Concept
Creditor Versus Donee Beneficiaries
Creditor-beneficiary remedies
Creditor Versus Donee Beneficiaries
When a promisor fails to perform, one fact separates the two classic beneficiaries: whether the promisee owed the beneficiary anything before the promise was made. Under the Restatement (Second), an intended beneficiary who has an enforceable claim against the promisee may take judgment against the promisee, the promisor, or both, each on that person's own duty to the beneficiary.1 A creditor beneficiary has such a claim, because the debt exists whether or not anyone later promises to pay it. A donee beneficiary does not. The gift-promise comment describes the donee's position: the recipient pays nothing for the promised performance, the performance discharges no right he holds against anyone, and the promise is apparently designed to benefit him, so he is an intended beneficiary under § 302(1)(b).2 The Second Restatement plays down the old creditor and donee labels, but § 302(1)(a) and (b) preserve slightly altered versions of them, and the remedial difference between the two survives.3
The donee ends up with one defendant because no duty runs from the promisee to the donee. By definition there is no antecedent obligation owing from the promisee to the beneficiary, and the promisee undertakes none by making the contract, so a donee ordinarily has no rights against the promisee.4 That result fits the basic logic of third-party beneficiary law. The doctrine does not abandon the idea of contract as a private consensual arrangement, because an outsider acquires a right to enforce only when the parties intended to give it to him.5 What the parties give a donee is the promisor's performance. They create no debt from the promisee. A creditor's claim against the promisee comes from a separate source, the original debt, so the new promise adds a defendant without displacing the old one.
The gift case of Seaver v. Ransom shows the donee's direct claim against the promisor. The court allowed the niece to recover and held that the principle of Lawrence v. Fox should be extended to the facts before it. It observed that some earlier cases had allowed third-party standing to children and wives on the strength of their close relationship with the promisee.6 That extension enlarged the class of beneficiaries who may sue the promisor. It did not turn the donee into a creditor of the promisee.
Reliance draws the same line. In Rogers v. Robson, the court contrasted the donee with the creditor beneficiary and saw no reason to presume that a donee would act in reliance on the contract between promisee and promisor. A donee may acquire rights without even knowing he has been named, and because no pre-existing duty or liability was owed to him, courts have no basis for presuming that he relied.7 The creditor therefore holds two things the donee lacks: a second defendant and a presumption of reliance.
Exam stems often say only that a promisor promised the promisee to pay a third party, that the promisor did not pay, and then ask whether the third party may reach the promisee. The answer turns on whether the promisee owed the third party anything.
A single promise can carry both labels. In one illustration, A owes C $100 for money lent, and B promises A to pay C $200, both to discharge the debt and to show A's gratitude to C for making the loan. C is an intended beneficiary under § 302(1)(a) as to the amount of the debt and under § 302(1)(b) as to the excess.8 The remedy rules then run separately on each part. C may sue B for the full $200, but C's claim against A reaches only the $100 debt, since A owes C nothing beyond the loan. On the overlapping $100, payment by either defendant satisfies the other's duty to that extent.9 A second illustration shows that the classification follows what the promisee manifests. B, who knows of no debt, promises A to pay $100 to C, to whom A in fact owes $100. C is a (1)(a) beneficiary if A manifests an intention that the payment satisfy the debt, and a (1)(b) beneficiary if A manifests an intention to make a gift, leaving the original debt outstanding.10
A donee's lack of a claim against the promisee is the general rule, with one qualification in the authorities. If, after the donee's right has vested, the promisee receives consideration for a promise to discharge or modify the promisor's duty, the donee may have an interest in what the promisee received. The First Restatement made the beneficiary elect between claiming that consideration and pursuing the promisor. The Restatement (Second) drops the election and substitutes a rule of what is equitable under the circumstances.11