Concept
Knowledge Matter by Matter
Requirement of personal knowledge
Knowledge Matter by Matter
Rule 602 asks not how well informed a witness is but whether she knows the particular thing she is about to say. A witness may testify “to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”1 The rule names the matter twice, and the repetition sets the unit of analysis: each assertion stands or falls on its own foundation. A witness can qualify on one point and fail on the next, even when both arise from the same event and the same examination.
The assertion-by-assertion test serves two ends. It protects reliability, because a cross-examiner's questions (where did you stand, how closely did you watch?) have answers only about a specific fact. A witness who watched a car run a red light can speak to the light but not to what the driver said to a passenger. The test also stays workable. Few witnesses perceive every link in the story they tell, and a rule that demanded it would exclude accounts that are truthful and useful as far as they go. A witness may testify to the part she knows, and cross-examination and the jury deal with the rest.
United States v. Rodriguez shows the test at work on a chain of custody. The defendant, Famania, argued that a subscription card and Agent Farley's testimony were admitted in violation of Rule 602.2 His complaint about the card was that nothing showed Farley or Agent Russell signed it at the time of the transaction or otherwise secured it as evidence, and nothing showed what Russell did with it in the five minutes before he met Farley.3 The card was admitted through Farley, who testified that it was in the same condition as when he received it from Russell.4
The court treated the card argument as “essentially a complaint about the chain of custody.”5 That label places the objection correctly. Farley testified to one matter, the condition of the card when it reached him, and he perceived that himself. What Russell did in the preceding five minutes is a different matter, one Farley never claimed to describe. The gap may give the defense something to argue about the exhibit's history, but it does not show that Farley failed to perceive what he reports.
Change one fact. Suppose cross-examination shows that Farley did not watch the purchase. That admission would bar him from describing the purchase, and an objection to a question about what passed between buyer and seller would be well founded. It would not undercut his account of receiving the card, because he perceived that. The admission marks the boundary of his testimony and leaves everything inside the boundary intact.
A store manager's testimony splits along the same line. Suppose a shopper is injured in a store, the manager investigates, and a watcher tells him the shopper had been running around like crazy. The manager did not see the shopper, so he lacks personal knowledge of how the shopper acted. He does know the watcher's words, because the watcher spoke to him during the investigation, and he may testify that the watcher said them.6 Rule 602 settles that much and no more. The words would be hearsay if offered to prove the shopper was running around the store, and the likeliest exception is present sense impression, which Rule 803(1) limits to statements made “while or immediately after” the speaker perceived the event. If the watcher spoke about ten minutes after the accident, some courts would find the lapse too long.7
On the varied facts, Farley and the manager stand in parallel positions: each can speak to the link he perceived, receiving the card or hearing the remark, and neither can speak to the event behind it. The links differ in what they accomplish. Farley's link is itself a fact the case needs, since it connects the card to the courtroom. The manager's link matters only if the watcher's words can be used for something, and that turns on the hearsay rules.
A witness whose source is other people's belief shows the rule at its limit. Suppose a witness testifies that the defendant committed the act, but all he actually knows is what people in the neighborhood think happened. The testimony should be stricken. He has personal knowledge of what the neighbors think, not of the defendant's conduct, and if offered to prove that what the neighbors say happened actually did, the testimony is also hearsay.8
The same approach governs exhibits, which enter through a witness who knows the fact that makes the exhibit what the proponent says it is. The subscription card entered through the agent who received it and could describe its condition.9 Photographs work the same way. Courts clearly favor their introduction, though admissibility rests in the court's sound discretion: still photographs, motion pictures, and videotapes of an injury are admitted to the same extent the injury itself could be exhibited, and they should not be excluded merely because they may stir horror or indignation in the jury.10 For Rule 602 purposes, the question is who can say the picture shows the scene as it was. That matter is the scene's appearance at the relevant time, so anyone who perceived the scene then can speak to it, whether or not he took the photograph. The photographer's own knowledge covers a different matter, the taking of the picture.
A writing offers the same flexibility. A percipient witness may authenticate it by testifying to some other connection between the writing and a particular person that makes the writing relevant: the person found it, read it, or possessed it, and an observer to that act may properly authenticate it.11