Concept
Assigning the Whole Contract
Delegation of duties
Assigning the Whole Contract
The language of an assignment often fails to say whether the parties mean to assign rights, delegate duties, or do both.1 A seller closing out its business tells the buyer that it is assigning “the contract,” and the paperwork stops there. The sales statute fills the gap. An assignment of “the contract,” of “all my rights under the contract,” or in similar general terms is an assignment of rights, and unless the language or the circumstances (as in an assignment for security) indicate the contrary, it is also a delegation of the assignor’s duties.2 The assignee’s acceptance then constitutes a promise to perform those duties, and either the assignor or the other party to the original contract may enforce that promise.3
The common law reaches the same result. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 328 treats general language of assignment as including both an assignment of rights and a delegation of duties unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, and UCC § 2-210(5) takes the same approach.4 Kunzman v. Thorsen explains why: the presumption “most probably conforms to the parties’ intent and to their understanding of the meaning of such broad language of assignment.”5 Some courts once read such phrasing as creating only an assignment of rights. The more modern view is that the parties probably intend an assignment of rights, a delegation of duties, and an assumption of those duties by the transferee.6 The sales article adopts that view, and the presumption yields when the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.7
Frumme’s sale of her business shows the presumption at work. When she sold the business to Chazzer Food Corp., she assigned Chazzer her entire contract with Gator Deli, which meant that she both assigned her right to payment and delegated her duty to supply sausages. Because the contract is for the sale of goods, UCC § 2-210 supplies the governing rules.8 This chapter’s vocabulary sorts the parties neatly. Frumme is the obligee of the payment duty, so she is the assignor, and she is the obligor of the supply duty, so she is the delegator. Chazzer is both the assignee and the delegate. Gator is the obligor on the assigned right and the obligee of the delegated duty.9
Chazzer’s acceptance of the transfer was a promise to perform the supply duty, and Gator needs nothing more. Gator need not look for a separate promise from Chazzer or resort to the common law of third-party beneficiaries, because Chazzer is liable as though it had signed the contract.10 The detour Gator avoids is not trivial, since third-party beneficiary doctrine must first decide which outsiders hold rights under a contract they did not make.11
Frumme’s duty does not vanish with the transfer. No delegation of performance relieves the party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for breach.12 If Chazzer’s sausages fall short, Gator may pursue Chazzer on its promise or Frumme on her continuing duty, but it is entitled to only one satisfaction.13 Chazzer’s promise also runs to Frumme, which gives her a reason of her own to enforce it.14
The same general words mean something different when a borrower uses them to secure a loan. Suppose Widget Company assigns its accounts receivable to a lender. The customers who owe those accounts must pay the lender, but Widget has delegated nothing to it and keeps performing.15 A lender that takes receivables as collateral wants a source of repayment, not a manufacturing business to run. Merchants routinely borrow this way: a bank or other financer lends against the security of accounts receivable, and in a modern credit economy that credit has become an essential part of the economic machinery.16 Reading every such assignment as a delegation would load lenders with performance duties they never sought. The statute and its comment therefore set assignments for security apart from the general presumption.17 Frumme and Widget could have used identical words. What separates them is the purpose of the transfer: Frumme sold the business the contract belonged to, and Widget’s lender took the receivables as a backstop.
A companion provision addresses a lender that later enforces its security interest. Creating, perfecting, or enforcing a security interest in the seller’s interest under a contract is not a transfer that materially changes the buyer’s position unless, and only to the extent that, enforcement actually results in a delegation of material performance by the seller.18 Even then the security interest remains effective. The seller is liable to the buyer for damages the buyer could not reasonably prevent, and a court may grant other relief, including cancellation of the contract or an injunction against enforcement.19
A transfer of the whole contract is therefore two transactions, and each must be proper on its own terms. The presumption fixes only what the parties did, and it does not decide whether the law permits it. Delegation is usually possible, but it is subject to greater restrictions than assignment of rights, because transferring a duty can affect the obligee more than transferring a right to performance.20 Under the sales statute, a party may perform through a delegate unless otherwise agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest in having the original promisor perform or control the acts the contract requires.21 Gator’s objection to the transfer, if it has one, would therefore target the delegation of the supply duty, and the earlier sections on the substantial-interest test and on demanding assurances explain how Gator would make that case.
The same construction operates when a contract forbids transfer. Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, a term prohibiting assignment of “the contract” bars only the delegation to an assignee of the assignor’s performance of a duty or condition, as the earlier discussion of contract terms barring delegation explained.22