Concept
Applying Both Rules Together
Identification and disclaimer
Applying Both Rules Together
Two sections of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts answer different questions about the same claimant, and a third-party beneficiary problem often needs both. Section 308 provides that it is not essential to the creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract containing the promise is made.1 Section 306 provides that a beneficiary who has not previously assented to the promise for his benefit may, in a reasonable time after learning of its existence and terms, render any duty to himself inoperative from the beginning by disclaimer.2 The first rule governs how a right comes into being; the second governs what the beneficiary may do about a right she never chose. The two therefore work in sequence. A claimant must hold a right before she can refuse it, and the right must survive the objection that she was a stranger to the contract when it was made.
Step one is the gateway. The promisor's duty runs to an intended beneficiary, who may enforce it,3 so a claimant who fails here has nothing to identify and nothing to disclaim.
In Warren v. Monahan Beaches Jewelry Center, Inc., a jeweler sold a ring to a customer it knew was buying an engagement ring, though it did not know his fiancée. When she later noticed a chip and brought the ring back, the jeweler undertook to replace it when new inventory arrived.4 An appraisal she then obtained showed the stone to be cubic zirconia, and she sued the jeweler directly. The court held that her complaint stated a cause of action. It alleged both the jeweler's discussions with her fiancé before the sale and its dealings with her afterward, and together those allegations adequately pleaded an intent to confer an enforceable benefit on her.5
What the jeweler knew carries step one only part of the way. Knowing the ring was an engagement ring told the jeweler who would end up wearing it, but knowing that someone else will receive the performance is not enough; the claimant must also show that the parties meant her to be able to enforce the warranty. The jeweler's later dealings with her helped on that point, because they amounted to a course of performance that supported the inference that the contracting parties intended her to have a right of enforcement.6
Step two is easy on these facts. The jeweler did not know her when the sale was made, and § 308 makes that gap irrelevant to whether a right exists. The condition that accompanies the rule, taught above, is that an unnamed claimant must be identifiable when performance falls due. She was: once the jeweler was dealing with her over the chipped stone, it knew who held the ring and therefore to whom the promised performance was owed. Warren was decided on the pleadings, so it shows what a claimant must allege to clear steps one and two. It does not decide whether she ultimately recovered.
Warren never reaches step three. The plaintiff kept the ring, had it appraised, and sued on the warranty, and by suing she treated the benefit as hers. Before step three is run on facts that do raise it, one premise needs restating. A beneficiary's right arises, if at all, when the contract is formed. Vesting, the point at which the promisor and promisee lose the freedom to modify or rescind, becomes an issue only if they try to change the arrangement.7 The beneficiary therefore need not accept anything to hold a right, and disclaimer is not a precondition to having one. Disclaimer is her exit from a right she already holds, which is why § 306 speaks of rendering the duty inoperative from the beginning rather than of conferring or withholding a right in the first place.
Nora and Owen clear steps one and two together, since the same contract and the same birth records serve both. They part ways at step three on a single fact: Owen assented before he tried to refuse. A month's delay might well be a reasonable time, so timing does not explain why Owen loses. His earlier assent ends the power by itself, because § 306 gives the power to disclaim only to a beneficiary who has not previously assented. A beneficiary who has said she wants the benefit cannot also keep a free option to walk away from it. Neither child had to accept anything to hold a right, since each right existed from formation. Owen's acceptance mattered only because it closed off his exit.
Nora's express written refusal also matters in jurisdictions that hold rights vest when the beneficiary learns of the contract and agrees to accept its benefits. There, a beneficiary who learns of the contract and does not expressly reject the benefits is ordinarily presumed to have accepted.8 The usual exam errors run in two directions. One is to treat the claimant's lack of identification at formation as the reason she has no right; the other is to treat her lack of acceptance as the reason. In this problem neither fact decides anything.