Concept
Impracticability and Frustration
Discharge of repudiation damages by later impracticability or frustration
Impracticability and Frustration
Section 254(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts turns on two excusing doctrines. It discharges a repudiator's duty to pay damages for total breach if it appears after the breach that the repudiated duty would have been discharged by impracticability or frustration before any breach by non-performance.1 The damages defense is therefore only as strong as the excuse beneath it.
The court's inquiry is counterfactual. It assumes the repudiation never happened and the contract ran its course, then asks whether a later event would have released the repudiator from performing. If it would have, the damages claim is discharged; if the event merely made the bargain less attractive, the claim stands. The later sections on timing and scope take up when the event must arrive and how much of the claim it removes.
The two doctrines share a core. Each depends on an event that occurs after formation and whose nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, and each is closed to a party who caused the event or bore its risk.2 They differ in what the event does to the bargain. Under impracticability, it places a great and unexpected burden on the party who must perform.3 Under frustration, performance remains possible but its expected value to the party who was to receive it has been destroyed.4 The party who must supply land, goods, or services therefore ordinarily argues impracticability, and the party who must pay ordinarily argues frustration.5
Which doctrine a repudiator needs thus follows from the side of the exchange it stood on. Even a qualifying event excuses no one who caused it or bore its risk, a limit that the final subsection develops.
Impracticability
Impracticability is the excuse of the party who must supply something and cannot, or cannot in the contemplated way. UCC § 2-615 states the doctrine for sales of goods and Restatement (Second) §§ 261 to 272 states it generally; the two differ in details, but the basic concepts are the same.6 Under § 2-615(a), a seller's delay or non-delivery is not a breach if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by a contingency whose nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, or by good-faith compliance with a governmental regulation or order, even one later found invalid.7 The section assumes that the seller is the party claiming impracticability, but courts have let buyers invoke the excuse in appropriate circumstances.8
The doctrine began as impossibility. In Taylor v. Caldwell, a music hall hired for performances burned down after the contract was made and before the time for performance. No express term qualified the owner's obligation to provide the hall, but the court found the hall's continued existence to be a basic assumption of the contract and implied a term that its destruction excused performance.9 The defense was originally confined to changes of circumstances that made performance objectively impossible. Over the twentieth century that limit came to seem too narrow, because an event can impose such a great and unexpected burden that fairness demands relief although performance is not absolutely impossible. The doctrine broadened and was renamed impracticability.10
Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard marks the broadened doctrine. The defendant showed that it had removed all the gravel above water level from the plaintiff's land and that removing the gravel below would have required a different means of extraction at ten to twelve times the cost. Performance was not literally impossible, or even subjectively impossible, but it was so different from what both parties had contemplated at contracting that the court excused the nonperformance as impracticable.11 Impossibility survives as the strongest case under the broader doctrine, and UCC § 2-615 is broad enough to reach traditional impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose alike.12
Because every element must be met, and the facts that bear on one often bear on the others, the analysis runs best as a short sequence.13
Step three screens out most claims. A promise to do an act carries the representation that the promisor has the usual skills and resources to do it, so the promisor assumes the risk of its own shortcomings.18 Cost works the same way. Increased cost alone is generally not enough, though cost that involves economic waste through an unreasonable allocation of labor and resources can make an alternative method of performance legally impracticable.19 A price is itself an allocation of ordinary cost risk, so relief is reserved for changes so dramatic that they go beyond the level of risk the promisor assumed. Mineral Park, with a cost ten to twelve times higher and a wholly different method of extraction, sits at that end. So does the Alcoa litigation, in which the court concluded that the increase in electricity costs and the scale of the resulting loss were so dramatic that the parties had not foreseen them and they exceeded the risk Alcoa had assumed.20 A change that only raises the price of performing, without removing the means of performing, usually fails. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, a closed-canal case in which the longer route cost more, is the standard illustration.21
Some events qualify more reliably than others: the death or disability of a person necessary to the performance, the destruction without the promisor's fault of the subject matter or of a thing necessary to performance, and supervening governmental action that prohibits or purports to prohibit performance.22 A singer's death or disability excuses the singer's duty to perform in a nightclub, and so would destruction of the nightclub not caused by its owner.23
Destruction of goods needs one more ingredient. UCC § 2-613 excuses a seller only when the goods were identified to the contract at the time of contracting and then suffered casualty, through no fault of the parties, before the risk passed to the buyer. A flood that destroys wheat the contract names excuses the grower; the same flood does not protect a grower who promised wheat without specifying the crop, because no goods were identified.24 The identification requirement also explains why a seller whose supply of goods was destroyed stays liable when nothing in the contract tied the sale to that supply, as in Bende & Sons, Inc. v. Crown Recreation, Inc.
A change in the law is also an event. If the law changes to prohibit a performance that was lawful at the time of contracting, the change defeats a basic assumption of the contract, and both UCC § 2-615(a) and Restatement (Second) § 264 excuse good-faith compliance with a governmental regulation even if it is later found invalid. Had the music hall in Taylor survived but the city council tightened its safety rules so that the hall could no longer lawfully be let for public performances, the change in the law would have defeated the same assumption.25
Section 254(2) puts these questions about a performance the repudiator never had to give. The court assumes the contract ran its course and asks whether a later event would have excused performance when it fell due; it does not ask whether performance was already impracticable on the day of repudiation.26
Two limits keep the test from becoming an easy exit. The standard is objective, so a repudiator who says it lacked the equipment or the money to perform has described its own shortcomings, a risk it assumed.27 And an event the repudiator helped bring about cannot count, a limit developed in the last subsection.
Frustration of Purpose
Frustration is the payor's excuse. Rarely is it impracticable or impossible for the payor to pay; but if something has happened to make the performance for which the payor would be paying worthless to the payor, an excuse for not paying, analogous to impracticability or impossibility, may be proper.30 In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., the court observed that the buyer's defense was more properly frustration than impracticability, though the facts did not bring the case within the frustration doctrine.31 Restatement (Second) § 265 states the rule: a party's remaining duties are discharged when, after the contract is made, its principal purpose is substantially frustrated, without its fault, by an event whose nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the contract, unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.32
Frustration is built like impracticability and differs only in the effect of the event. Like impracticability, it concerns a post-formation event whose nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the contract; the event must not have been caused by the fault of the party whose purpose is frustrated, and that party must not have borne the risk of its occurrence.33 In Chase Precast Corp. v. John J. Paonessa Co., the court called frustration a "companion rule" to impossibility. Both concern the effect of supervening circumstances on the parties' rights and duties, and under frustration "[p]erformance remains possible but the expected value of performance to the party seeking to be excused has been destroyed by [the] fortuitous event."34 Because impracticability has grown to cover far more than objective impossibility, most frustration cases could probably be resolved under it. That lessens the need for a separate frustration doctrine, but courts and § 265 continue to treat the two as separate but allied.35
Krell v. Henry is the leading case. Henry rented a flat to watch the coronation procession, the coronation was postponed, and Krell sued for the balance of the agreed rent.36 The contract never stated why Henry wanted the flat, but both parties understood that his sole purpose was to view the procession, and that purpose was the very foundation of the contract. The postponement was a supervening event the parties had not reasonably contemplated, and the court excused Henry although both promises could still literally be performed: Henry could pay, and Krell could still let him have the flat.37
The shared-purpose requirement protects the other side of the bargain. A payor's private motive is no part of what the counterparty agreed to, so excusing a payor whose unspoken hope failed would penalize someone who relied on the contract as written. The purpose must be patent enough from the circumstances that both parties must have shared it.38 The Krell court gave little attention to risk allocation, and a concurring opinion asked whether Henry, the lessee, should have borne the risk of postponement. That is a fair question, because a contract silent on risk does not always show who should absorb a loss caused by frustration.39 The result is defensible because Krell could relet the room at the premium rental for the coronation's new date, so Henry cannot have meant to insure Krell against a postponement.40
Frustration's elements track those of impracticability, so the analysis differs mainly in what the event destroys.
Steps two and three do the screening peculiar to frustration, and they are cumulative: a purpose can be principal and still be only partly defeated, in which case the doctrine does not apply.
The Restatement's gasoline-station illustration shows how narrow the doctrine is. A lessee's business falls so far after a change in traffic regulations that it can run the station only at a substantial loss, and it stops paying rent. Because the lessee can still operate the station, its principal purpose is not substantially frustrated, the duty to pay rent is not discharged, and the lessee is liable for breach. The result would be the same if gasoline rationing or termination of the franchise had caused the loss.46 A rent fixed in advance leaves the risk of poor business with the lessee, and if lower profit were enough, any bargain that went sour could be unwound by pointing to a changed market. Krell lies on the other side of the line: the postponement left nothing of the purpose to pursue, while the gas-station lessee keeps every means of pursuing its purpose and simply earns less from it. Even a performance that has become useless to the payor does not always qualify. A tailor who contracts to make a dress uses usual skill, labor, and materials, whereas the flat's licensor charged a very high rate for an extraordinary use that became worthless.47
Krell was a suit by a lessor for the balance of the rent, not a repudiation case, but § 254(2) runs the same reasoning through a counterfactual. The licensee's announcement was a total breach, yet the owner's damages claim measures a payment that the cancellation would have excused before it fell due. The cancellation came after formation, its nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the license, it destroyed the licensee's principal purpose without the licensee's fault, and it arrived before any non-performance of the duty to pay. Those facts supply the discharge that § 254(2) describes, and the owner's damages claim fails.48 A repudiating gas-station lessee stands elsewhere: whatever a later traffic regulation does to its profits, it would still have owed the rent, so the later event supplies no excuse and the damages stand.49
Risk Allocation and Fault
A later event discharges a repudiator's damages liability only if the repudiated duty would truly have been excused, and excuse has limits that follow from how the doctrines work. Excuse operates as a gap-filler: where the contract does not address the event, a court may imply a term releasing the promisor, as it did for the burned music hall in Taylor.51 A gap exists only if the parties left the risk unallocated and the party seeking relief did not bring the event about. If the parties foresaw the event, they probably allocated its risk, expressly or impliedly.52 Each limit below therefore asks, from a different direction, whether the contract or the repudiator's own conduct already decided who bears the loss. If it did, nothing was omitted, nothing is discharged, and the damages claim stands.
The first limit is the repudiator's own responsibility for the event. Misconduct or negligence by the party seeking relief may be enough to deny it.53 Under UCC § 2-615, if one link in the causal chain that makes performance impracticable is the seller's fault, as where a seller fails to pick fruit before a hard freeze injures it, the seller cannot claim the section's protection.54 The common-law account agrees: a promisor whose wrongful conduct is responsible for an injunction against performance loses the defense, and so does one who creates the impracticability by a voluntary act.55 The structure explains why. Excuse presupposes an outside event that the contract did not address, and an event the promisor's own conduct helped produce is not one. Letting the promisor escape by pointing to it would reward the conduct that caused it.
Fault can also take the form of a failure to perform something already due. A seller who fails without good cause to deliver specific goods on February 1 cannot invoke impracticability when the goods are destroyed afterward, because that failure is contributory fault.56 The destruction there followed a breach by non-performance, the sequence that § 254(2)'s closing clause screens out and that the timing requirement takes up directly. A repudiation alone does not disqualify, because the rule presupposes a repudiation and still allows discharge when the event would have arrived before any breach by non-performance. What disqualifies is the repudiator's contribution to the event, or a due performance left undone before the event arrived.57
The second limit comes from the agreement itself. Parties often write force majeure clauses, which excuse a promisor when a listed event occurs: natural catastrophes such as fires, earthquakes, or hurricanes, and often war, governmental regulation, or labor strikes. Parties can condition performance on the nonoccurrence of any event they choose.58 Courts construe such clauses narrowly, so a disruption outside the clause's words is unlikely to be included by analogy.59 In sales of goods, Article 2 applies with an expanded concept of contract that reaches beyond the written words.60 An express clause comes first because it closes the gap that excuse exists to fill. Once the parties have said who bears the loss from a named event, nothing has been omitted, and the court enforces the allocation as written. The narrow reading follows from the same logic, since parties who wanted a broader clause could have drafted one.
A casino and a disc jockey show a clause at work. The casino pointed to a governor's shutdown order in March 2020 and to a clause relieving both parties of damages liability if performance was "rendered impossible," and a court on similar facts agreed with the casino.61 A clause worded that way supplies by agreement the release that impracticability would otherwise supply by implication, so the first question is whether its words reach the event. Had the clause named only fire and flood, a narrow reading would leave the shutdown order outside it.
When no clause covers the event, courts look first for evidence that the parties meant to allocate the risk anyway. Commercial practice and the surrounding circumstances can imply that the party seeking excuse took the risk of an event nobody considered.62 If no intention can be found, the court fills the gap. In Taylor the court reasoned from the assumption that the hall would continue to exist and implied a term excusing the owner.63 An economic approach asks a different question: it places the risk on the superior risk bearer, the party better able to bear it, for instance by buying insurance. Because a hall owner can insure against fire, that approach would leave the owner liable.64 The first method asks what assumption the contract rested on, and the second asks who could best have borne or insured the loss. Either can organize an answer to an unfamiliar event.
Some risks fall on a promisor because of the kind of risk they are. Insolvency is the common example. A promisor who cannot make a scheduled payment is not discharged, whatever caused the financial difficulty, and is deemed to have assumed the risk of becoming insolvent.65 A payee who agrees to wait for money relies on the payor's ability to supply it, and a promise to pay that dissolved whenever funds ran out would be worth only what the promisor happened to hold. A repudiating buyer whose later insolvency would have blocked payment therefore gains nothing under § 254(2), because that event would not have discharged the duty to pay.
The remaining limit is the basic-assumption requirement, and foreseeability is the evidence courts argue about most. The assumption need not be articulated, but it must be patent enough from the circumstances and the apparent purpose of the contract that the parties must have shared it.66 Courts divide on how much foreseeability matters, but most hold that relief should not be denied simply because the event may have been foreseeable.67 The court in Transatlantic Financing explained why: "Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot agree, often simply because they are too busy. Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated is probative but does not necessarily establish an allocation of the risk of the contingency which actually occurs."68 The Restatement (Second) treats foreseeability as only one factor. A few authorities would go further: they would let the promisor explain why no clause covered the contingency, as when the other party dictated a standard form, and they would not treat a failure to deal with an improbable or insignificant contingency as an assumption of the risk, even if it was foreseen.69 A fire in a music hall is easy to imagine, yet if the parties never treated it as a real likelihood, its imaginability does not make the owner assume the risk. These questions look to the bargain as made. Section 254(2) allows hindsight about the event, which arrived after the repudiation, but the allocation of its risk was fixed at formation.
The party seeking excuse also carries the burden of proving it. The burden rests on the party who asserts impracticability, who must show that the task could not be accomplished, and a party who creates the impracticability by its own voluntary act receives no excuse at all.70 A repudiator who invokes § 254(2) asserts exactly that excuse against a damages claim that already rests on its repudiation, so the burden of establishing the later event, the discharge it would have worked, and the absence of its own fault or assumption of risk is the repudiator's. Contract liability is strict, excuse is the exception, and the party asking for the exception is the one who holds the facts about its own conduct, its insurance, and the dealings that show who carried the risk.
Because each limit screens a different way in which a later event can fail to excuse, the limits can be run in order on any event a repudiator offers.