Concept
Common-Law Disqualifications
Competency of witnesses
Witness Competency
Common-Law Disqualifications
Under Rule 601, every person is competent to be a witness unless the rules provide otherwise.1 Competent in this modern sense means only that the person may testify. Older cases often used the word as a synonym for admissible proof, but today it describes the witness rather than the evidence.2 Competency answers a "who" question, which is who may take the stand, while most evidence rules answer a "what" question about which items the factfinder may see or hear.3 The presumption now seems like common sense, but it replaced a regime in which the common law imposed disabilities that made many potential witnesses incompetent, so that the most knowledgeable people often could not testify.4
The old regime sorted people by status. Five of its best-known statuses show how it worked:
- Atheists, agnostics, and members of certain sects could not testify. The oath required belief in a deity who would punish false swearing, either in this life or the next, and these persons could not satisfy that religious test. No particular creed was required, and believers in most major religions were competent.5
- Persons convicted of felonies or of crimen falsi, crimes of falsehood, could not testify. They were viewed as civilly dead, having shown such disregard for morality and law that their testimony could not be trusted.6
- Parties could not testify, even for themselves.7 The rule rested partly on interest and partly on "the general expediency of avoiding the multiplication of temptations to perjury."8
- Children were presumed incompetent, though the presumption could be disputed. Courts asked mainly whether the child understood the oath and paid less attention to the child's capacities of perception and recollection.9
- Insane or mentally impaired persons could not be sworn while the defect of understanding lasted, whatever its cause and whether it was temporary or permanent.10
The five rules look unrelated, but they rest on one assumption: the excluded persons were either unduly biased or incapable of giving reliable testimony.11 Infants and the insane were treated as incapable, and the others as biased or untrustworthy. In each case the law decided in advance whom to believe, fixed that decision into a status, and never let the factfinder hear the witness. For small children and deranged persons, the major driver was the judges' distrust of a lay jury's ability to assess their words critically.12
The remedy was the real problem. Exclusion removes a witness who may be the only person with knowledge of the facts. Even when the testimony is hard to evaluate, it is better on balance to let it in for what it is worth, with cautionary instructions.13 Statutory reform, especially in the twentieth century, abolished or modified these incapacities.14 The modern approach relies on the jury's ability to size up witnesses by listening to them, watching their demeanor, and judging how they hold up under cross-examination. That confidence is narrow. We do not trust jurors' general ability to separate good evidence from bad, which is why the other exclusionary rules of evidence law remain.15
The Supreme Court made this move for convicted witnesses in Rosen v. United States. The objection there rested on the common-law rule of 1789, which United States v. Reid had treated as controlling in federal criminal trials, and which made a witness convicted of crime incompetent. The Court reasoned that the legislation and the very great weight of judicial authority behind the modern rule proceeded upon sound principle. It concluded that "the dead hand of the common-law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied," and it approved the lower courts' ruling on the point.16
The old worries did not vanish; they moved from the courtroom door to cross-examination. A conviction that once made a person incompetent is now a basis for impeaching the person's testimony.17 A financial stake in the outcome likewise remains admissible to impeach, and the same evidence can show that a witness is biased.18 A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine a prosecution witness to expose bias, and in most jurisdictions the judge tells the jury to weigh a party's testimony in light of that party's self-interest.19 The facts that once closed the door now go to the jury as reasons to believe a witness more or less, which is why competency and credibility are different questions.
Some limits on testifying survive in the Rules themselves, and Rule 601 expressly yields to them.
The bar comes from Rule 605: the presiding judge may not testify as a witness at the trial, and a party need not object to preserve the issue.20 It is the kind of exception Rule 601 contemplates when it presumes competence "unless these rules provide otherwise."21
Two other leftovers deserve a mention. The most likely surviving state rule of competency is the Dead Man's Statute, which in its most rigid form bars the live party in a suit against a decedent's estate from testifying to any conversation or transaction with the decedent.22 And spouses of parties, once barred like the parties themselves, raise a distinct issue. Spousal disqualification would keep a spouse off the stand altogether, whereas the spousal communications privilege protects confidential statements between spouses even when they or anyone else testifies.23 The sections that follow take up the capacity of children and mentally impaired adults, and the state-law rules that still apply in civil cases.