Concept
Later Failure of the Contract
Defenses against the beneficiary
Later Failure of the Contract
A contract that was sound when made can stop binding the promisor later, and when it does, the beneficiary's claim goes down with it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 309(2) says so directly: if a contract ceases to be binding in whole or in part because of impracticability, public policy, non-occurrence of a condition, or present or prospective failure of performance, the right of any beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified.1 Four grounds, one consequence. Whatever the promisor loses as a duty owed to the promisee, the beneficiary loses with it, because the beneficiary's rights derive from the contract and are limited by any defense arising out of it.2
Timing separates this provision from the last section. Subsection (1) inspects the contract on the day it was made: a promise creates no duty to a beneficiary unless a contract forms between promisor and promisee, and a contract that is voidable or unenforceable at formation leaves the beneficiary's right subject to the same infirmity.3 Subsection (2) asks what happened afterward to a contract that passed that inspection. Its defenses arise from post-formation occurrences that affect the very basis of the contract, such as supervening impracticability and the nonoccurrence of a condition.4 Public policy straddles the line. A contract that offends public policy when made is unenforceable at formation and belongs to subsection (1), while a later development that makes enforcement against the promisor contrary to public policy belongs here.
The words “to that extent” set the measure. The beneficiary's right shrinks as far as the promisor's duty shrinks, and no further. If the contract stops binding the promisor entirely, the beneficiary's claim is discharged. If it stops binding the promisor only in part, the claim is modified to match, and the beneficiary may still recover what the promisor continues to owe.5 A broader defense would let the promisor keep part of a bargain that still binds it. The default yields only to a contract that makes clear it confers rights on the beneficiary free of defenses. Without such a term, the beneficiary's rights carry the limits inherent in the contract.6 Each of the four grounds follows, beginning with the supervening event that makes performance impracticable.
Impracticability
Impracticability, the first ground in § 309(2), reaches the beneficiary because it reaches the promisor. When an event after formation makes the promisor's performance impracticable and the contract ceases to bind in whole or in part, the right of any beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified.7 The excuse chapters develop the elements of the doctrine, so they are not rebuilt here. What matters for a beneficiary is the consequence: the promisor may raise against the beneficiary any defense arising from post-formation occurrences that affect the very basis of the contract, supervening impracticability among them.8
The death of a party whose personal services the contract requires is the standard example of such an event. Death is foreseeable in the abstract, since everyone is mortal, but the mere possibility that an event may occur does not make it foreseen when a court decides whether its nonoccurrence was a basic assumption of the contract. The parties must have had some reason to treat it as a probability.9
Mary's claim fails even though she took no part in the contract and bears no blame for the death. Her innocence changes nothing, because her right is the promisor's duty to the promisee redirected to her, and a duty the law excuses leaves nothing to enforce.10 Excuse doctrine allocates the risk of unforeseen events between the two parties who made the bargain, and Mary cannot claim a better allocation than the promisee himself would have had. The discharge reaches only her claim against Dan. As a creditor beneficiary, she keeps whatever claim she holds against the promisee on the original debt, here a claim against Orsini's estate.11
The harder question on a given set of facts is often whether the event qualifies at all, and the answer turns on what the event did to the contract's basis.
The two scenes differ in what happened to the contract's basis. Orsini's death removed the performance on which the whole exchange depended, while the price rise only cut into Dan's margin. Mary's innocence is a tempting fact and an irrelevant one. The first question is whether the event discharged the promisor's own duty. If it discharged that duty only in part, the beneficiary's right is modified to match and survives for whatever the promisor still owes.12
Public Policy
Public policy, the second ground in § 309(2), strips a contract of binding force with the same effect on the beneficiary: the right of any beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified.14 The earlier discussion of voidable and unenforceable contracts covered a policy violation present at formation. The ground taught here is the later version, in which a contract lawful and enforceable when made becomes one the law will no longer enforce against the promisor. A statute enacted after the bargain that forbids the very service the promisor bought is one example. Violation of public policy is an enforcement defense, and it passes to the beneficiary along with the contract it attaches to.15
Derivation explains why. The beneficiary's right is carved out of the promisor's duty to the promisee, so if the law will not enforce that duty, it will not enforce the right carved from it.16 Otherwise a promisee who could not collect would escape the bar by directing the promised performance to a payee. The phrase “to that extent” keeps the defense proportionate. If the bar reaches only part of the promised performance, only that part of the beneficiary's right is lost.
One question sorts these cases: in whose relationship does the policy problem sit? The defense reaches only one of the two relationships that surround a beneficiary's claim.
The two scenes differ in where the bar attaches. In the pesticide case the law refuses to enforce the contract Dan made, which removes the foundation of Mary's right. In the second scene the contract stands, and the objection concerns a separate transaction in which Dan has no stake. The promisor may not assert against the beneficiary defenses arising out of the transaction between the beneficiary and the promisee, and whether Joe actually owed Mary any sum is of no relevance to Dan.17 The analysis would shift only if Dan's own promise were measured by what Joe legally owes Mary, a question of contract terms taken up later in this chapter. Before treating a policy problem as a defense, confirm that it infects the promisor's own contract.
Failure of a Condition
Non-occurrence of a condition, the third ground in § 309(2), discharges or modifies the right of any beneficiary to the extent it ends the promisor's binding duty.19 A condition precedent is an event, often the other party's own performance, that must occur before a party's duty becomes due. A promisor often ties a payment to something the other side must do first, and the tie works like a gate: if the event happens, the duty opens, and if it does not, the duty stays shut. Because the beneficiary's right is carved out of the promisor's duty, a duty that never becomes due leaves the beneficiary nothing to collect. Non-occurrence of a condition is among the post-formation occurrences the promisor may raise against the beneficiary.20
The standard illustration uses three parties. Joe owes Mary money and agrees to render a service for Dan, and Dan promises to pay $10,000 to Mary. Dan's duty to pay depends on Joe's performing the service, so that performance is a condition precedent to the duty. If Joe never renders it, the condition fails, and Mary's suit meets a complete answer. The sole basis for her action is the Dan-Joe contract, so any defense Dan could assert under it, including failure of a condition precedent to his duty, is available against her.21
The defense follows from what Dan actually promised. Dan bargained for Joe's service, and the $10,000 was the price he agreed to pay if the service was given. Naming Mary as payee does not turn that conditional promise into an unconditional one, and a contrary rule would make Dan pay full price for a service he never received. Mary's innocence changes nothing, because her right comes through the promise Dan made. The defense shuts the door only against Dan, and whatever claim Mary holds against Joe on the original debt is untouched by it.22
The same promise reads differently once Joe does the work. When Joe renders the service, the event that gates Dan's duty occurs, Dan's duty to pay matures, and a refusal to pay would be a breach that Mary may sue on. The failure-of-condition defense then has no missing event to point to. This marks the line between failed condition and breach. A failed condition means the promisor's duty never became due, so there is nothing to breach, while a breach concerns a duty that did arise and went unperformed. Joe's failure to serve can be framed either way, as a failed condition on Dan's duty or as a breach by Joe, and the next section takes up the breach framing. The condition framing asks a prior question: did Dan's duty ever come due?
A failed condition does not always defeat the beneficiary, because the law sometimes excuses non-occurrence. An improperly rejected tender is one example. A tender is a demonstration of present willingness and ability to perform, and when the other party improperly rejects it, the non-occurrence of the condition is excused and the other party's duty becomes absolute.23
In both the Joe-Dan scene and the Hartley scene the promised service was never rendered, so the missing event cannot be what separates them. What separates them is why the event did not occur. Joe simply never served, which left Dan's duty shut, while Hartley's own improper rejection kept Quill from serving and excused the condition. A beneficiary meets exactly the defenses the promisee would meet and no others, so Dan's defense against Mary is as strong as it would be against Joe, and Hartley's defense against Pell is as weak as it would be against Quill.24
The words “to that extent” matter at the last step. If the failed event gated only part of the promisor's duty, the beneficiary's right is modified by that part, and the portion of the duty that did come due remains enforceable.25
Failure of Performance
Present or prospective failure of performance, the last ground in § 309(2), covers the promisee who has not delivered what the contract required or who has made clear it will not. If that failure causes the contract to cease to bind the promisor in whole or in part, the right of any beneficiary is to that extent discharged or modified.27 A present failure means the promisee has not rendered the performance that was due, or has rendered it so defectively that the result is a material breach. A prospective failure means the promisee has not yet missed a performance but has shown that it will. Either way, the promisor may raise the promisee's breach against the beneficiary, because the defense arises out of the contract itself and the beneficiary's right is subject to every limitation the contract carries.28
The defense follows from the way a bargain is built. The promisor promises to pay or perform in return for the promisee's performance, so the promisor's duty depends in substance on the promisee actually delivering. A promisee who fails to deliver cannot demand the return performance, and the promisor is excused to the degree of the failure. The previous section separated a failed condition, where the promisor's duty never came due, from a breach, where a duty arose and went unperformed. A promisee's material failure leaves the promisor close to the position of one whose condition failed: holding a duty the law will not require it to carry. The beneficiary's right is carved out of that duty, so it shrinks whenever the duty shrinks.
The limit on that defense is the practical lesson of this section. The promisee's wrongful act can be raised by the promisor against the beneficiary, yet it imposes no liability on the beneficiary, who by accepting the benefit does not assume responsibility for the promisee's breach. The promisor must pursue any recourse for the breach against the promisee.29 Assignment law follows the same logic. If a lawn-care provider ruins a customer's lawn through a material breach, the customer could assert that breach against the provider, and because an assignee receives only what the assignor had, the customer can assert it against an assignee of the right to payment as well.30 A creditor beneficiary like Mary also keeps whatever claim she holds against Joe on the original debt, and Dan's recourse for his excess loss runs to Joe alone.31
The phrase “to that extent” keeps the defense from growing larger than the failure that supports it. A promisee's total failure can defeat the beneficiary's claim entirely, while a partial failure only reduces it.
Prospective failure covers the promisee who has missed nothing yet. The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation is well established in the common law and under the UCC, which codifies and refines it in §§ 2-609 to 2-612, and Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 243 and 250 to 257 reflect its spirit.32 For a prospective nonperformance to be a material repudiation, the party who owes the performance, here the promisee, must clearly, unequivocally, and voluntarily communicate an intention not to render it when it falls due, whether by words or by conduct.33 To the extent such a repudiation releases the promisor from its own duty, the beneficiary's right is discharged or modified correspondingly.34
Two instincts mislead on hypothetical facts. One treats the beneficiary's innocence as a reason to let the claim go forward at full value, which overlooks that the right was carved out of the duty and shrinks with it. The other treats the promisor's large loss as a reason to hold the beneficiary for the difference, which overlooks that the beneficiary made no promise about the promisee's work. The correct answer lies between them: the promisor may use the failure to defeat or reduce the beneficiary's claim, and any remaining loss belongs in a suit against the promisee. The next part of this chapter takes up the limits on what else a promisor may raise, beginning with claims that have nothing to do with this contract.