Concept
Lay Opinion and Inference
Requirement of personal knowledge
Lay Opinion and Inference
Rule 602 lets a witness testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of it.1 The earlier sections applied that condition to events: did the witness see the light change, hear the remark, or receive the package? Witnesses rarely stop at reporting what their senses delivered. One who says the pavement was slippery has turned the feel of sliding feet into a description of the street, and one who says a driver was speeding has turned the sight of a passing car into a judgment about its speed. Each statement carries an inference, and this unit asks how much inference a lay witness may add to what she perceived.
Two requirements answer that question, and they divide the work. Rule 602 asks whether the witness perceived the facts on which the opinion rests. Rule 701 asks whether the opinion is rationally based on that perception, which means only that it is one a person could normally form from the observed facts.2 A third requirement, that the opinion help the jury, is a separate inquiry that this unit leaves aside.3 The perceptual basis comes first below because the other two topics depend on it: a hedge or an estimate is only as good as the perception behind it, and a guess is an answer with no perception behind it. After the perceptual basis, the unit takes up the witness who hedges or estimates, then the point at which an answer slides from inference into conjecture.
Perceptual Basis
Before a lay witness gives an opinion or inference, she must lay a foundation establishing personal knowledge of the facts on which it rests, and Rule 701 separately requires that the opinion be rationally based on her perception.4 Where relevancy requires, the foundation must also cover her personal knowledge of the facts to which the observed facts are being compared. A witness therefore may not say that something smelled like dynamite unless the foundation shows that she knows from prior experience what dynamite smells like.5 A lay witness offering an opinion must have personal knowledge of the facts on which the opinion is based.6 The first requirement asks whether she sensed those facts, and the second asks whether they can reasonably carry the conclusion drawn from them.7
Neither requirement turns on the form of the testimony or on the issue it addresses. Rule 602 treats personal knowledge as an aspect of witness competency rather than testimonial form, and Rule 704 provides that lay opinion is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue. Any relevant testimony speaks to issues the jury must resolve, so the old objection was overbroad.8 What remains is whether the opinion has a perceptual source.
Courts read “rationally based” to require two things: a logical connection between the opinion and the matters perceived, and perception sufficient in quality and quantity to justify the opinion.9 The first depends on whether the proposition linking perception to opinion is valid. A witness who says the substance on a defendant’s breath was alcohol relies on the proposition that alcohol has a recognizable smell, so the opinion is rationally based only if that proposition holds, which usually means the witness has smelled alcohol on a person’s breath before. If the witness assumed that alcohol smells like fried onions, the opinion would not be rationally based.10
A lay opinion therefore works as a comparison, in which the witness matches something observed in this case against a stock of experience. The proponent must show that the witness relies on a generalization developed through personal experience and that she has personal knowledge of the case-specific fact. If either element is missing, the conclusion cannot come in as lay opinion, and if it is admitted at all it must satisfy the requirements for expert testimony.11
Both elements can be seen in a single witness. A runner named Wyn hears a loud, high-pitched screech and testifies that it was a vehicle’s brakes, explaining that she knows the sound from experience. She has the generalization, built from hearing brakes, and the case-specific fact, the sound she heard.12 Asked whether the sound came from the defendant’s SUV, she is in a different position, because she did not see the vehicle as it made the noise and hearing a screech does not tell her which car produced it. The case-specific link is missing, and the defect can be named under either rule: the opinion lacks a rational basis in her perception, and she lacks the personal knowledge of the source that the answer assumes. Had the SUV been the only vehicle in the area, the opinion might have been rationally based, so what the proponent lacked was evidence tying the sound to the car, which counsel never developed.13
The quality of a perception limits how precise an opinion may be, as well as whether any opinion may be given. Wyn was running in one direction while the SUV traveled toward her, and she had no vehicle of her own to supply a reference point for its speed. A witness traveling alongside the vehicle at a known speed would probably be allowed to estimate the other car’s speed, even if the two were moving at somewhat different speeds. Counsel did not give up. The court allowed him to elicit a rough range, such as faster than 40 miles per hour but probably not faster than 60, which is much more likely to be rationally based on her perception. It is less useful to the proponent than a specific figure, but it still gives counsel something to argue at the close of the case.14 A later section returns to estimates.
The quantity of perception limits an opinion in the same way. Without an opportunity to view the context of an individual’s actions and a large enough sample of those actions, an opinion as to sanity has little value.15
Sample size alone separates the clerk from the pedestrian. Experience and an opportunity to observe can also ground an opinion about another person’s state of mind, and many courts have become more receptive to such opinions.16 Lay opinion testimony is admissible if it is “rationally based on the perception of the witness” and helpful to the jury in understanding the testimony or determining a fact in issue.17 In one case, a paramedic who treated Meling’s wife testified to the impression that Meling was feigning grief, and the court found the impression admissible. Paramedics are trained to respond quickly in emergencies, and the paramedic had ample time while treating the wife to form that impression.18
Experience that does not fit the subject produces the opposite result. In Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, a collision between a pickup truck and a semi-tanker, the defense offered a motorist named Highlan to testify that the tanker driver “did everything he could to avoid this accident” and that the plaintiff could have avoided it, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the exclusion.19 Highlan watched from a car in the opposite lane, so he could not know the exact measures the tanker driver took or when the driver first perceived the plaintiff’s truck. Nothing showed that he knew the tanker’s safety equipment, stopping distances, load, brakes, or steering, and twenty-nine years of driving did not supply that knowledge. The opinion was not excluded because it went to a central issue, since lay opinion is not objectionable on that ground.20 It failed because both elements of the foundation were missing: the case-specific facts, and a generalization from experience that fit the vehicle.
The paramedic and Highlan both drew on experience, and what separates them is fit and opportunity. The paramedic watched the very person whose demeanor he described for as long as the treatment lasted, while Highlan saw neither the driver’s choices nor the tanker’s capabilities.
A lay opinion may also rest on something the witness heard, and then the question is what about the statement the opinion depends on. If the opinion depends only on the fact that the statement was made, it rests on the witness’s own perception, because she heard it. If it depends on the truth of what was said, it rests on the speaker’s perception, which the witness lacks.21 A witness who heard a person announce, “I am the Queen of England,” may give the opinion that the speaker is insane, because the odd announcement is the evidence and the witness heard it. She may not give the opinion that the speaker is the rightful heir to the English throne, because that opinion relies on a fact the speaker asserts, which the witness has no way of knowing, so it is based on hearsay and not on the witness’s perception.22 The witness knows that words were spoken and knows nothing about whether they were accurate.
Information that reaches a witness through other people does not always disqualify her, which limits the statement-versus-truth line. In Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., the Seventh Circuit approved business executives’ assessments of a copier’s quality on the reasoning that such assessments are inferential and, when they are the kind of inference businesspeople customarily draw, count as personal knowledge rather than hearsay.23 The question to ask of any opinion that draws on what others said is whose perception and whose judgment it carries. The insane-speaker opinion carries the witness’s own inference from an announcement she heard, and the heir opinion would only repeat the speaker’s claim on the speaker’s authority.
A practice problem puts the sequence to work. Al Davis’s pickup truck collides with a car driven by Sandy Pinkston, seriously injuring her child Amy, who was in the right front seat. Sandy sues Davis and calls Luke Hanson as a witness. Read Hanson’s direct and cross-examination and decide whether either side has a proper Rule 701 objection, naming for each objection the link in the sequence above that fails.24
Uncertainty and Estimates
Rule 602 asks whether evidence supports a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter, and nothing in its text asks how certain the witness feels about what she perceived.26 Personal knowledge concerns the source of the witness’s information, so a witness who hedges has not thereby shown that her information came from someone else. Absolute certainty on the part of a lay witness is not required. A witness may say “I believe” or “I can’t be positive, but,” and her opinion may be framed as what “could” have happened, what “most probably” happened, or what “is similar to” something she knows.27 Most courts apply the same approach to a witness who is unsure of a point she observed, allowing “I think” or “it is my impression” without any cost to admissibility.28
A hedge tells the jury how firmly the witness holds her account, and deciding how much that account deserves is the jury’s work, so uncertainty goes to weight. Human perception is imperfect, and a rule demanding certainty would silence most of the people who actually saw something. The hedge is therefore not the defect that costs a witness the right to testify. The absence of perception is the defect, and a hedge neither creates it nor repairs it.
The houseguest’s problem is one the rules distinguish carefully. When a witness acknowledges that he was told of the event by another person, the proper objection is hearsay, and when he acknowledges that he was too far away to perceive it, the proper objection is lack of personal knowledge.29 Neither objection is about how sure the witness sounds.
Estimates raise the same issue in concentrated form. Speed and distance cannot be described without approximation, and helpful opinions rationally based on the witness’s perception are admissible even when they are couched as an estimate.30 The law does prefer concrete detail to inference, so a careful examiner first asks the witness what she saw. That preference yields when it is impractical for the witness to verbalize all the data supporting an inference, and her inferential testimony is then admissible. The principal impact of the preference is on the form of examination.31
A witness’s vantage point can still shape the form of an estimate. Wyn saw an SUV approach while she ran in the other direction, and when she was asked its speed in miles per hour, the court let her testify only within a rough range.32 A witness riding alongside the vehicle at a known speed of her own would probably be allowed to name a figure. The court fits the precision of the testimony to the quality of the perception behind it: a rough range is more likely to be rationally based on what Wyn could sense, and although it is less useful to the proponent than a specific figure, it still gives counsel something to argue at the close of the case.
Whether a given opinion qualifies depends on the facts of the case, and the court decides.33 Three questions should therefore be kept apart. A hedge goes to weight. A figure more exact than the vantage point supports is trimmed to a range. An absence of perception is the only one of the three that keeps the witness from testifying.
Speculation and Conjecture
Rule 602 allows a witness to testify to a matter only if evidence supports a finding that she has personal knowledge of it, and that condition shapes the questions a lawyer may ask as well as the answers a witness may give.35 A question addressed to a witness lacking personal knowledge of the event is objectionable if it asks her to guess or surmise what occurred, and the objection is that it calls for speculation or conjecture.36 The two objections often travel together. Lack of personal knowledge identifies the missing perception, and speculation identifies the question that asks the witness to fill the gap with a guess.
The wording of a question usually gives it away. Asking what “probably” occurred or for the witness’s “impression” invites a guess. So do questions on cross-examination about whether something “is possible” or “could have been,” and questions that begin “what if,” when they are put to a witness lacking sufficient personal knowledge.37 Each phrasing moves the inquiry from what happened to what might have happened, and no witness can have perceived what might have happened. A witness describing her own perception can be tested on where she stood and how closely she watched, but a witness who guesses gives cross-examination nothing to hold, and the jury may credit a sworn guess more than it deserves.
The classic setting is a witness who saw part of an event and is asked to judge all of it. Highlan, the motorist in Gorby who watched from the opposite lane, could not know what the tanker driver did or when he first saw the plaintiff’s truck, so his opinion that the driver “did everything he could” measured the driver’s real conduct against an imagined ideal. Twenty-nine years of driving did not fill the gap, because that experience said nothing about this tanker’s brakes, steering, load, or stopping distances.38 Testimony of that kind draws a speculation objection and a personal-knowledge objection together, since one missing perception supports both.
The foundation decides the objection, and the wording alone does not. A witness who stood at the curb and watched the sedan approach and brake faces the same words on a different footing, because her answer would draw on what she saw. The objection is aimed at the question put to a witness lacking sufficient personal knowledge.39 The same holds for the word “impression.” A question asking a witness who lacks personal knowledge for her impression is objectionable, yet the paramedic’s impression that Meling was feigning grief was admissible lay opinion because he had ample time while treating Meling’s wife to form it.40 A hedge belongs on the same side of the line. A witness who watched a truck pass and says “I think it was going about 35” has not been asked to guess, and most courts allow such qualifiers because uncertainty about what was perceived goes to weight.41 The hedge qualifies a perception, and the speculative question asks the witness to supply what perception never provided.
Proper questions ask what the witness perceived or remembers. On direct examination, the substantive questions are aimed at the witness’s knowledge of pertinent facts, such as the direction from which the car was coming, how fast it was going, and which car had the light.42 Each can be answered from perception, and none invites a guess.
The same test reaches an expert whose opinion depends on so many varying or uncertain factors that he must guess or surmise to reach it, and that opinion is objectionable as speculation or conjecture.43 A related limit applies to questions about another witness’s truthfulness. A question that requires a lay witness to comment directly on the veracity of another witness, a matter exclusively within the province of the trier of fact, is improper, so “Are you saying Mr. Jones is a liar?” will be prohibited. Such questions are equally improper on direct or redirect, and it is similarly improper for an expert to opine on another person’s veracity. Some trial courts have been known to permit the milder “Do you disagree with Mr. X who testified that . . . ?”44
When a fact pattern presents “calls for speculation” or “no personal knowledge,” ask the one underlying question of whether the witness perceived what the question asks about. A witness who admits he was in a distant location when the event occurred draws a lack-of-personal-knowledge objection to his account of it.45 The same witness asked what probably happened there draws a speculation objection, and the same missing perception disposes of both.