Concept
Derivative Beneficiary Rights
Defenses against the beneficiary
Defenses Against the Beneficiary
Derivative Beneficiary Rights
An intended beneficiary who sues the promisor is suing on a promise made in someone else's contract, and that fact controls what the promisor may say in response. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 304, a promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary, and the beneficiary may enforce that duty.1 Whether a particular third person qualifies as an intended beneficiary is a separate question; this unit assumes that she does.
The duty carries a condition. A promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless the promisor and promisee have formed a contract, and if that contract is voidable or unenforceable when formed, the beneficiary's right takes the same infirmity.2 The beneficiary has no other basis for suit. Any defense the promisor could properly assert under the contract is therefore available against her, whether it goes to formation, such as misrepresentation or mistake, or to enforcement, such as violation of public policy.3
A right that exists only because of a contract can be no sturdier than the contract. The promisor agreed to one bargain, and naming a third person to receive the performance does not enlarge what the promisor owes.
Restatement (Second) § 309 turns that idea into the working rule. Unless the contract makes clear that it confers rights on the beneficiary free of defenses, her rights are subject to any limitation inherent in the contract. The promisor may raise against the beneficiary any defense, arising out of the contract, that would have been available against the promisee.4 Put simply, any claim or defense arising out of the contract that the promisor could have asserted against the promisee is good against the beneficiary.5
The sections that follow sort those defenses by when the problem arose. Some are defects at formation: lack of consideration, fraud, duress or another bargaining defect, and failure to satisfy the statute of frauds. Others arise afterward: the promisee's breach, supervening impracticability, and the nonoccurrence of a condition.6 A final group marks the limits of the principle, including the one exception the sources note, that a modification or rescission cannot defeat beneficiary rights that have already vested.7
The Rouse dispute shows the principle at work, and it shows its edge as well. Rouse bought a house from Winston and promised to pay $850 that Winston owed Associated for a heating plant. The FHA, as Associated's successor, sued Rouse as a beneficiary of that promise. Rouse raised two defenses. The first was fraud, and the court treated it as good: if Rouse could raise fraud against a suit by Winston, the same defense had to be available against the beneficiary, because one who promises to pay the promisee's creditor can assert against the creditor any defense the promisor could assert against the promisee.8 The second was that Associated had installed the plant improperly, and the court sustained the order striking it. Rouse could have shown, if he could, that Winston owed Associated nothing enforceable, since the beneficiary's rights would be no greater merely because Rouse had taken over Winston's obligations. But what Rouse assumed was a fixed sum, not a litigable claim. It was as if Winston had already settled with Associated and conceded that she owed $850 when she sold the house.9 What the promisor actually promised, then, determines which defenses survive.
The beneficiary's position resembles an assignee's, and the comparison helps.10 Suppose a contractor mows Alice's lawn so poorly that the work is a material breach, and then assigns the right to payment to someone else. Alice could have raised the breach against the contractor, and she may raise it against the assignee, because an assignee receives only what the assignor had to transfer.11 The resemblance stops at how the third party's right arises. An assignee holds a right transferred from an existing contract, while a beneficiary holds a right that exists because the contracting parties made their contract to benefit her. In an assignment case the question is whether requiring performance for the assignee materially changes the obligor's duties, not whether the parties meant to benefit the assignee.12
A defense of this kind can reduce or defeat the beneficiary's claim, and it goes no further. By accepting the benefit, the beneficiary does not assume the promisee's obligations. A promisor wronged by the promisee's breach or fraud may therefore refuse the beneficiary, but must pursue the promisee for any recourse.13