Concept
Remedies for the Obligee's Breach
Remedies when the obligee breaches an accord
Remedies for the Obligee's Breach
When an obligee breaks an accord, the obligor gains three things at once: the original duty stays in force, the obligor may sue to have the accord enforced, and the obligor may add a claim for damages. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 281(3) states all three in one sentence. Breach of the accord by the obligee does not discharge the original duty, but the obligor may maintain a suit for specific performance of the accord, in addition to any claim for damages for partial breach.1 Specific performance is a court order requiring a party to do what the party promised. Here it compels the obligee to take the agreed substitute. The obligor's own default is a different problem, compared with this one in the next section.
The three consequences serve one purpose, which is to protect the bargain Okafor made. Okafor bought a release from the $450 duty by promising to render $425. If Brandt's breach discharged the original duty, Okafor would owe nothing at all, a windfall produced by the obligee's misconduct. If the law gave Okafor nothing, Okafor would stay exposed to a $450 claim while ready to pay the smaller sum Brandt promised to take. Section 281(3) avoids both results. It keeps the original duty in place, which prevents the windfall, and it gives the obligor ways to obtain what the accord promised. The sections below take each consequence in turn.
The Original Duty Survives
An obligee's breach of the accord leaves the original duty exactly where it was. While the accord is pending, the original duty is suspended, and it is discharged when the accord is performed, meaning the obligor renders the substitute and the obligee accepts it.2 An obligee's breach is the opposite of that event, because the obligee refuses or abandons the substitute instead of taking it. Nothing has happened to discharge the duty, and § 281(3) accordingly says that it survives.3
Okafor's $450 duty to Brandt therefore continues to exist after the August 1 refusal. The tempting error is to reason that Brandt broke the deal and so forfeits the debt, as if discharge were a penalty for misconduct. Discharge is the product of satisfaction, the substitute rendered and accepted, and Brandt's refusal is exactly what prevented satisfaction. An obligee's wrong can therefore block a discharge, but it cannot supply one.
The two scenes differ in one respect: Whitfield supplied the satisfaction, and Brandt withheld it. That difference decides whether the debt ends, and it also shows why the rule has this shape. If an obligee's breach released the original duty, Brandt would lose the entire claim over a breach whose real harm is delay and disruption of a bargain that remains enforceable. An obligor could even stand by while the obligee defaulted and collect the release anyway. The remaining clauses of § 281(3) hold the obligee to the accord instead, so the obligor needs no windfall to be made whole.
Ordinary breach law draws the same line. A total breach is serious enough to justify discharging the nonbreaching party, who may refuse to perform and even contract elsewhere. A partial breach leaves the nonbreaching party bound to perform and yields damages only for the harm actually suffered so far.4 Section 281(3) pairs the obligee's breach with damages for partial breach, which marks it as a default that does not end the other side's obligations.5 The general rules explain why the clause has this shape, and § 281(3) remains the controlling rule for accords.
The clause says only that the original duty is not discharged, and a careful answer stops there. It does not say that the obligee may sue on the original $450 at once. What it establishes is narrower: Okafor remains bound and has not yet received the release the accord promised. The next two clauses supply the ways to obtain it.
Specific Performance of the Accord
The second clause of § 281(3) gives the obligor a way to obtain what the accord promised: the obligor may maintain a suit for specific performance of the accord.7 The first clause left Okafor bound to the $450 duty and without the release, and a suit to compel Brandt to take the tendered substitute goes directly at that gap. Damages for partial breach, the third clause, are a further claim taken up in the next section.
A money judgment for the obligee's refusal would leave the original $450 duty alive, so the obligor would still face a claim the accord was meant to end. A decree compelling acceptance puts the obligor where the accord promised. Once the obligee accepts, the accord is performed, and performance of the accord discharges the original duty.8 The remedy therefore finishes the transaction the parties began on July 1.
Definiteness does the least work in the accord setting. An accord by definition names the stated performance the obligee will accept, so a court asked to enforce one usually has an amount, a form of payment, and a date to put in the decree. The general framework demands more certainty for a decree than for the formation of a contract, because the party ordered to act must know exactly what is required and faces contempt for disobedience.10 An accord that left the substitute open, such as an agreement to take some payment whenever convenient, would run into this requirement even though it might still be a contract.
Readiness is where an obligor most easily loses the remedy. A claimant must show that its own duties are complete and that it is ready, able, and willing to perform what remains.11 In an accord, that usually means a conforming tender, since the decree orders the obligee to accept something and there must be something to accept. A court may also condition its order on the obligor's actually rendering the substitute.12
Ibarra and Okafor hold the same kind of accord for the same $425. Okafor's suit rests on a delivered check that gives the court a concrete act to order Brandt to accept, while Ibarra's rests on a promise never carried out.
Inadequacy of damages carries the most weight in the equitable inquiry, because the law treats damages as the norm for breach and regards an order that binds the defendant personally as a harsher form of relief.13 Modern analysis asks less whether the subject matter is physically unique than whether damages can be measured reliably enough to put the plaintiff where performance would have.14 The obligor's argument starts from the structure of the accord: what was promised is a release, and a money judgment against the obligee releases no one from anything. Section 281(3) authorizes the suit without saying how courts apply the inadequacy requirement to accords in particular, so an answer should name the requirement and argue it from the nature of what the obligor bargained for.
The last condition lets the court weigh the equities. A court may deny relief where mistake, grossly disproportionate consideration, duress, or other unreasonable hardship is present, even when those factors would not independently avoid the contract.15 For an obligee resisting a decree on an accord, the difficulty is that the burden imposed is to take the very payment the obligee already promised to accept. Hardship becomes a serious argument mainly when something taints the accord itself, as when the obligee was pressured into it.
A decree for specific performance operates in personam. It is a command directed at the obligee personally, whereas a money judgment is enforced against property, and disobeying the command can be punished by fine or jail for contempt.16 That personal quality explains why equity wants definite terms and a ready claimant before it acts. It also fits the accord well, because the command asks for one definite act, accepting a tendered substitute, and does not ask the court to supervise a continuing relationship.
Damages for Partial Breach
The third clause of § 281(3) adds a money claim to the decree: the obligor may sue for specific performance of the accord “in addition to any claim for damages for partial breach.”19 The word partial fixes both what the obligor keeps and what the obligor can collect. A total breach is serious enough to let the injured party treat the contract as ended, refuse further performance, and recover for future harm as well as harm already suffered.20 A partial breach gives a right to damages only for actual harm resulting to date, and it does not excuse the injured party from its own performance.21 By leaving the original duty in place, § 281(3) puts the obligee's breach on the partial side of that line, so the obligor stays bound and recovers only for harm the breach has produced so far.22
The claim reaches only past harm because of what the decree does. An order compelling Brandt to accept the check performs the accord going forward, and once the accord is performed the original duty is discharged. Damages for future harm would pay Okafor for a loss the decree is already preventing. What the decree cannot reach is the harm that piles up between the refusal and the order. Okafor's choice to keep the accord alive and enforce it also preserves the right to recover for the breach already suffered, because an aggrieved party may elect to continue the contract after a breach and sue for partial breach.23
Damages for partial breach protect the same expectation as any contract damages, the gain the injured party would have realized had the contract been fully performed.24 Under an accord, the decree restores the main thing the obligor bargained for, release from the $450 duty, so what remains is the cost of delay and any expense the open debt imposed in the interim. Two ordinary requirements govern that claim: the loss must have resulted from the breach, and the obligor must prove it with reasonable certainty, the same measurement concern that drives the inquiry into whether damages are an adequate remedy at all.25
The decree and the damages cover different ground, and that division prevents double recovery. Where the order gives the breach victim its complete expectation, no damages are added. Where the breach caused a loss the order will not avert or recoup, damages compensate that irretrievable loss in addition to the order.26 A damages claim that compensated the same loss the decree supplies would put the obligor ahead of the position full performance would have produced.
The $0 and the $100 in these two scenes differ in a single fact, whether the delay left a proven loss behind, and the rule tracks that fact. Three misreadings follow from overlooking it. Treating the obligee's refusal as a total breach would release Okafor from the debt and invite a claim for the lost bargain, yet § 281(3) says the original duty is not discharged.27 Treating damages as an alternative to the decree would hand Okafor money in place of the release, when the clause attaches the damages claim to the suit for specific performance. Awarding damages for the whole value of the accord would count twice what the decree already supplies. In each case the answer is the same: the decree delivers the bargained-for performance, and damages cover only the proven loss it leaves uncured.