Concept
Common Lay Opinion Subjects
Lay opinions
Common Lay Opinion Subjects
Rule 701 names no approved subjects. It sets two tests instead, and every lay opinion must pass both: the opinion must be rationally based on the witness’s perception, and it must be helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue.1 Courts apply those tests to the same kinds of testimony so often that a familiar set of subjects has emerged. The Third Circuit’s summary in Asplundh, which the Advisory Committee cited favorably, is the best short inventory. It lists the appearance of persons or things, identity, the manner of conduct, light and darkness, sound, size, weight, distance, and “an endless number of items that cannot be described factually in words apart from inferences,” and it adds the speed of a vehicle, the mental state or responsibility of another, whether another was healthy, and the value of one’s property.2
The same subjects recur because each fits both clauses. In each, the witness holds a whole impression that a list of details would not convey. A lay witness may testify in the form of an opinion when her personal knowledge could be conveyed in no other form, when she formed an accurate total impression but cannot account for every detail, and above all when an accounting of the details alone would not convey the impression she received.3 Ordinary experience also gives people a sound basis for such conclusions, and rational connection asks only that the opinion be one a person could normally form from observed facts.4
This section takes the subjects in three groups: the condition and state of mind of people, the behavior of objects and events together with questions of value, and the identification of voices and persons. Each group opens with the typical admission and closes on the limit that applies when perception thins or the jury could judge as well as the witness. None is a safe harbor. These opinions have not been admitted in every case, and courts exercise discretion in each situation.5
Condition and State of Mind
People observe one another as an integral whole, without a distinct awareness of each feature, and from that observation they characterize a trait, such as age, or an emotion, such as fear or anger.6 The jury was not there. An opinion that sums up what the witness saw gives jurors information they cannot get another way, and its tie to observed behavior satisfies the perception requirement. Courts accordingly accept lay opinion on another person’s age, health, ability to work, sanity, suffering, mental faculties, hearing, eyesight, unconsciousness after an accident, and intoxication.7 The stock examples are a party guest who appeared drunk, a searcher who looked exhausted and worried after hours of looking for a lost child, and a man who looked really angry on hearing unwelcome news.8
In People v. Acosta, a child’s father angrily confronted a man caught in inappropriate conduct with the child, and the father was properly allowed to testify that the man was “very guilty-looking.”9 The phrase reports demeanor that the father took in at once and could not easily break into parts. A lay witness may likewise describe what a person did and said so that an inference of mental illness can follow. In People v. Clark, a gunman walked into a church, drew a gun, and robbed the parishioners, and at his trial the parishioners could describe his behavior during the robbery. The Michigan Court of Appeals wrote, “The testimony of lay witnesses may be competent evidence on a defendant’s mental illness.”10
A witness who gives such an opinion need not recite every observed matter first. If the proponent adequately establishes the witness’s personal knowledge, the witness may state the opinion, though the judge has discretion to require preliminary testimony about the observations. Rule 403 still applies, so even an opinion that passes Rule 701 may be excluded when it is prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or time-wasting.11 Opinions about another’s state of mind or emotion nevertheless create special difficulties,12 and the difficulty is the one the two clauses police. A witness without a sufficient basis may lull the jury into accepting a flawed or unfounded opinion, and such an opinion fails the rationally based requirement as well as the helpfulness requirement.13
The inmate in United States v. Bogan shows the rule applied to the gravest mental state, intent. Hilpipre sat in a phone booth about ten feet from the officer station and watched two prisoners beat a corrections officer with a telephone and a clothes iron. During a recorded call to his family he exclaimed that “they’re trying to kill him,” and the recording was later played for the jury.14 Bogan argued that any statement describing a third person’s observations and forming the basis for a conclusion about a defendant’s thoughts and motivations is presumptively inadmissible. The court found no case law for that theory and pointed to its own precedent holding that “lay opinion testimony as to the mental state of another is indeed competent” under Rule 701.15 Another court gave the same answer to an appellant who called a witness’s testimony merely a personal opinion about another’s mental state: Rule 701 permits lay opinion and does not limit the subject matter to which it can relate.16 The question was never whether the subject was off limits. It was whether the witness saw enough, and Hilpipre, ten feet from a beating, had.
Not every court agrees. In a footnote responding to a dissent, a Massachusetts court called inadmissible a teammate’s opinion that Lever checked Borella with intent to injure, reasoning that the state’s principle on lay opinion does not permit a witness to say what someone was intending or planning to do based on observing the person.17 Borella v. Renfro states a state rule. In federal court, Bogan and the decision just described admit opinions about another’s intent and motive, so the federal objections are lack of a perceptual basis under clause (a) and lack of helpfulness under clause (b).
An opinion is only as good as the observation beneath it. A lay opinion must be rationally based on the witness’s perception, which requires firsthand knowledge of the factual predicates for the opinion. One court excluded an investigating officer’s opinion because he did not observe the assault, and it admitted the eyewitness’s opinion because he obviously had firsthand knowledge of the facts behind it.18 A 911 operator’s opinion that a caller sounded as though he were feigning grief, the testimony in United States v. Meling, passes on the same ground, because she heard the call herself. It also helps even though the jury can replay the recording, since an opinion helps only when it adds information beyond what the facts convey.19 The jury has the words and the tone. What the operator can add is a comparison with the other emergency callers she has handled, if her experience supplies one.
A comparison requires observation at both ends. A witness who describes a child’s health after her rescue reports what he saw. A witness who says she seems healthier asserts more, because “healthier” compares two states. As Bush v. State puts the point, a witness who had known Jennifer before and after her rescue could have testified that she appeared healthier.20 The converse follows. A witness who met the child only afterward has nothing to compare, so the comparison fails clause (a) even though a description of her present condition passes.
One limit closes this group. A witness may say a person looked ill or hurt, but a diagnosis or a medical cause depends on training that jurors do not share, and Rule 701(c) bars a lay opinion that is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.21
Objects, Events, and Value
A witness perceives a passing truck, a gasoline smell, or a broken crossing as one impression, and the inference arrives already folded into it. Rule 701 accordingly treats these perceptions as prototypical lay opinion: the Asplundh list includes the appearance of things, sound, size, weight, distance, and the speed of a vehicle, and it includes the value of one’s property.25 Lay witnesses have likewise given opinions on the condition of an accident site, the quality or acceptability of a thing, the adequacy of safety precautions or devices, and the nature of a substance or smell.26
Speed shows the pattern most plainly. A witness who watched a vehicle pass holds an impression of motion, and she can convey it only as a number or an adjective. A lay witness may state an opinion when an accounting of the details alone would not convey the total impression she received, and the speed of a vehicle is one of the examples the Asplundh summary calls quintessential lay opinion.27 Qualified or approximate answers do not defeat admission, because opinions framed as “I believe,” “I can’t be positive, but,” “most probably,” or an estimate remain admissible.28 The weakness of a quick look goes to cross-examination, and where cross-examination and argument can be effective the balance tips toward admitting the opinion.29
The foundation limits how exact the number may be. In a commentator’s hypothetical, a jogger named Wyn ran in the opposite direction from an SUV, with no moving vehicle of her own to give her a speedometer reference, and the commentator concluded that an actual speed in miles per hour was not rationally based on her perception, because estimating speed under those circumstances is very difficult.30 A passenger in a second car holding a steady speed would have a reference she lacked. The same hypothetical marks the edge for sound. Wyn’s opinion that a sound came from the SUV did not appear to rest on her perception, because she did not say she saw the vehicle as it made the sound. Had the SUV been the only vehicle in the area, the opinion might have been rationally based, but counsel never developed that fact, and the problem also implicates the personal knowledge requirement.31
Smells work the same way, with a foundation requirement. A witness may not testify that something smelled like dynamite unless it is established that she knows from prior experience what dynamite smells like.32 The comparison depends on recognition, and the witness either has it before the smell arrives or does not.
Conditions of places call for the same kind of compression. Statements such as “The railroad crossing was in poor condition and difficult to get across” are typical.33 A witness who has driven over such a crossing takes in its roughness as one impression, and the phrase conveys it more faithfully than an inventory of rails and planks.
Value needs only a short mention here. The Asplundh list names the value of one’s property, and lay witnesses have been allowed to opine on the value of property or profits.34 An owner who has bought, used, and sold goods of a kind has the familiarity that makes an everyday valuation rational. How far an owner’s valuation or profit projection may go before it requires qualification as an expert is a Rule 701(c) question that a later section takes up.
Two decisions about drivers show perception and rational connection at work on opinions about events. In Robinson v. Bump, the court found no abuse of discretion in admitting Battle’s testimony, because Battle had every opportunity to observe the truck’s movement, the movement of a truck is rationally connected to its driver’s control, and the testimony helped the jury assess Bump’s negligence.35 In Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, the court affirmed the exclusion of a motorist’s opinions about the accident. As to the semi-tanker, nothing established that the witness, Highlan, knew the safety equipment such trucks carry, the distances in which they stop safely, the load the Schneider truck carried, or its brake and steering equipment, and twenty-nine years as a motorist did not supply the personal knowledge an admissible lay opinion requires. His opinion that Gorby could have avoided the accident was a closer question, because a pickup resembles an ordinary car more than a semi-tanker does. Still, nothing in the record showed that Highlan knew the pickup’s type, safety features, acceleration and stopping times, or load, and the court could find that his testimony rested on speculation and not first-hand knowledge.36
What separates the two cases is the thing each opinion asserts. Control can be read from how a truck moves, and Battle had watched it move. What a driver could have done with a particular vehicle depends on facts about that vehicle, and general driving experience does not supply them.
The outer edge of this subject is Rule 701(c), which bars a lay opinion based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.37 The line between lay and expert opinion is not always clear, because police officers and auto mechanics often testify on points beyond everyday experience and can qualify as experts themselves. The proviso in Rule 701 means that they must qualify as experts before giving that kind of testimony.38 Experts regularly testify, and disagree, about whether metal fatigue can be detected from a post-accident examination, and one court found no reported case in which a lay witness had done so. That consistent use of experts underscored the technical nature of the opinion.39 Describing a wobble or a smell draws on perceptions nearly everyone has. An opinion that depends on a trained reading of the evidence belongs to Rule 702.
A standard practice problem sends a pickup truck driven by Al Davis into a car driven by Sandy Pinkston, injuring her child Amy in the right front seat, and asks you to read Luke Hanson’s direct and cross-examination for proper Rule 701 objections.40 Put two questions to each answer: what did Hanson perceive, and what does his statement tell the jury that a list of details would not?
Two errors recur on exam essays about these subjects. The first is to object that a speed estimate or a description of a smell is “just an opinion,” which ignores that these are the quintessential lay opinions. The second is to treat the familiar subjects as automatically admissible, although courts decide each situation in their discretion.41
Identification Opinions
An identification opinion helps the jury only when the witness knows something about the speaker or the person pictured that the jurors cannot work out for themselves, because an opinion that adds no information beyond what the facts convey wastes time.44 Clause (b) therefore puts a comparative question to these opinions: is the witness better placed than the jury to make the identification?45 The witness qualifies through familiarity gained by her own perception, as clause (a) requires,46 and not through a scientific method of comparison, which clause (c) sends to Rule 702.47
Recognition resists reduction to parts. People take in another person as an integral whole, without a distinct awareness of each feature,48 so a witness who recognizes a voice or a face can seldom itemize what gave it away, and the identification arrives as an opinion.
United States v. Zepeda-Lopez applied that approach to FBI Special Agent Barrett, who told the jury that the voice on a wiretap recording and the image on a video were the defendant’s. The court held the identification admissible as lay opinion under Rule 701, because it helped the jury decide whether the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant belonged to the conspiracy.49 The agent’s basis explains the help. He had listened to most of the conversations in the wiretap monitoring room, and he identified the voice through a “baseline call,” a call in which one party is identified by name. In that call the speaker called himself “Cacho,” the defendant admitted at trial that he was known as “Cacho,” and he admitted that his voice was on three of the taped calls, including the baseline call.50 The jurors had the recordings. The agent had listened to most of the calls and held a call that tied a voice to a name.
Familiarity built through an investigation can supply a sufficient foundation. In another drug-conspiracy case, an agent listened to every intercepted conversation on the suspects’ phones from February through July 2005 and testified that he became “very familiar” with the voices. Surveillance of the conspirators’ activities often confirmed that his understanding of a recording was accurate, and he took part in interviews of witnesses who knew the defendants and in obtaining proffers from members of the conspiracy. The court held that these bases defeated a claim of insufficient foundation.51 The same reasoning keeps such agents on the lay side of the line. One trial judge reasoned that an agent who testifies from having listened to the calls, and not from experience as a law enforcement officer, gives Rule 701 testimony and not Rule 702 testimony.52 The later section on officers and agents develops that line.
The comparison is sharpest with photographs. A witness who has never met the defendant and merely studies a surveillance image stands where the jury stands and adds only a second pair of eyes. A witness who can match the image against the people she has known brings a reference the jury lacks. Decisions on surveillance photographs, such as United States v. Jackson, draw that distinction.
Two errors recur. The first is to argue that the jury can decide identity for itself merely because the recording is in evidence, when the opinion helps whenever the witness’s exposure supplies a basis the jury lacks. The second is to treat an agent’s identification as helpful because of the agent’s position. An agent whose exposure matches the jurors’ adds weight and no information, and an agent with a thin foundation risks an opinion that fails the rationally based requirement.53