Concept
The Intended Beneficiary Test
Intended or incidental beneficiary
The Intended Beneficiary Test
Section 302(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts separates the beneficiary who may sue from the beneficiary who may not. Unless the promisor and promisee have agreed otherwise, a beneficiary is an intended beneficiary if recognizing a right to performance in that beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties, and one of two further conditions is also met.1 A beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary is an incidental beneficiary.2 The test therefore runs in two steps: a threshold question about the parties’ purpose, and then a screen about the beneficiary’s relationship to the promisee.
The two relationships appear as clauses (a) and (b). Under clause (a), performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary. Under clause (b), the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.3 Suppose Debtor owes Creditor on a loan, and Buyer, in a contract with Debtor, promises to pay that debt to Creditor. Buyer’s payment will discharge what Debtor owes, so Creditor falls within clause (a). Without a right of direct enforcement, Debtor, the promisee, would be the only person who could sue Buyer for the payment, and Creditor’s only claim would be against Debtor on the loan. As an intended beneficiary, Creditor can sue Buyer directly and keeps its claim against Debtor, though it can collect only once.4 Clause (b) reaches the promisee who owes no debt but wants someone else to have what the promisor will deliver.
Each half of the test does separate work. The threshold asks whether the parties meant the beneficiary to hold an enforceable claim. The clauses then name the two relationships in which that meaning is most plausible, because a promise to pay the promisee’s debt to a beneficiary and a gift promise each involve a manifestation of intention sufficient to make the beneficiary’s reliance both reasonable and probable.5
The clauses are the modern descendants of two older labels. Historically, third-party beneficiaries with enforceable rights were classed as donee or creditor beneficiaries, depending on whether the promisee was trying to make a gift or to discharge an obligation, real or assumed, owed to the third party. That classification aids, but does not conclusively decide, whether the beneficiary has enforceable rights.6 The Restatement (Second) keeps the principle but plays down the labels. It treats the fundamental line as the one between intended beneficiaries, who enjoy a right of direct action, and incidental beneficiaries, who do not. Its drafters aimed to steer courts away from mechanical use of the old categories and toward more flexibility, particularly for noncreditor beneficiaries, where donative intent in the altruistic sense may be lacking.7
The test matters most to the claimant who has nowhere else to turn. In one dispute, the plaintiff’s negligence claims against laboratories failed for want of a material fact issue, and that failure left his third-party-beneficiary claim as his last hope.8 The subsections below take the steps in order: the intent threshold, then the money-obligation route, then the benefit-conferring route.
Intent to Confer a Right
The threshold asks whether the parties meant the beneficiary to be able to enforce the promise. A contract is properly described as made for a third party’s benefit only if it manifests the parties’ intent to give the third party a benefit that the third party may enforce directly against the contracting party who undertakes to perform. Creation of that directly enforceable right is the hallmark of the doctrine.9 A third party who merely gains from performance does not qualify, because the fact that a third party may gain an incidental benefit is not enough.10
Courts did not always accept third-party enforcement. Early common-law courts balked at letting a third party enforce a contract when that party had no privity with the promisor and no consideration had “flowed” from it. Today every American jurisdiction allows enforcement, but a third party acquires the right only if the court finds that the principal parties intended to create legally enforceable rights in it.11 That limit is what makes the doctrine fair to the promisor. If the promisee’s manifested intention in obtaining the promise was to create enforceable rights in the third party, nothing is unjust, inequitable, or unfair in requiring the promisor to perform the duty owed to the third party or to answer to it for breach.12
Courts describe the inquiry in different words. Some require a finding that the third party was a “direct” or “primary” beneficiary, others ask whether the contract was made for the “express benefit” of the third party, and one formulation asks whether the contract manifests an “intent to benefit” the party who claims enforceable rights.13 No matter how it is articulated, the critical question is whether the promisee’s manifested intention in obtaining the promise was to create enforceable rights in the third party.14 When an opinion speaks only of intent to benefit, read it with the Restatement’s phrase in mind: the intention that matters is an intention that the beneficiary hold a right to performance.
Intent to benefit is a matter of interpretation, and the evidence comes in layers. Express language is the best evidence. Where a contract expressly states that the parties intend to confer a cause of action on citizens, they should be able to sue, and a contract that names them as its beneficiaries likely makes them donee beneficiaries.15 A beneficiary named or identified in the contract is likely to be intended. If the contract does not identify the beneficiary, the strong inference is that the benefit is merely incidental, though not inevitably so, because a beneficiary who will be identifiable when performance falls due may be intended despite the lack of specific identification at the time of contracting.16
When the contract is silent, the circumstances speak, and the Restatement measures them by the beneficiary’s reliance: a beneficiary who would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right is an intended beneficiary.17 The Restatement’s illustration involves a municipality that, to prevent harm to landowners downstream from its sewage system, obtains from a plant operator a promise to remove specified wastes from its deposits into the system. A downstream landowner is an intended beneficiary.18 In Vogan v. Hayes Appraisal Associates, Inc., MidAmerica obtained periodic progress reports from Hayes Appraisal on a home construction project. The reports and invoices carried the project’s location and also the buyers’ name, which gave Hayes reason to know that MidAmerica wanted the reports to give the buyers some protection for the money they had invested. On those facts the buyers qualified as third-party beneficiaries of the inspection agreement.19 In both settings, what mattered was what the promisor could see about the purpose behind the promise.
The clause speaks of the intention of the parties, yet clause (b) looks only to what the promisee intends, and jurisdictions differ on whose intention must be shown. The Restatement looks to the promisee’s manifested intention, although it may take account of factors that do not depend on that intention. In some jurisdictions, however, opinions state that both promisee and promisor must manifest the intent that the third party be a beneficiary.20 The first Restatement shows how the objective version of the promisee-focused test works: a third party could sue as a donee beneficiary when a reasonable person would believe that the promisee’s purpose was to make a gift to the third party, and in that situation a reasonable promisor would understand that, if it breached, the third party would be the primary aggrieved party.21 Grigerik v. Sharpe adopts the stricter view. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that it is the intent of both parties to a contract that determines whether a third party is a beneficiary.22 Put another way, a contract can result in an obligation to a third party only if both parties intended to create a direct obligation from the promisor to that party, so an incidental benefit is not enough.23 If a problem names a jurisdiction’s formulation, apply it; otherwise use the Restatement’s promisee-focused inquiry.
The opening words of § 302(1), unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, let the parties close the gate themselves.24 A third party acquires a right to enforce only if the principal parties intended to create it, so they may decline to create it.25 In Buckhorn, Inc. v. Orbis Corp., a party that tried to claim attorney fees under an indemnification provision in a contract between others lost, because that contract specifically denied third-party rights.
The word appropriate gives a court a final measure of control even when the parties clearly wanted the third person to gain. The Restatement’s commentary explains that where there is doubt whether the beneficiary’s reliance would be reasonable, procedural convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on the parties’ manifested intention may affect whether recognizing a right is appropriate. In some cases an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, requires a right without regard to the parties’ intention. The commentary’s example is Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, which extends a grocer’s express warranty to the buyer’s injured minor child regardless of what the buyer or the grocer intended.26
Creditor Beneficiaries
Clause (a) of § 302(1) supplies the first route to intended status: a beneficiary is intended where performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary.28 In the paradigm case, a promisor agrees to pay a sum that the promisee owes a creditor. Payment discharges the debt, and the creditor who receives it is the beneficiary the rule has in mind, which is why the Restatement’s comment calls this beneficiary a “creditor beneficiary.”29
The American rule letting such a creditor sue comes from Lawrence v. Fox. Holly, who owed Lawrence a debt, lent Fox money and directed Fox to pay it to Lawrence, and Fox promised Holly to do so.30 Fox did not pay. Lawrence, who had made no contract with Fox, sued Fox directly and won a verdict for the amount of the loan with interest. The judgment was affirmed at the Superior Court’s general term, and Fox appealed again.31 New York’s highest court allowed the suit under the rule that a third person may maintain an action on a promise made to another for his benefit when the promise rests on consideration advanced by the debtor.32
Early common-law courts would have found it hard to let someone in Lawrence’s position sue, because he had no privity with Fox and no consideration flowed from him.33 The court rejected that defense. It held that even where no agency or trust is established, the parties to a contract have the power to create rights enforceable by a person who is not a party, and that person may sue the promisor to enforce the performance undertaken to the promisee for the person’s benefit.34 Practical reasons reinforce the result. If Lawrence could not sue Fox, Holly would have to sue Fox, and if Holly then had second thoughts about paying Lawrence, Lawrence would have to sue Holly. Letting Lawrence sue directly reduces the likelihood of multiple lawsuits and puts the case in the hands of the party with the greatest interest in pursuing it.35
Comment b to § 302 restates the logic in the vocabulary of suretyship. In a creditor case the promisee is surety for the promisor, the promise is an asset of the promisee, and a direct action by the beneficiary against the promisor is normally appropriate to carry out the intention of promisor and promisee, even though no one manifested an intention to give the beneficiary the benefit of the performance.36 The debt itself supplies the reason the parties would want the creditor to be able to enforce. Suing the promisor also costs the creditor nothing. On the more common contemporary view, the creditor surrenders no rights against the promisee by seeking to enforce the promise against the promisor. The promisee, as surety, remains liable for whatever part of the debt the promisor leaves unpaid, and may then try to recover from the promisor for breach.37 In the opening example, Creditor may sue Buyer and, if Buyer cannot pay, may still look to Debtor.38
Section 302(1)(a) is narrower than the first Restatement’s creditor category. The first Restatement did not require that the promisee owe the beneficiary a money debt, and the debt did not even have to be real, because a “supposed or asserted duty” would do.39 The Second Restatement requires that the promisee’s duty be a duty to pay money or its near equivalent.40 Comment b stretches the rule only to obligations easily convertible into money, such as duties to deliver commodities or securities actively traded in organized markets. Less liquid obligations are left to clause (b).41 For Lawrence himself the revision changed only the label, because he fits comfortably within clause (a).42
A debt need not be enforceable against the promisee for clause (a) to apply. A suretyship relation may exist even though the promisee’s duty is voidable or is unenforceable because of the statute of limitations, the Statute of Frauds, or a discharge in bankruptcy.43 In the comment’s first illustration, A owes C a debt barred by limitations, B promises A to pay it, and C is an intended beneficiary under clause (a). In another, B promises A to furnish support for A’s minor child C, whom A is bound by law to support, and C is again an intended beneficiary under clause (a), so the underlying obligation may arise from law as well as from a loan.44
No suretyship exists if the promisee was never under any duty to the beneficiary. A promise to satisfy a “supposed or asserted duty” therefore falls outside clause (a), as does a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee’s property or to satisfy the duty of a third person. These beneficiaries are not shut out entirely. They may still be intended beneficiaries under clause (b), the route taken up next.45
A different exclusion turns on how one promise is read, and the comment’s third illustration shows it. B promises A to pay whatever debts A may incur in a certain undertaking, and A incurs debts to C, D, and E. If the promise means that B will pay C, D, and E, they are intended beneficiaries under clause (a). If the money is to be paid to A so that A can pay them, they are at most incidental beneficiaries.46 In the first reading, B’s performance discharges debts that A owes the beneficiaries. In the second, B’s performance delivers funds to A, who then decides what to do with them, and nothing B does satisfies an obligation A owes C, D, or E.
Macksey v. Egan applied that illustration. Egan and Burr had agreed to see to the provision of funds to a company so that the company could carry out a tender offer. Reading Egan and Burr as B, the company as A, and Macksey as C, the court concluded that Macksey was at most an incidental beneficiary.47
The creditor label is older than the Restatement (Second), and many courts still sort beneficiaries by it. Oregon case law, for instance, recognizes donee, creditor, and incidental beneficiaries and makes a third party’s right to enforce a promise depend on the intention of the contracting parties.48 The words of the contract can help. One court read an agreement’s description of the medical providers, including the plaintiff, as Russell’s “creditors” as a sign that the parties recognized the listed medical expenses were in fact owed.49 An answer that applies a state’s creditor-beneficiary test should use the state’s wording, while under § 302(1)(a) the duty must be one to pay money.
Gift and Other Intended Benefits
Clause (b) of § 302(1) supplies the second route: once the intent threshold is met, a beneficiary is intended where the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.51 The clearest case is the gift promise, one whose performance the recipient has not paid for, which discharges no right the recipient holds against anyone, and which is apparently designed to benefit the recipient. Its beneficiary is traditionally called a donee beneficiary.52 The leading early case on the donee’s right to sue is Seaver v. Ransom, and its facts show how the clause works.
A dying woman had a will drawn that left her niece less than she wished the niece to have. Her husband told her that if she signed it, he would provide for the niece in his own will, and she signed. When he died, his will made no provision for the niece, who sued to enforce his promise.
New York law at the time confined a third party’s right to sue, first, to cases in which a pecuniary obligation ran from the promisee to the beneficiary.53 The niece fit no such case, since her aunt owed her no money. The court let her sue anyway. It observed that the contract was made for her benefit, that she alone was substantially damaged by its breach, and that the representatives of the wife’s estate had no interest in enforcing it.54 It added that the tendency of American authority is to sustain the gift in all such cases and to permit the donee beneficiary to recover on the contract.55
In Fourth Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., New York’s highest court later explained the shift. It quoted the observation that the requirement of some obligation or duty running from the promisee to the beneficiary had been “progressively relaxed until a mere shadow of the relationship suffices, if indeed it has not reached the vanishing point.” Rather than duty, it said, it has emphasized when upholding a third party’s right to enforce a contract that no one other than the third party can recover if the promisor breaches, citing Seaver, or that the language of the contract clearly evidences an intent to permit enforcement by the third party.56 The inquiry moved from whether the promisee owed the plaintiff something to what the promisee meant to accomplish by obtaining the promise.
The rule follows from how a gift promise works. A promisee who obtains a promise to give something to another loses nothing when the promisor defaults, so the promisee has little reason to sue and may be unable to, as the dying wife in Seaver was. If the recipient cannot sue, no one can, and the promisor keeps the price for a promise that no one can hold it to. The niece’s having given nothing for the promise once troubled courts, but it is no obstacle, because the contract she enforces is the one her aunt and uncle made, and consideration passed between them.57
Clause (b) reaches further than the old donee label. Its drafters wanted courts to decide cases with more flexibility, particularly for noncreditor beneficiaries, where donative intent in the altruistic sense may be lacking.58 Marion Seaver fits comfortably within clause (b), and for her the revision was only a rewording.59 The contract need not call for performance directly to the beneficiary, because a gift may be made by paying the beneficiary’s debt, and no contact or communication with the beneficiary is essential.60
The Restatement’s illustrations show the breadth. An insurer that promises a policyholder to pay $10,000 on the policyholder’s death to the policyholder’s wife owes that promise to an intended beneficiary. So does a promisor who agrees to give a box of cigars to a troublesome acquaintance of the promisee, who dislikes him but believes a present is the best way to obtain freedom from annoyance. The promisee’s self-interested reason for giving does not change the fact that the promisee means to confer the benefit. And where a parent secures a promise to pay a son’s debt to a creditor in order to help the son, both the son and the creditor are intended beneficiaries under clause (b).61
One promise can sit under both clauses. If A owes C $100 and B promises A to pay C $200, partly to discharge the debt and partly to express A’s gratitude for the loan, C is an intended beneficiary under clause (a) as to the debt and under clause (b) as to the excess. The label can even turn on what the promisee manifests about a single sum. If B, unaware of any debt, promises A to pay C $100, C is an intended beneficiary under clause (a) if A manifests an intention that the payment satisfy the debt, and under clause (b) if A manifests an intention to make a gift, leaving the original debt outstanding.62 When an exam gives you a promisee who both owes the beneficiary something and wants to be generous, ask what the promisee meant the payment to do. Either answer yields an intended beneficiary.
Gift promises are not the only promises that qualify under clause (b). The Restatement’s comment identifies other cases that are quite similar: a promise to perform a supposed or asserted duty of the promisee, a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee’s property, and a promise to satisfy the duty of a third person. In each, the test is whether the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him.63 None fits clause (a), because the promisee owes no established money debt to the beneficiary, yet the promisee’s purpose to benefit someone can be as plain as in a gift. Where C asserts that A owes him $100, and A neither owes it nor thinks he does but secures B’s promise to pay C in order to avoid litigation and obtain peace of mind, C is an intended beneficiary.64 The roofer in the previous subsection stands in the same position: the homeowner obtained his brother’s promise to end the dispute, so the roofer is an intended beneficiary.
Because clause (b) turns on purpose, the relationship between promisee and beneficiary does evidentiary work. In Seaver the court emphasized the close relationship of the wife and her niece and the lack of interest of the wife’s representatives in enforcing the promise, and in just such a situation a reasonable promisor should know that the wife’s purpose was to give her niece a gift.65 A bond of family or affection explains why a promisee would want to confer a benefit, but it supplements the inquiry into intent and does not replace it. Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry Center, Inc. shows the same inquiry in a commercial sale. A fiancée claimed as a third-party beneficiary of her fiancé’s purchase of an engagement ring from a jeweler who knew the ring was meant for her, and the jeweler’s knowledge of that purpose supported her claim to intended status.
The same inquiry defeats a claimant whom the promisee had no purpose to benefit.
Whatever label an opinion uses, whether donee beneficiary, asserted duty, or a third person’s debt, the question under clause (b) is the promisee’s purpose to benefit the beneficiary, judged from the circumstances as a reasonable promisor would see them. The old test asked whether the promisee owed the beneficiary something. The modern one asks whether the promisee meant to give the beneficiary the benefit.