Concept
Defenses the Promisor Cannot Raise
Defenses against the beneficiary
Defenses the Promisor Cannot Raise
An intended beneficiary's right comes out of the contract between promisor and promisee, so any defense that arises out of that contract follows the right to the beneficiary. The formation defects and later failures covered above are the main examples.1 Almost everything else stays between promisor and promisee. Under § 309(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and except as stated in § 309(1) and (2), in § 311, or as the contract provides, a beneficiary's right against the promisor is not subject to the promisor's claims or defenses against the promisee, and it is not subject to the promisee's claims or defenses against the beneficiary.2
The default's line is easiest to see in the standard three-party arrangement. Joe promises Dan a service, and Dan promises to pay $10,000 to Mary, a creditor of Joe. Mary's only basis for suing Dan is the Dan-Joe contract, so any defense Dan can properly assert under that contract is good against her. That includes formation defenses such as misrepresentation or mistake and enforcement defenses such as violation of public policy.3 Claims that arise elsewhere, whether from Dan's other dealings with Joe or from Joe's dealings with Mary, start on the other side of the line.
This unit follows the default through four steps: the promisor's unrelated claims, the promisee's defenses against the beneficiary, the contract's power to rewrite the default, and the parties' power to change the contract after the beneficiary's right has vested.
Promisor's Unrelated Claims
A promisor's claims against the promisee fall into two groups, and only one group reaches the beneficiary. Claims that arise out of the contract the beneficiary is enforcing travel with the beneficiary's right: a defect at formation,4 the promisee's breach, a failed condition, or supervening impracticability.5 Claims that arise anywhere else stay behind. Unless the contract expresses a contrary intent, the promisor cannot raise against the beneficiary any defense that is purely personal against the promisee, such as a defense that the promisee owes the promisor money in another transaction.6
That is the first half of § 309(3). Apart from the matters § 309(1) and (2) carry over, the vested rights § 311 protects, and the contract's own terms, the beneficiary's right is not subject to the promisor's claims or defenses against the promisee.7 Sorting the two groups takes one question. Both kinds of claim can run between the same two people, so the parties do not decide the matter; the transaction the claim comes from does.
Change one fact, and the answer changes with it. Suppose Joe's work is shoddy, and repairing it costs Dan $3,000. Now the complaint arises from Joe's failure to perform the very contract Mary is enforcing, so her right is reduced to that extent, and Dan owes her $7,000.8 The defense stays defensive. By accepting the benefit, Mary assumes no responsibility for Joe's breach, so any loss beyond the reduction is for Dan to pursue against Joe.9
A beneficiary who accepts the benefit assumes no responsibility for the promisee's wrongful conduct or breach, and the promisor's recourse lies against the promisee.10 Dan's remedy for the unpaid loan is therefore a suit on the loan against Joe. Netting the loan out of Mary's payment feels natural, because people routinely subtract what each owes the other. Netting presupposes that the two sides owe each other, though, and Mary owes Dan nothing. The $2,000 is Joe's debt.
A stem that says the promisee owes the promisor money calls for one question: owes it for what? A debt from a loan or a different job leaves the beneficiary's claim at full value, while a shortfall in the contracted performance reduces it.11
Promisee's Defenses Against the Beneficiary
The second half of § 309(3) keeps the promisee's claims and defenses against the beneficiary out of the promisor's hands.13 Suppose Mary sues Dan, and Dan answers that Joe never owed Mary anything, or that Joe had a defense he could have raised against her. The answer fails. Dan received from Joe the promise or performance for which he bargained, and Joe, for reasons satisfactory to himself, obtained Dan's agreement to pay Mary. If the Joe-Dan contract is enforceable, it is none of Dan's concern whether Joe was actually obligated to pay Mary, and nothing is unfair in enforcing Dan's promise.14
The bar leaves the promisor's own defenses intact. A promisor who could resist the promisee on the strength of the promisor-promisee contract can resist the beneficiary on the same ground, because the beneficiary's right derives from that contract. The Rouse case shows both sides of the line in a single dispute.
Rouse bought Winston's house and took over her obligation to pay $850 to Associated for the heating plant. Associated's successor, the FHA, then pursued Rouse on that promise.15 Rouse offered two defenses: fraud, which he could have raised against Winston in a suit on their contract, and improper installation of the heating plant by Associated.16 The court reasoned that if Rouse could raise a fraud defense to a suit by Winston, the same defense must be available to him against the beneficiary: “one who promises to make a payment to the promisee's creditor can assert against the creditor any defense that the promisor could assert against the promisee.”17 Fraud made the Rouse-Winston contract voidable, so it falls within § 309(1).18 The installation defense went the other way, and the lower court's decision to strike it was sustained.19
The difference lay in what Rouse had promised. A promisor who takes over a litigable claim may show, if he can, that the promisee was under no enforceable liability, because a creditor with no valid claim against the promisee gains no greater rights against the promisor merely because the promisor agreed to take over the promisee's obligations.20 Rouse had undertaken something else, an obligation to pay a specific $850. The court treated that promise as if Winston had already settled with Associated and conceded a debt of $850 when she sold the house. The settlement was reflected in the price of the house, and Rouse assumed its burden and was not free to reopen it.21
The question for an exam answer is therefore what the promise measured, and a bare dispute between promisee and beneficiary decides nothing. A fixed sum, like Rouse's $850 or Dan's $10,000, is its own measure, and the promisee's disputes with the beneficiary stay outside the case. A promise to pay whatever the promisee legally owes the beneficiary makes that legal liability the measure of the promisor's duty. Proof of what the promisee actually owed then goes to the size of the promise, so the promisor is not borrowing the promisee's defense.22
Orlov's promise has no number until the Pell-Marsh relationship supplies one, while Rouse's promise carried its figure from the start. Two reflexes mislead on facts like these. One bars every dispute between promisee and beneficiary automatically, which is right in Rouse and wrong for Orlov. The other admits any such dispute because it sounds like a defense, which overlooks that a fixed promise gives the promisor no standing to raise it. A third trap confuses the promisee's defenses with the promisor's own. A misrepresentation to the promisor, a failed condition, or a material failure by the promisee to perform for the promisor all arise inside the promisor-promisee contract, so they reach the beneficiary through § 309(1) and (2), as the fraud defense did in Rouse.23
The contract's own language can change the result at any step, since the parties may write a promise that widens or narrows what the promisor can raise. The next subsection takes up that qualification. Rouse sits at the third step, the position most exam stems describe: a promisor who agreed to pay a stated amount and now points to a quarrel between two other people.
Contract Terms and Beneficiary Rights
Section 309(3) builds an escape into its own default: the beneficiary's right is shielded from the outside claims it lists except as the contract provides.25 That phrase makes the default a rule for contracts that are silent. The beneficiary enforces the promisor's duty to perform the promise,26 and because the beneficiary's rights derive from the contract, they carry whatever limits the contract contains.27
A contract can enlarge what the promisor may raise. The bar on a promisor's purely personal defenses applies unless the contract expresses a contrary intent, and an express provision supplies that intent.28
Had the roofing contract said nothing about set-off, Dan would owe Mary the full $10,000 and collect the loan from Joe. The clause alone moves the answer. Mary took no part in drafting it, yet it binds her, because it is part of the promise she is enforcing.
The contract can also narrow what the promisor may raise. Unless it makes clear that it confers rights on the beneficiary free of defenses, the beneficiary's rights are subject to the limitations inherent in the contract, including formation defects, the promisee's breach, and post-formation events such as supervening impracticability and nonoccurrence of a condition.29 Section 309(2) lists those later events, along with public policy and failure of performance, as the ones that discharge or modify the right when the contract ceases to be binding.30
A contract may also attach procedural conditions to the beneficiary's right, and the most familiar is an obligation to submit disputes to arbitration. In Borsack v. Chalk & Vermillion Fine Arts, Ltd., a federal district court in New York held that an intended beneficiary of a licensing contract had to arbitrate its dispute.31 The clause gives the promisor no defense on the merits. It fixes where and by whom the claim is decided, and a beneficiary who enforces the promise takes it with that clause attached. A contract with no such clause leaves the beneficiary free to sue in court.
Because the default points the other way, the drafting must carry the load. A promisor who relies on a clause to add a defense must find it in the contract, and a beneficiary who relies on one to remove defenses needs language that makes the freedom from defenses clear. On an exam, ask first whether the contract says anything about set-off, defenses, or disputes; the default governs only when it does not.
Vested Rights and Later Modification
The defenses so far come from a flaw in the contract or from an event that undermined it. One more comes from the parties themselves: after making the contract, promisor and promisee agree to rescind or modify it. Section 309(3) sends that case to § 311 as an exception, and timing decides it.33 If the parties rework the deal before the beneficiary's right has vested, the change is a defense to the beneficiary's claim. If they rework it after vesting, the change is no defense.34 After vesting, an agreement to modify or discharge the performance still defeats the promisee's own suit, but it does not avail against the beneficiary.35
The dissent in Lawrence v. Fox put the worry in sharp form. Judge Comstock objected that the beneficiary's claim might be divested or diluted through separate action of the promisor and promisee, because their dealings may involve other matters, and the beneficiary's interest could be bargained away or compromised as part of a separate settlement. The majority answered that the beneficiary's rights must vest at some appropriate point, though it left unclear whether that point is the time of suit or earlier.36
Jurisdictions fix the vesting point differently. Some vest the right at formation, even if the beneficiary learns of the contract later. Others vest it when the beneficiary learns of the contract and agrees to accept the benefit, and acceptance is ordinarily presumed unless the beneficiary expressly rejects it. The third rule, probably the most commonly applied, requires the beneficiary to change position in reliance on the contract.37 The Restatement vests the right when the beneficiary materially changes position in reliance, brings suit, or manifests assent at the request of the promisor or promisee. Once any of these happens, the contracting parties can no longer modify or discharge the right.38
Return to Dan, Joe, and Mary, and suppose Dan and Joe agree to redirect the $10,000 payment to Joe. If they agree before Mary has learned of the contract, assented at a party's request, sued, or relied, her right has not vested under the Restatement approach, and the modification is a defense. A jurisdiction that vests at formation would reach the opposite result.39 If Mary learned of the contract and changed position in reliance on her right to recover from Dan, her right is vested under any rule a court might apply, and the modification cannot defeat it.40 The modification reads the same in both versions; what differs is what Mary had done by the time the parties made it.
Vesting limits the parties' power to change the contract; it does not create the beneficiary's right. That right arises, if at all, when the contract is formed, and vesting becomes an issue only when the parties try to modify or rescind the contract so as to affect the existing right.41 The other defenses have nothing to do with it. Suppose a promisee agrees not to cut certain timber, the promisor promises $1,000 to a beneficiary in exchange, and the promisee cuts the timber. The promisor may raise the breach against the beneficiary whether or not the right has vested, because no one has tried to vary or discharge the beneficiary's right.42 The same holds for fraud at formation, failure of a condition, and impracticability: vesting is irrelevant to each.43
The parties who create the beneficiary's right may also write its limits. They may agree that a later agreement cannot vary the right, and contract law honors that intention.44 They may instead reserve a power to discharge or modify the promisor's duty, which is nearly always done in modern life insurance policies and employee death benefit plans.45 Without such a reservation, the parties' power to alter the right ends when it vests.46 A beneficiary who consents to a change leaves the parties free to make it.47