Concept
Material Adverse Effect on the Obligor
Assignment of rights
Material Adverse Effect on the Obligor
The first limit on the presumption of assignability protects an obligor from a transfer that leaves it materially worse off. Under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2)(a), a contract right cannot be assigned if substituting the assignee's right for the assignor's would materially change the obligor's duty, materially increase the burden or risk the contract imposes on the obligor, materially impair its chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce the contract's value to it.1 UCC § 2-210(2) states the same limit for sales of goods in the first three of those terms and omits the reduction in value.2 Each term names a different way an obligor can lose by the substitution, and this section takes them in turn: the duty itself, the burden and risk around it, and the return performance and value the obligor expects.
The word material carries the whole limit. Every assignment changes something, if only the name of the person to be paid, so a limit triggered by any change would swallow the presumption that rights can be assigned. The Code assumes that limits on the power to transfer contract rights restrict commercial activity, and its policy is to encourage such assignments.3 A merchant who sells on credit, for instance, can raise cash by selling its accounts receivable or by borrowing against them, which is why assignability serves as a lubricant to the production-distribution process.4 An obligor may therefore resist a transfer only when its position in the bargain is worse, and a preference for the old counterparty is not enough. In Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., the court saw no problem in assigning the distributor's rights, although the manufacturer pointed to a relationship of confidence and trust with the distributor's management, because corporate officers change even without an assignment and neither party was guaranteed the same officers for the length of the contract.5
This limit governs the assignment of rights, which the law treats more generously than the delegation of duties. Contractual obligations are not property rights of the obligor, and a transfer of duties can affect the other party more than a transfer of the right to performance, so delegation, although usually possible, faces greater restrictions.6 The two questions can still arrive together, because the parties to an assignment, in the Restatement's words, “may not distinguish between assignment of rights and delegation of duties.”7 They remain analytically separate, and the limit examined here concerns only the right.
Change in the Obligor's Duty
The first clause bars an assignment when the substitution would materially change the obligor's duty.8 Since every assignment puts a new person in line for the performance, the question is whether the performance stays materially the same when rendered to that person. The Restatement directs a court to the nature of the contract and the circumstances surrounding it, and although that inquiry is ad hoc, it supports some generalizations.9
A duty to pay money anchors the harmless end of the range: an assignment will usually not materially change it.10 The other end appears in a Restatement illustration in which B contracts to support A for the rest of A's life. A cannot assign to C the right to have B support C for the rest of C's life, because A and C are different people with different life spans and needs.11 B promised to meet one person's needs for one person's lifetime, and a substitute recipient would hold B to a performance B never promised.
The same reasoning reaches any performance fitted to the person who receives it. A physician's treatment is shaped by one patient's body, an architect's design by one client's purposes, and a lawyer's advice by one client's affairs, so a new recipient asks the obligor for different work. Courts accordingly treat the assignment of rights under a personal-services contract as raising a real question of material change in the performance.12 Work defined by a thing, in contrast, stays the same whoever holds the right to it.
What separates the two scenes is what defines the performance: the patient in the first, the roof in the second. A commercial supply contract can be personal in the same way, and Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co. is the classic example.13 Terminal had agreed to supply Frederick with up to 250 tons of ice at the contract price, under what amounted to a requirements contract: the quantity depended on Frederick's needs. Frederick assigned its right to Crane, which did business in a large geographic area, and Terminal refused to supply Crane. The court held that the right was not assignable to Crane and that Terminal did not have to supply it with ice.14
The court's reasoning shows why the duty was personal. It pointed out that Terminal had delivered ice to Frederick for three years before the parties made the contract, a history that set the scale of what Terminal had promised.15 Supplying Crane would be a totally different matter, because Crane could demand the full 250 tons whenever the market price elsewhere exceeded the contract price and take no ice when the reverse was true.16 A contract price for a quantity that depends on the buyer's needs is a bet on how much the buyer will take, and the assignment would have handed the buyer a free option. The court reacted to the fact that the assignment “set up a new measure of ice to be supplied and so a new term in the agreement,” and held the contract too personal to assign.17
The result might be different under the Code. UCC § 2-306(1) lets a buyer request only “actual . . . requirements as may occur in good faith,” and it bars any quantity “unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior . . . requirements.”18 Because an assignee cannot demand an amount of goods that unreasonably strays from the assignor's estimated or actual requirements, the buyer's rights under most requirements contracts should be assignable, absent other considerations. The price of the transfer is that the assignee takes a contract measured at baseline by the assignor's requirements, not necessarily by its own.19
Continental Can Co. v. Poultry Processing, Inc. turned on that reasoning. The case involved a requirements contract assigned under § 2-210, and the court found effective an assignment of the right to receive “those cans necessary for the canning season then underway,” so that the assignee's promise to pay for the cans was enforceable.20 The quantity term was definite enough to enforce unless the demanded quantities were unreasonably disproportionate to stated estimates or to prior or normal requirements, and because no one alleged disproportion, the court held the assignee liable for the cans it promised to purchase.21 The material-change limit survives under the Code, but it operates by capping what the assignee may demand and not by barring the transfer.
Employment contracts show that the personal-services label does not settle the question; what counts is whether the substitution changes the work or its conditions. In Evening News Assn. v. Peterson, a television station was sold and the seller assigned its news anchor's employment contract to the buyer. Peterson objected, but the court upheld the assignment because it did not materially alter his working conditions, increase his burden of performance, or endanger his prospects of return performance.22 In Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham, the purchasers of a basketball franchise could enforce a player's contract because he was not obligated to perform differently for them than for the previous owner of the same club.23 In both cases the job, the work, and the place stayed the same, and only the ownership behind the employer changed.
The result reverses when the substitution changes what the performer bargained to receive. In a standard teaching problem, an opera singer named Bravo contracts to perform for Megalopolitan, a company with a famous, world-class opera house, and Megalopolitan transfers the contract to Upstate, a regional company. The fee is the same, but a performance at the Megalopolitan house would have given Bravo a chance at stardom that a regional company cannot supply. Bravo may therefore decline to perform for Upstate, because the substitution changes the bargain the contract delivers to him.24 Peterson and Bravo share the same label, personal services. They differ because the anchor's contract delivered the same terms to the new owner, while the singer's delivered a different bargain.
Covenants not to compete test how far the personal-services label stretches. Such a covenant is a promise not to compete for a stated time in a stated geographic area, and covenants of this kind arise most often on the sale of a business, at the end of a partnership interest, and in employment, especially in highly technical industries and in sales.25 The setting matters to assignability. The Restatement treats a covenant given by the seller of a business as assignable to the buyer of that business,26 while courts divide over whether an employer may assign its rights under an employee's covenant to a successor.27 In Reynolds & Reynolds Co. v. Hardee, a federal court applying Virginia law treated the covenant as personal to the employment relationship.28
The second step does the work. A support-for-life promise and a contract price set for one buyer's demand both fail it, while a payment, the repair of a particular roof, and an anchor's work for a new station owner pass.
Increased Burden or Risk
The second clause bars an assignment when the substitution would materially increase the burden or risk imposed on the obligor by its contract.30 UCC § 2-210(2) carries the same clause for sales of goods.31 Where the first clause asks whether the performance itself changes, this clause asks whether the exposure around it grows. An obligor accepts a price against the specifications it must meet, the claims it may face, and the labor of working out what it owes and to whom, and an assignment that enlarges any of these charges it for a cost it never priced.
Goods made to order give the clearest case. A contracts to sell goods built to B's quality specifications, and B assigns its rights in the goods to D, whose specifications vary materially from B's. A would have to meet a standard it never priced, so the assignment would materially increase A's burden, and B cannot assign.32 A transfer to a D whose specifications matched B's would leave A building exactly what it promised.
Warranties supply a second example. In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., a court applying Georgia law held a seller's warranty unassignable because assigning it would materially change the risks and burdens of the original seller.33 A warranty runs to a particular buyer, and moving it to a stranger changes the exposure the seller accepted. The decision also exposes a feature of this clause: the court could as easily have rested on a material change in the seller's duty, because it is hard to say when an assignment of a right would raise burden or risk without also changing the duty.34 The clauses overlap, and courts often find a material adverse effect without sorting the facts into one of them. The working move is to identify how the obligor is made worse off and to tie that harm to the clause that names it.
A different burden appeared in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Medical Lien Management, Inc., where the assignment covered an ill-defined portion of a claim. The Colorado court held the assignment invalid because the obligor would have to work out the amount assigned, possibly through litigation.35 The cost was the labor, and the danger of error, in dividing the payment between assignor and assignee, which the obligor never agreed to bear. An assignment of a stated fraction or a stated dollar amount leaves the obligor nothing to work out, and Restatement § 326(1), subject to its exceptions, treats a part specified as a fraction, as an amount, or otherwise as operative as if the part had been a separate right, a rule taken up with partial assignments later in this chapter.36
Most assignments leave the obligor's exposure where it was. A bare right to payment will rarely increase risk, because it is generally of no moment to a payor whether it pays one person or another.37 Inconvenience does not suffice either. In Clark v. B.P. Oil Co., a gasoline supply contract passed from a producer to a regional distributor, and the Sixth Circuit treated the price increases and changes in credit terms the retailer faced as immaterial.38 The retailer felt some effect, but the changes did not materially enlarge what the contract asked of it, and the gap between inconvenience and added exposure is where this clause draws its line.
Impaired Return Performance or Value
The last two clauses guard the obligor's side of the exchange. Return performance is what the obligor is to receive for its own performance, and the Restatement bars an assignment that would materially impair the obligor's chance of obtaining it or materially reduce the contract's value to the obligor.40 UCC § 2-210(2) states the impairment limit for sales of goods but has no separate reduced-value clause.41 The two clauses overlap with each other and with the earlier ones, and the working question is whether the substitution leaves the obligor materially worse off in what it was promised.
Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co. shows an assignment doing harm through a delegation. Best held a distributorship for Nexxus products and sought to assign it to Sally, a competitor of Nexxus. The court found no problem with assigning Best's rights, which had no negative impact on Nexxus, but it refused the delegation of Best's duties because distribution of Nexxus products would be in the hands of its competitor, depriving Nexxus of the benefit of its bargain.42 A dissent would have allowed the delegation, since Sally would be obliged to use best efforts in selling Nexxus products.43 Impairment problems of this kind can arise whenever an assignment is paired with a delegation, and the Restatement acknowledges that the parties to an assignment “may not distinguish between assignment of rights and delegation of duties.”44
A bare right to payment can cause the same harm when the assignor still owes the obligor something. A seller who has a continuing obligation regarding goods already delivered, under a contract in which the buyer is to pay at least part of the price at future dates, may be unable to assign its right to payment, because the assignment may diminish the seller's interest in continuing its performance.45 A seller with money still to collect has a reason to keep the buyer satisfied. Sell the right to collect, and that reason weakens, and with it the buyer's assurance of receiving the performance it still awaits. Whether the loss is material depends on how much performance remains and how much of the price is still unpaid.
The fourth effect, a material reduction in the contract's value to the obligor, reaches harm that does not show up in the performance itself. Bravo's contract, discussed above, is the example: the fee and the singing are the same under Upstate as under Megalopolitan, but the contract is worth materially less to Bravo because a regional company cannot supply the chance at stardom that a world-class house offers.46 Nexxus lost value in the same way when distribution of its products would have passed to a competitor.
Two decisions mark where the impairment clause stops. In Tennell v. Esteve Cotton Co., the court explained, in dicta, that an assignor's failure to notify the obligor of the assignment does not by itself materially impair the obligor's chance of receiving return performance.47 Notice answers a different question, whom the obligor must pay, which the later unit on notice and discharge takes up. In another decision, a car finance contract was assigned from the original creditor, and the court held that the buyer's chance of receiving return performance was not materially impaired because the purchase agreement disclaimed all warranties.48 The disclaimer left no continuing performance for the assignment to put at risk. An answer that calls an assignment impairing merely because the obligor was not told, or because it dislikes the new payee, has not identified any return performance that is in danger.
When an assignment delegates performance and gives the obligor reason to doubt the transferee, the law supplies a narrower remedy than invalidity. The obligor may seek an adequate assurance of performance, and if none comes, it may object to the assignment or delegation, and in some circumstances the failure can amount to a repudiation by the assignor or delegator that permits relief for anticipatory breach.49 In a standard sausage problem, Frumme delegates to Chazzer her duty to supply sausages that must be processed in compliance with Jewish law. If Chazzer gives Gator no adequate assurance, Gator may refuse the delegation and, because an improper delegation by Frumme would repudiate the contract, may declare a material breach and claim damages from her. If Chazzer assures Gator that the sausages will be processed separately from nonkosher meat in a plant and under a process that complies with Jewish law, Gator must accept the transfer and remains bound, and even an effective delegation does not release Frumme from her obligations.50 The remedy is sized to the harm: a demand for assurance protects the obligor while keeping in place the many transfers that nothing actually endangers.