Concept
Damages for Nonacceptance
Aggrieved seller's remedies when the buyer breaches
Damages for Nonacceptance
A buyer who refuses conforming goods leaves the seller with a lost bargain and no figure for it. Resale supplies one: the seller sells to someone else, and the price of that sale replaces the missing number. Section 2-703 lets the aggrieved seller “resell and recover damages as hereafter provided,”1 but only a sale made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner earns the resale measure.2 A seller who never resold, who resold improperly, or who holds goods no one wants has still lost the bargain. For that seller Section 2-703 supplies another remedy: the seller may “recover damages for non-acceptance (Section 2-708) or in a proper case the price (Section 2-709).”3 This unit covers the damages half of that clause. The price has its own unit below.
The trigger is the one that opens every remedy on the seller’s menu. The buyer must wrongfully reject or revoke acceptance, fail to make a payment due on or before delivery, or repudiate as to part or the whole. The remedy then reaches the goods directly affected and, when the breach goes to the whole contract, the whole undelivered balance.4
Section 2-708 supplies two measures, and they look in different places. Subsection (1) looks outward to the market. Subsection (2) looks to the seller’s own profit, for the seller the market figure would leave short. A closing subsection takes up a contested question: whether a seller who resold properly may still claim the market measure when it pays more.
Market-Price Damages
Section 2-708(1) measures the seller’s loss against the market. Subject to the lost-profit alternative in subsection (2) and to the Code’s rules for proving market price (Section 2-723), the seller recovers the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price, plus incidental damages (Section 2-710), less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer’s breach.5 The formula has three working parts: a price gap, an addition for costs the breach created, and a subtraction for costs it spared. It needs no second sale, so a seller who never resold can use it. So can a seller whose resale fails Section 2-706, because the comment to that section says that failing to act properly “relegates him” to the market-price measure.6
The differential is the measure because a fixed-price contract allocates market risk. Each party assumes the risk of price movement: if the market falls, the seller benefits, and if it rises, the buyer benefits.7 A buyer who refuses the goods after a fall is trying to shed a loss it agreed to carry. In Peace River Seed Co-operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Marketing, the Oregon Supreme Court called market-price damages “the risk for which both parties bargained.”8 The two adjustments serve the Code’s general policy of putting the aggrieved party in as good a position as full performance would have.9 Incidental damages restore costs that only the breach created, and the expenses-saved deduction keeps the seller from profiting on costs it avoided.
The statute anchors the comparison at “the time and place for tender.” The question is what the goods were worth in the market where and when the seller was to make them available to the buyer. Later market movement does not change the benchmark, and neither does anything the seller does after the breach. That is also why the seller need not resell to keep the claim. The Oregon court reasoned that because the Code does not require a seller to resell, the duty to mitigate cannot force the seller into the resale measure either.10
Step three is where the measure most often strains. The statute makes the differential subject to the Code’s proof-of-market-price rules, so the seller must prove what the goods were worth at that place and time, and market price is often hard to prove.11 That difficulty is one reason resale, whose price is an actual transaction, can look more attractive to a seller. Step six marks the measure’s limit. When the differential is inadequate, subsection (2) substitutes the profit the seller would have made from full performance.12
Courts treat the statutory measures as mandatory. One court rejected a jury instruction that the jury “may award any of the following” measures, because the Code’s measures “are not stated in permissive language” but “specifically state the amount of recoverable damage depending upon the remedy seller has pursued.”13 Another court, on facts where guns the buyer never accepted remained with the seller, described the nonacceptance remedy of Sections 2-703(e) and 2-708 as “clearly and distinctly described,” and noted that the seller had sought the price instead.14 The price is a separate remedy with its own preconditions, taken up in the next unit. Oregon’s highest court even read the “unqualified text” of its Section 2-708(1) as suggesting that market price is the default measure of damages.15
Lost-Profit Damages
Section 2-708(2) supplies the second measure. Where the market-price differential is “inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done,” the seller recovers the profit (including reasonable overhead) it would have made from full performance by the buyer, together with incidental damages, with due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of resale.17 The measure is a fallback, so the first question on any set of facts is why subsection (1) fails for this seller.
The differential treats the refusal as the loss of one lot of goods. The seller keeps the goods, the market says what they are worth, and the gap is the damage. That arithmetic works when the breach frees goods for a second sale the seller could not otherwise have made, because the second sale stands in for the first. It fails for a seller who can supply every customer who comes along. For that seller the breach frees nothing, because the second sale was available anyway, and the seller ends up with one sale where performance would have given it two. A California court, quoting earlier authority, put it this way: where an intermediate dealer’s relationship with a producer lets it supply all obtainable customers, “the buyer’s breach does not make possible a new sale in which the profit lost by the breach would be replaced but, rather, results in an irreplaceable loss of profits because every new sale by such seller would bring in a new profit.”18
In Distribu-Dor, Inc. v. Karadanis, the court found that the plaintiff was acting as a middleman and held that the measure in Section 2-708(2), “the profit which would be earned, including reasonable overhead,” must be applied.19 The label mattered because of what it implied about supply.
Courts use two labels for one idea. Distribu-Dor speaks of the middleman. The Oregon Supreme Court, in a footnote in Peace River, defined a lost-volume seller as one who would have made a sale to the breaching buyer and also to the party who bought the goods after the breach, and noted that resale-price damages are not a proper measure for such a seller. It did not decide the point, because it awarded market-price damages.20 Either label reduces to a single question: would the seller have made the second sale anyway? If so, the resale adds a sale instead of replacing one, and the loss is the profit on the sale that fell through. If not, the breach freed the goods for a sale that was otherwise impossible, and the ordinary differential measures the loss.
A contrasting set of facts shows why supply decides the question.
An exam stem usually signals the issue through the seller’s supply. A seller described as stocking the product, ordering from a distributor on demand, or able to serve every customer points toward lost profit. A seller with one machine, one painting, or one lot points away from it. Whether a resale really replaces the lost sale can be disputed even on a routine-looking record, and the next subsection returns to that point.
The statute counts reasonable overhead as part of the profit, and the reason is practical. Fixed costs such as rent and salaried staff continue whether or not the sale closes, so a lost sale also costs the seller its contribution toward them. A measure that left overhead out would leave the seller worse off than performance would have. The credits run the other way: payments already received, and proceeds of resale, come off the award so the seller is not paid twice for the same performance. Like the market-price measure, this one is mandatory: the Code’s measures are not stated in permissive language and are keyed to the remedy the seller pursued.21
Resale Versus Market Price
Resale damages under Section 2-706 and nonacceptance damages under Section 2-708 sit side by side on the seller’s menu.23 Usually the two come out close, and the choice does not matter. Section 2-706(1) gives a seller who resells in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the difference between the resale price and the contract price. Section 2-708(1) gives the difference between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract price. Each adds incidental damages and subtracts expenses saved.24 The figures part when the seller’s actual resale beats the market price at tender, as happens when the seller holds the goods until prices recover or finds a buyer who pays a premium. The resale shortfall is then smaller than the market differential, and the question is whether a seller that resold properly may still claim the larger number.
A seller whose resale fails the Section 2-706 conditions does not face this question. In Foxco Industries v. Fabric World, the seller privately sold some of the goods without notice to the buyer. It could not invoke Section 2-706 and was limited to Section 2-708 or 2-709.25 The contested case is the seller that did everything the resale section demands and then asks for the market measure because it pays more. The Code does not say which measure governs, and the Oregon Supreme Court agreed with commentators that the drafters did not clearly resolve the issue.26
One view caps the seller at its resale shortfall. Professors White and Summers, whose view a number of courts have adopted, argue that the Code’s general policy is to put the seller only in as good a position as full performance would have, so a seller that has resold should not recover more in market-price damages than in resale-price damages.27 The court in Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co. quoted the same position: a seller who resells goods reasonably identified to the broken contract for more than the market price should be limited to the difference between the contract price and its actual resale price, because that difference is an exact measure of the seller’s expectation.28 On the press the argument is easy to follow. A seller that keeps $85,000 in resale proceeds and also collects $30,000 in market damages ends with $115,000 from a $100,000 contract, and the extra $15,000 is the premium its resale happened to earn.
Even the cap has limits that matter on a fact pattern. The buyer invoking it bears the burden of showing that the seller was not a lost-volume seller and that the goods resold were those that would have been delivered to the breaching buyer.29 If the seller could have filled the contract by buying on the market or by choosing among fungible goods, the buyer cannot show that the resale was reasonably identified to the broken contract, because the difference between the contract price and a specific resale price measures the seller’s expectation only when that resale substitutes for the lost sale.30 Change the press facts so the seller is an equipment dealer who orders a press from the manufacturer whenever a customer calls. Its later sale above the market price replaced nothing, because the dealer would have made both sales, and the buyer cannot use that price to cap the claim.
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the cap in Peace River Seed Co-operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Marketing. It held that an aggrieved seller may seek market-price damages even if the seller has resold the goods and those damages exceed its resale damages.31 The court reached that result in layers. Before the Code, a seller who resold was treated as having elected the resale remedy and could recover only resale damages, but the Code specifically rejected the doctrine of election of remedies.32 The text of Oregon’s Section 2-703 lists the seller’s remedies without a limiting “or” that would make them exclusive, while the parallel list for buyers joins cover and damages for nondelivery with “or.”33 Section 2-706 says the seller “may” resell and “may” recover resale damages,34 and the unqualified text of Section 2-708(1) suggests that market price is the default measure.35
One comment cuts the other way, because it says that failing to act properly under the resale section relegates the seller to market-price damages, as though resale were the primary remedy. The Oregon court read the comment as showing only that its drafters saw market-price damages as less favorable, perhaps because market price is hard to prove, and not as barring a seller that resold properly from choosing them. The legislative history agreed: an early draft comment made resale the exclusive measure for a seller that met its requirements, and the comment as adopted kept only permissive wording.36
The compensation argument gets a direct answer. A fixed-price contract assigns market movement to the parties, and the market differential is the very risk they bargained for.37 A commentator the court cites adds that a seller expects the contract-market differential in return for the risk that the sale may not prove profitable, and that a later resale does not diminish that expectancy.38 Mitigation does not change the result, because a seller need not resell, and a duty that cannot compel resale cannot compel the resale measure. A resale is the seller’s own transaction, made for its own benefit, and the seller owes the buyer no accounting for profit on it.39
Neither side can call the question closed, and the official comment to Section 2-703 explains why. It says the Article “rejects any doctrine of election of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are essentially cumulative in nature,” and then adds that “[w]hether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts of the individual case.”40 Quoting only the first half states the cumulative position as if it were the whole law. The second half ties the answer to what the seller did and what the resold goods were.