Concept
The Intended Beneficiary's Right
Intended or incidental beneficiary
The Intended Beneficiary's Right
Intended status matters because of what it delivers: a claim of one's own. Section 304 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states the rule in one sentence. A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.1 The promisor now answers to two people: the promisee who bargained for the promise and the beneficiary for whom it was made. That directly enforceable right is the hallmark of a contract for a third party's benefit, which manifests the parties' intent to give the third party a benefit enforceable against the party who undertakes to perform.2
The loan arrangement shows the difference. Debtor owes Creditor under a loan contract, and Buyer promises Debtor to pay that loan. Without a direct claim, Debtor, the promisee, would be the only person who could sue Buyer, and Creditor could look only to Debtor under the loan contract. As an intended beneficiary, Creditor can sue Buyer directly if Buyer fails to pay. It keeps its right against Debtor as well, so it has two parties from whom to seek recourse, although it can obtain only a single satisfaction, and payment by one releases the other to that extent.3
The direct claim does real work. The promisee who arranged the benefit may be unable or unwilling to pursue it, and a beneficiary who cannot sue on the contract may simply be out of luck, whatever the contracting parties intended.4
The privity obstacle
Section 304 reads as obvious now, but early contract law would have turned Creditor away. Apart from trusts, it generally required a party to be in privity of contract to sue.5 English common law recognized a direct action by a beneficiary only if the beneficiary could establish that the promisee was acting as its agent or that the contract created a trust.6 Neither workaround fits an ordinary three-party contract well. Agency requires that the promisee have acted for the beneficiary. A trust requires a trust asset, or res, which a bare agreement between two parties may not supply.7
Courts had reasons for the caution. Over-extending the right to sue on other people's contracts could deter promisors from contracting at all. A manufacturer that agreed to pollution limits in a contract with a city might have thought twice if every citizen could sue it for breach. The caseload from such suits could also tax the courts.8
Lawrence v. Fox
In the mid-nineteenth century, American law broke from that position, beginning with the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Lawrence v. Fox.9 The evidence showed that Holly, at Fox's request, loaned Fox $300 and said at the time that he owed that sum to Lawrence for money borrowed. In consideration of the loan, Fox promised to pay the $300 to Lawrence the next day.10 When Fox did not pay, Lawrence sued him. The court held that a third person may maintain an action on a promise made to another for his benefit when the promise is founded on consideration advanced by the debtor.11 It rejected the defense and announced a broader principle: even where no agency or trust is established, the parties to a contract have the power to create rights enforceable by a nonparty, who may sue the promisor to enforce the performance undertaken for his benefit.12
The decision was not unanimous. The Court of Appeals affirmed Lawrence's judgment 6–2, but two of the six judges in the majority would have said that Holly contracted as Lawrence's self-professed agent. That left only four committed to the general proposition that when “a promise [is] made to one for the benefit of another, he for whose benefit it is made may bring an action for its breach.”13 The argument against the suit was straightforward. Lawrence would benefit if the arrangement were fully carried out, but the arrangement was between other parties and under their exclusive control, and had Fox paid Holly, his debt would have been discharged.14
The law has largely answered that objection. On the facts of Lawrence, the fears that kept strangers out of court carry little weight, and positive policies point the other way. If Lawrence cannot sue Fox, Holly must sue Fox, and if Holly then has second thoughts about paying Lawrence, Lawrence must sue Holly. A direct suit avoids that chain of lawsuits and leaves the claim with the party who has the greatest interest in pursuing it.15 The courts have summed up the point as procedural economy and convenience of remedy: where A, for consideration, promises B to pay money or transfer property to C, C, no less than B, should be able to sue if A fails to perform.16
Where the right ends
The right exists because the parties meant to create it, and the Restatement's definition says so. Unless the promisor and promisee agree otherwise, a beneficiary is intended if recognizing a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the parties' intention and one of two further conditions is met.17 Two consequences follow. A beneficiary who is only incidental acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the promisor or the promisee.18 And because the definition begins with “unless otherwise agreed,” a contract that expressly denies rights to outsiders keeps an outsider from becoming an intended beneficiary, so the promisor owes it no duty.19
What the promisor knows can establish intent. In one case, the inspection reports and invoices that Hayes Appraisal gave MidAmerica named the Vogans as the home purchasers on the project. That gave Hayes reason to know the reports were meant to give the Vogans some protection for the money they had invested, and under the Tredrea standard the Vogans qualified as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement.20
An exam stem in which an outsider sues on someone else's contract is therefore asking whether the parties gave that outsider a right. The outsider's loss is not the test. The stem may also contain a clause disclaiming third-party rights, so read the contract's language before you reach the remedy.
What the beneficiary may do once the right exists is settled, but whether the parties can later take it away is not. Lawrence raised without answering whether the contingent nature of a third party's rights should keep the third party from suing. The court noted that Holly and Fox had not changed their minds and left for later cases the question of when a beneficiary's rights vest and become unchangeable.21