Concept
Defects at Formation
Defenses against the beneficiary
Defects at Formation
A beneficiary's right is only as good as the contract it comes from, so the first defenses to check are the ones that existed on the day that contract was made. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 309(1) states them in two clauses. A promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless the promisor and the promisee formed a contract; and if that contract was voidable or unenforceable at formation, the beneficiary's right is subject to the infirmity.1 The inquiry runs backward from the lawsuit to the bargain and asks what promisor and promisee actually produced.
The backward look follows from the derivative character of the beneficiary's right. Section 304 lets an intended beneficiary enforce the promisor's promise, but the promise is a duty only because it sits inside a contract.2 A flaw at formation weakens everything resting on that contract, including the claim of the person the parties meant to benefit. Unless the contract makes clear that it confers rights free of defenses, the beneficiary takes subject to the limits inherent in the contract.3 The beneficiary is not a party to the bargain, and the law has no reason to let the beneficiary enforce a bargain the promisee could not have enforced.
The two clauses address different failures. In the first, no binding agreement ever formed, so no promise exists for the beneficiary to enforce. In the second, a contract formed, but the law lets the promisor avoid it or refuses to enforce it, and the beneficiary's right inherits that limit. Defects that arise only after a sound contract was made fall under a separate rule, taken up in the next part. The first subsection begins with the contract that never formed.
No Contract Formed
The first clause of § 309(1) means what it says: no contract between promisor and promisee, no duty to the beneficiary.4 A contract forms when the two contracting parties manifest assent to an exchange and the promise is supported by consideration, something the promisor sought and received in return. If either ingredient is missing between those two, the law has produced no contract. An offer may never have been accepted, or the promisor may have received nothing bargained for. In either case the promisor may say so in answer to the beneficiary's suit.5
The reason lies in how § 304 builds the beneficiary's right. That section attaches a duty to a promise in a contract, and the beneficiary enforces the duty the contract created.6 Without a contract, what remains is a statement of intention that no court will enforce, so there is no duty for the beneficiary to enforce. Naming a third person as payee does not close that gap, because the naming only identifies who would receive performance if a binding promise existed. The promisor is bound because the promisee gave something in exchange, and the beneficiary's benefit rides on that exchange.
Because the question is whether promisor and promisee formed a contract, the consideration that counts is the exchange between those two. The beneficiary need not have given either of them anything.7 A rule requiring the beneficiary to pay would exclude nearly every beneficiary, since the point of the arrangement is that the promisee has bought the benefit for someone else. Still, a lack of consideration between promisor and promisee is a formation failure that the promisor may raise against the beneficiary.8
One fact separates these two scenes: whether the promisor bargained for something from the promisee. The beneficiary paid nothing in either, so the beneficiary's own contribution cannot be the dividing line. Students make two opposite mistakes here. One is to notice that the beneficiary gave no consideration and conclude that the claim fails. The other is to notice that the beneficiary is the promisee's creditor and conclude that value was given. Both mistakes look at the wrong pair of parties, because only the promisor and the promisee matter.
This defense also differs from the one taken up next. Here the parties produced no contract, so nothing exists to enforce. In the next situation a contract did come into being but was voidable or unenforceable when made, and the beneficiary's right is subject to that infirmity.9 The question in this subsection is whether formation occurred at all, judged by ordinary formation rules applied to the promisor and the promisee.
Voidable or Unenforceable Contracts
The second clause of § 309(1) covers a contract that did form but carried a flaw from the start: if it was voidable or unenforceable at formation, the beneficiary's right is subject to the infirmity.11 Two terms carry the clause. A contract is voidable when one party has the power to cancel it because of how that party's assent was obtained, as with fraud, duress, or another bargaining defect. A contract is unenforceable when a rule of law bars a court from enforcing it even though the parties agreed, as when a promise that must be in writing under the statute of frauds exists only orally.12 Either way the promisee holds a bargain the promisor can resist, and the beneficiary gets nothing better than the promisee had.
The clause follows from the derivative character of the beneficiary's right. That right is carved out of the contract between promisor and promisee, so any power the promisor holds to escape that contract stays attached to the claim when a beneficiary asserts it.13 If the rule read otherwise, a promisor tricked into a bargain could defeat the promisee's lawsuit by avoiding the contract and still be held to the identical promise by a payee. A promisee holding a voidable deal could then turn it into an enforceable one simply by directing performance to a payee of its choosing. Treating the infirmity as the beneficiary's burden closes that route.
The two infirmities have different sources. Voidability protects the integrity of the promisor's assent, which is why misrepresentation, fraud, duress, and mistake belong here. Unenforceability reflects a separate legal judgment that a particular agreement should not be enforced, as when it violates public policy or lacks the writing the statute of frauds demands.14
Rouse v. United States shows a voidable contract passing its infirmity to the beneficiary. A beneficiary of the Winston–Rouse agreement sued Rouse on his promise, and Rouse pleaded fraud as a defense.15 The court reasoned that Rouse's liability to a third party could be no greater than his liability to the promisee: if Rouse could raise fraud against a suit by Winston, the same defense had to be available against the beneficiary. In the court's words, "one who promises to make a payment to the promisee's creditor can assert against the creditor any defense that the promisor could assert against the promisee."16 Fraud made the contract voidable, so Winston could not have collected without answering for it, and the beneficiary's claim existed only through that same contract. The court's test looked to what the promisor could assert against the promisee, not to anything the beneficiary did. A beneficiary's own conduct raises a separate question, taken up in its own section below.
Only a defect in the contract qualifies under this clause, whether the defect lies in how the contract was made or in the law's willingness to enforce it. A promisor who merely wishes the deal had come out better has no such defect to point to.
Halvorsen's complaint describes how the bargain turned out, and contract law leaves the risk of a poor outcome with the party who accepted the deal. Rouse's complaint described how the contract was made, because fraud corrupts the assent on which the contract rests. That difference decides which promisor can resist the beneficiary. A student who meets the first kind of complaint on an exam should reject it as a defense, however sympathetic the promisor looks.
The statute of frauds supplies the cleanest example of unenforceability, because the contract can be sound in every respect except the missing writing.
The defense works against Idowu for the same reason it works against Voss: the claim exists only through an agreement that no court will enforce against the promisor. The Restatement's list of defenses that carry over to the beneficiary includes unenforceability under the statute of frauds alongside voidability for fraud, duress, or another bargaining defect.17 Public policy can arise in either of two places. A contract that offends public policy when made is unenforceable at formation and falls under the clause taught here, while a later development that makes enforcement contrary to public policy falls under the Restatement's separate rule for contracts that cease to be binding after formation, taken up in the next part.18 The label matters less than the result: if the contract cannot be enforced against the promisor, the beneficiary's claim fails to that extent.19