Concept
Incidental Beneficiaries
Intended or incidental beneficiary
Incidental Beneficiaries
A beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary is an incidental one, and the Restatement gives that person no right under the contract. Section 302(2) defines the category by exclusion,1 and § 315 states the consequence: an incidental beneficiary acquires by virtue of the promise no right against the promisor or the promisee.2 The definition is circular. Incidental status says nothing independent about the claimant; it records only that the claimant failed the intended-beneficiary test.3 That test, in § 302(1), asks whether recognizing a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the parties' intention.4 A claimant who fails it, or who clears it but cannot show a debt the promisee owes the claimant or a promisee purpose to give the claimant the benefit, is incidental, and the contract route closes against both parties.
Performance of a contract often benefits a third person, but unless that person is an intended beneficiary, the contract creates no duty to him.5 The reason is partly practical. When the promisor and promisee priced their bargain and allocated its risks, they could not have weighed the expectations of myriad unnamed persons, such as neighboring landowners, and they would hardly have worried about the financial effect on those persons of a later breach. Contract law provides a framework within which the parties generate gains for themselves; it is not directly concerned with the wealth effects on nonparties.6 A rule that benefit alone created rights would expose a builder on a single contract to claims from every neighbor, and the builder would have to price them all.
The result holds against the promisee for a different reason. The promisee bargained for the promise to serve its own purposes and promised the bystander nothing. An intended creditor beneficiary can proceed against the promisee only because the debt is the promisee's own.7 A bystander has no such debt to point to, so the promise is the only possible source of a claim, and it supplies none.
Illustration 16 shows the pattern at its plainest. B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A's land, and C's adjoining land would rise in value if the building is completed. C is an incidental beneficiary.8 C's gain is real, yet the contract concerns A's land, and C has no claim if B walks off the job. The same is true when a landscaper, developer, or construction company breaches. The people who expected to benefit, even those with an important stake in performance, have no cause of action to enforce the contract or to claim damages, because the benefit they anticipated was an incidental result of a transaction between others.9
Receiving money does not turn a bystander into an intended beneficiary either. In Illustration 17, B contracts with A to buy a new car manufactured by C, and C is an incidental beneficiary even though the promise can be performed only if money is paid to C.10 The money reaches C as the price of C's own goods in a chain of sales. That gives the money a reason to move and gives C no right to enforce. Payment to a third person marks an intended beneficiary only when the promisee's purpose was to send it there. In another illustration, A conveys land to B in return for B's promise to pay $15,000: $5,000 to C, A's wife, on whom A wishes to make a settlement; $5,000 to D, to whom A owes that amount; and $5,000 to E, a life insurance company, to buy an annuity payable to A. C and D are intended beneficiaries, C as the object of a gift and D because the payment discharges A's debt. E is incidental even though the money goes to E.11 E is paid simply as the seller of a product that A is buying for A's own benefit.
An interest written into the claimant's own contracts does not change the result. In Illustration 18, a labor union promises a trade association not to strike against any member for a certain period, and one member charters a ship from C on terms under which a strike would cause C financial loss. C is an incidental beneficiary of the union's promise.12 The loss is large and contractual, yet the promise ran to the association. Illustration 19 applies the rule to a chain of contracts. A contracts to erect a building for C, and B then contracts with A to supply lumber for it. C is an incidental beneficiary of B's promise, and B is an incidental beneficiary of C's promise to pay A.13 Each depends on the other's performance, but each promise was made to A, so neither the owner nor the supplier holds a right on the other's promise. Construction chains return later in this chapter.
In the first contract, the performance reaches Lindqvist as a side effect of work on someone else's property. In the second, it is the whole point of the contract, which is why only the second shows a promisee purpose to benefit Lindqvist.14 The neighbor gains in both versions, but the answer flips with the promisee's evident purpose.
Because the line follows that purpose, neither the size of a third person's stake nor the intensity of the third person's interest moves it. In Devine v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, an employee required to take a drug test as a condition of employment received a false positive and sued the laboratories that ran it, claiming to be an intended beneficiary of their contract with his employer. The Maine court held that he was not, even though a breach by the laboratory would clearly affect him, because nothing showed an intent to give him standing to enforce the contract.15 His livelihood depended on the result, which shows that how much the third person cares about performance is not the variable. The variable is whether the promisee, in obtaining the testing promise, meant to give employees a right to hold the laboratory to it.
Courts apply the same reasoning to purely economic loss and to the students a college serves. In Bain v. Gillispie, store owners sued a referee for losses they attributed to his incompetent calls in a game that cost Iowa its chance at a championship. One basis for the claim was the referee's alleged contract with the Big Ten Conference to call games competently, and the court affirmed summary judgment for the referee.16 A student named Verni, who claimed third-party beneficiary status under a contract between his college and a faculty member, fared no better. The court acknowledged that Verni and all of the college's students are incidental beneficiaries of the college's employment contracts with faculty, but explained that not every person a contract benefits may sue to enforce it. Only those clearly intended may.17
Incidental status closes the contract route and no other. Devine's negligence claims failed because he produced no evidence raising a material issue of fact, not because of his status, and that failure left his beneficiary claim as his last hope.18 A claimant who is incidental on the contract may therefore still plead negligence. Outside commercial deals, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes circumstances in which a lawyer owes a duty of care to a nonclient. If an attorney botches the execution of a will and deprives a named taker of an intended benefit, the attorney is accountable to that person for negligence, and Lucas v. Hamm is the well-known authority.19 This chapter returns to will drafting below. When the facts make the claimant incidental, the answer to whether the claimant can sue on the contract is no, and any other theory the facts support needs its own analysis.