed in advance spares them a trial on that question. The harder the loss is to estimate or prove, the likelier a fixed sum is to be reasonable.3
The reasonableness requirement guards the other flank. If a seller could write any retention term at all, drafting would defeat subsection (1): every contract would say that the buyer loses everything paid, and forfeiture would return under another name. A sum far above the injury may also signal unfairness in bargaining, or an agreement meant to frighten the buyer out of breaching and to punish the breach if the threat fails.4 Contract remedies exist to compensate, not to punish.5
Testing Reasonableness
Subsection (2) borrows the test that courts use for liquidated damages generally. The retained sum must be reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulty of proving it,6 and a clause that fixes unreasonably large damages is void as a penalty under UCC § 2-718(1) and unenforceable on grounds of public policy under Restatement (Second) § 356(1).7 “Penalty” is only the label for a sum that fails the comparison; the working question is always whether the sum is reasonable.
The older formulation was more categorical. It denied compensation for part performance that was merely a payment of earnest money, and it let a retention term stand unless the sum was so greatly in excess of the defendant's harm that the provision was rejected as imposing a penalty.8 Subsection (2) asks one question of every retained sum, whatever the payment is called.
Subsection (2) measures the sum against “the anticipated or actual loss,” so a retained sum can be judged at two moments: by the forecast the parties could make at signing, and by what the breach actually cost.9 The difficulty-of-proof factor points the same way. A fixed sum earns its place by standing in for a loss that is hard to prove, so a seller who can readily prove a small actual loss has a harder time defending a sum many times larger. The party resisting the agreed sum carries the burden of showing that it is disproportionate to the foreseeable or actual harm.10
Deposits and Down Payments
Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc. shows subsection (2) at work on a real deposit. The buyers there contracted to purchase a condominium for $78,800 and paid $7,880, a sum the contract designated as liquidated damages. When Euel Vines's employer transferred him, they decided not to take title, and no one claimed that the seller had failed in any obligation.11 The question on appeal was whether the liquidated damages clause defeated the defaulting purchasers' claim to restitution.12
The trial court had ordered the deposit returned. It reasoned that the unit had risen in value to $160,000 by trial, which it treated as roughly an $80,000 windfall to the seller, although neither side had offered evidence of the unit's value at the time of breach or of the seller's damages.13 The Connecticut Supreme Court began by recognizing that a buyer whose breach is not willful has a restitutionary claim to recover money that unjustly enriches the seller. It then held that the seller could keep the deposit, because a clause allowing the seller to retain ten percent of the price as earnest money is presumptively a reasonable allocation of the risks of default, and the presumption is rebuttable.14 The presumption suits a record like this one. A trial that measured the seller's gain by later appreciation had no figure for the loss the breach caused, and the presumption supplied a reasonable answer that the buyers remained free to rebut.
New York reaches a similar result by keeping the old rule. In Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, the Court of Appeals declined in 1986 to overrule Lawrence v. Miller as applied to real-estate down payments of about ten percent, because the long-established practice of letting a seller keep such a payment was no worse a rule than restitution. The court expressed no view about payments above ten percent.15 The two decisions leave the seller with the same ten percent for different reasons. Connecticut starts from a restitution right and lets a contract term defeat it, so the clause does the work. New York starts from the forfeiture rule for customary deposits, so custom does the work, and no clause is needed to explain the outcome.
Kutzin v. Pirnie shows what happens when the contract contains no retention term. The buyers defaulted after paying a $36,000 deposit on a $365,000 price, and the New Jersey Supreme Court held them entitled to restitution of the benefit conferred in excess of the loss they caused, with the burden on them to prove unjust enrichment.16 The court said that the deposit's being under ten percent did not affect the holding, and it noted that the contract said nothing about liquidated damages.17 With no retention term, subsection (2) had nothing to operate on, so the buyers' claim went directly to the subsection (1) calculation.
Vines and Kutzin together show that a deposit's size does not decide the case. In Connecticut, a ten percent deposit backed by a liquidated damages clause was presumptively retainable, while in New Jersey a deposit just under that size supported restitution where the contract was silent. Different states and different rules lie behind those results, but the contrast makes the practical point: under § 374, a seller who wants to keep a deposit of customary size needs a contract term that says so.
The Lancellotti Remand
Lancellotti v. Thomas applies subsection (2) as a sequence of two questions: did the parties agree that the payment would be kept, and is keeping it reasonable? The trial court had decided the case under the common-law rule, so it never considered whether the appellant, the party in breach, was entitled to restitution under § 374(1), nor the further question that depends on the answer.18 The appellate court concluded that the case should be remanded to the trial court.19
Subsection (2) frames the second question. If on remand the trial court again finds that the parties intended the payment to be retained on breach, it must decide whether retaining it is reasonable as liquidated damages in light of the anticipated or actual loss and the difficulty of proving it; if retention is unreasonable, the breacher's restitution claim goes forward.20 The opinion observes that the trial court correctly pointed out that the signed agreements clearly evidenced the parties' understanding, and it describes the appellant's breach of those agreements as “what might charitably be termed sharp practice.”21 Neither point answers the reasonableness question. The agreements show that retention was agreed, and the court must still compare the retained sum with the loss to learn whether it was a genuine estimate of damages or a forfeiture.
The first question in a real problem is which jurisdiction's rule applies. A court that has kept the forfeiture rule for customary real-estate deposits, as New York has for payments of about ten percent, never reaches step three, while a court following § 374 treats the same payment as a restitution claim unless the contract itself provides for retention.