Concept
Statute and Public Policy Limits
Assignment of rights
Statute and Public Policy Limits
A right that passes the material-effect test can still be unassignable, because a limit that comes from outside the contract may take the transfer off the table. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2)(b) states it: a contractual right cannot be assigned if the assignment is forbidden by statute or is otherwise inoperative on grounds of public policy.1 The material-effect test asks whether the obligor ends up worse off. This limit asks whether the law has withdrawn the transfer from the parties, and it can apply even when the obligor would not mind the transfer at all.
The limit is an exception to a strong default. The law generally presumes that contract rights can be transferred, except where the contract or public policy precludes it,2 and the presumption does commercial work: a merchant who sells on credit can sell the accounts receivable for cash, or borrow against them as collateral, instead of waiting for customers to pay.3 A party therefore has the power to transfer its contractual rights unless the contract specifically prohibits the transfer, or the nature of the contract is such that a transfer would impair the other party's reasonable expectations or offend public policy.4 Because a statutory or public-policy bar comes from outside the contract, silence about assignment does not defeat it, and a clause welcoming assignment would not cure it.
A statute that forbids an assignment decides the question without regard to the obligor. Suppose a state statute prohibits assigning wage claims. A worker short of cash before payday assigns next month's wages to a lender, the employment contract says nothing about assignment, and the employer would pay the same amount to either party. The assignment fails anyway. The employer's indifference answers only the material-effect question, the contract's silence consents to nothing the statute forbids, and § 317(2)(b) makes a statutory prohibition a separate and sufficient ground.5
Federal statutes work the same way. A specific provision of the United States Code, 41 U.S.C. § 6305, prohibits a party to a government contract from transferring the contract without the government's consent, and it applies whether or not the contract itself bars the transfer.6 A contract to supply bricks shows that the statute, and not the subject matter, does the work. Bricks are still just bricks, and nothing about supplying them would otherwise stand in the way; only the statute changes the answer when the buyer is the government.7
A statutory bar is only as broad as its terms, and a later statute can cut an exception into it. ERISA's anti-alienation provision, § 206(d)(1), is an example. One court rejected a defendant's reliance on it, holding that Congress, by making restitution orders in certain criminal cases liens in favor of the United States and by authorizing their enforcement against all property not exempt from the government's reach for payment of taxes, created in the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) a statutory exception to the anti-alienation provision. The en banc Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion.8
Public policy can bar an assignment where no statute does, and the cases show courts dividing over where the line falls. Many courts hold that a client's malpractice claim against a lawyer cannot be assigned, because the attorney-client relationship is uniquely personal and implicates confidentiality, loyalty, and trust.9 Some courts treat the bar as absolute. Others take a case-by-case approach that weighs the nature of the breach and the circumstances of the assignment.10 In Gurski v. Rosenblum & Filan LLC, the Connecticut court, using the case-by-case approach, held an assignment invalid because the assignee was the client's adversary in the very action in which the malpractice was committed.11 The client had settled that action by assigning his malpractice claim to the other party to the suit. Both weaknesses sit in one set of facts: the claim grew out of a relationship of confidence between lawyer and client, and the person who received it was the party the lawyer had been engaged to oppose. That combination explains the result without a rule that malpractice claims can never move, and a court on the case-by-case approach remains free to weigh a transfer to a stranger differently.
Personal injury claims raise a second public-policy limit, and traditionally the claim itself cannot be assigned. Two worries drive the bar. Assignment would let a litigious person buy injury claims and prosecute them aggressively, and it would encourage an accident victim to give up a potentially more valuable claim in return for an advance payment.12 The bar has ties to the old common-law policy against champerty and maintenance, which condemn promoting litigation for profit by financing it in exchange for a share of the proceeds.13 That is the kind of judgment § 317(2)(b) has in mind when it speaks of assignments inoperative on grounds of public policy.
Courts then divide over a narrower question. Some hold that parties may not assign a personal injury claim but may assign its proceeds, while others treat that distinction as a distinction without a difference.14 A. Unruh Chiropractic Clinic v. De Smet Ins. Co., 782 N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 2010), discussed both lines of authority and adopted the nonassignability approach.15
Two reported cases show what these transactions look like from the assignee's side. Kelly Health Care pursued Prudential Insurance on the theory that Kelly was William Green's assignee, after Prudential refused to pay bills for care that Green's wife received at a Kelly facility as a dependent under his group policy.16 In Herzog v. Irace, Dr. Herzog sued two attorneys for breach of an assignment of personal injury settlement proceeds that they had collected for their client, Gary Jones. The District Court found the assignment valid and enforceable against the attorneys, and the Superior Court affirmed.17 The assignment in Herzog reached settlement proceeds and not the injury claim itself, which is the fact on which the split above turns.
An answer in this area should name the source of the bar and test the facts against it. For a statute, ask whether the right falls within the statute's terms and whether any exception applies. For a public-policy limit on which courts split, identify the competing approaches and the fact that decides between them: the identity of the assignee in a malpractice case, or whether the transfer reaches the claim or only its proceeds in a personal injury case. Under every limit in this section, the obligor's own indifference to the transfer is beside the point.