Concept
Companion Rule: Section 254(1)
Discharge of repudiation damages by later impracticability or frustration
Companion Rule: Section 254(1)
Section 254(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts adds a second way to cut off repudiation damages, this time by looking at the injured party's side of the bargain. The repudiator's duty to pay damages for total breach is discharged if it appears after the breach that the injured party would have totally failed to perform the return promise.1 Subsection (2), covered above, looks at the repudiator's side instead and asks whether impracticability or frustration would have discharged the repudiated duty before any breach by non-performance.2 Both subsections look past the repudiation to what would have happened had the contract run its course, and both discharge the damages duty when that look shows the exchange would never have been completed. They differ in whose performance would have failed.
Damages for repudiation pay the injured party for the performance the repudiation cost, so they are owed only where the repudiation caused the loss. Each performance in an exchange is the price of the other, and an injured party who would never have rendered the promised return would never have collected the repudiator's performance either. A buyer who could not have raised the price was not deprived of the goods by the seller's repudiation, because the buyer's own shortfall would have ended the exchange anyway. An award of the goods' value would pay that buyer for a bargain that could not have been completed.
Kanavos v. Hancock Bank & Trust Co. shows the rule at work. Kanavos held an option to buy stock from the bank, and the bank repudiated the agreement by selling the stock. Kanavos relied, as the trial judge apparently had, on a statement in Lowe v. Harwood (1885): when a seller repudiates by selling land to a third person, the buyer's inability to pay the contract price is unimportant in an action for breach.3 The court would not follow it. Lowe cited no relevant authority for the proposition, the principle appeared to be extinct, and there was no compelling reason to adopt it.4 The court instead treated the bank's obligation to sell and Kanavos's obligation to pay as concurrent. If neither could perform, neither could recover, even though the bank had repudiated, so Kanavos's financial ability to buy was a material issue in his damages action.5
Kanavos also marks the limit of what a repudiator may demand. He did not have to show that he was ready, willing, and able to buy the stock on the day the bank repudiated by selling it.6 That makes sense, since a tender of the price for stock that was already sold would have been pointless. Yet the principle does not make his ability to buy during the option period irrelevant.7 The two points answer different questions. The first asks what an injured party must do after the repudiation to keep a damages claim alive, and the answer is that no tender and no proof of readiness on the repudiation day is required. The second asks what facts that appear later show about whether the exchange was ever going to be completed, and the answer is that those facts matter.
The buyer's later ability to pay moved the answer, while the buyer's lack of cash on the repudiation date moved nothing, because readiness on that day was never required. A repudiator who offers a later fact in defense must therefore be asked whose side of the bargain the fact affects.
The sorting matters because the two subsections demand different things. Subsection (2) requires a genuine excuse, and a promisor's own inability to pay is ordinarily a risk the promisor bears, not an excuse, as the discussion of risk allocation explained. Subsection (1) states its test in terms of failure to perform the return promise and does not ask whether that failure would have been excused.8 A buyer's lack of funds therefore matters under subsection (1) for a reason that would not carry it under subsection (2), since a payor without the price does not render the return performance. A repudiating seller can defend by proving that the buyer could not have paid, but a repudiating buyer cannot defend by proving that it could not have paid.