Concept
Judges and Jurors
Competency of witnesses
Judges and Jurors
Rule 601 presumes every person competent to testify unless the rules provide otherwise,1 and nearly everyone with personal knowledge of the facts clears that bar. Only two categories of people are excluded outright: the judge and the jurors in the case.2 The rest of this chapter asks about the individual witness, namely what that person knows and whether that person will commit to tell the truth. These two exclusions ask instead about the seat the person occupies.
Neither exclusion turns on honesty or accuracy. A judge who watched a collision from the sidewalk may be as reliable an observer as any bystander, and so may a juror who saw the same collision. The objection is structural. Each of these people already does a job that the trial needs kept apart from the job of a witness. The judge rules on objections, so a testifying judge would have to rule on objections to his own testimony. The juror helps decide what the evidence proves, so a juror who gave evidence would be both a source of proof and one of its judges.
The presiding judge comes first, because the bar is absolute and needs no objection from either side. Jurors follow under a rule with two parts. One part governs testimony at the trial, and the other governs what jurors may say afterward about the jury’s deliberations.
The Presiding Judge
Rule 605 supplies the judge’s exclusion: “The presiding judge may not testify as a witness at the trial. A party need not object to preserve the issue.”3 The two sentences do different work, and each has its own reason.
The first sentence bars the testimony. The judge decides what the jury may hear, so a judge on the stand would be the source of the evidence and also the person who rules on objections to it. That conflict exists whether or not the judge would tell the truth. A judge who watched an intersection collision may be an accurate observer, and the testimony is still barred, because the problem lies in the role the judge occupies and not in the judge’s candor.
The second sentence answers a practical question: who would hear the objection? Ordinarily a party who wants testimony excluded objects to the judge, the judge rules, and a party who stays silent forfeits the point on appeal. When the witness is the judge, the objection would have to be made to the judge who is violating the rule by testifying while presiding. Rule 605 removes that awkwardness by providing that silence forfeits nothing. The prohibition is absolute, in the sense that a party prejudiced by a violation may enforce it even after choosing not to object.4
The second scene shows how far the rule extends. The word presiding ties the bar to the judge on the bench at this trial, and the words at the trial tie it to this proceeding, because the conflict between arbiter and witness exists only for that person. A judge elsewhere in the building rules on none of the objections here, so the reason for the bar does not apply to her. A student who reads Rule 605 as a ban on judges in general has stretched it past its reason. A student who reasons that an honest judge should be allowed to testify has missed that the rule attaches to the role. And a student who treats counsel’s silence as a waiver has applied the ordinary preservation rule to the one setting where the rule switches it off.
Jurors
Rule 606 addresses jurors who might give evidence, and it does so in two subdivisions that apply at different moments. Subdivision (a) applies at the trial itself. Subdivision (b) applies afterward, during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment.6 They answer two separate worries. One is that a juror may hold information about the facts in dispute in the very case the juror is deciding. The other is that a losing party may hope to reverse a result by having a juror describe improper conduct in the jury room.7 Rule 601 presumes every person competent unless the rules provide otherwise, and Rule 606 is one of the places where they do.8
Subdivision (a) is the simpler rule: a juror may not testify as a witness before the other jurors at the trial.9 Its logic resembles the logic of Rule 605. A juror is one of the people who decide what the evidence proves. A juror who also supplied evidence would contribute a piece of the proof and then weigh that piece in the jury room, and the other jurors would be asked to evaluate a colleague’s account while deliberating with that colleague. None of this depends on doubt about the juror’s honesty. A juror who saw the holdup may be as accurate as any bystander, and the bar applies anyway, because it attaches to the seat the person occupies.
The second sentence of subdivision (a) addresses procedure: if a juror is called to testify, the court must give a party an opportunity to object outside the jury’s presence.10 Without that provision, a lawyer would have to challenge one of the decision makers in front of the whole jury. The text differs from Rule 605 in one telling respect. Rule 605 adds that a party need not object to preserve the issue, while subdivision (a) contains no such sentence and promises only a chance to object. A party who wants the juror kept off the stand should therefore use that chance.
Pruitt’s testimony fails even though he has personal knowledge and would readily take the oath. The presumption of competence in Rule 601 gives way because the rules provide otherwise, and the problem lies in the seat he occupies, not in the quality of what he saw.11
Subdivision (b) concerns a different moment and a different question. The basic situation is this: a party who lost a jury verdict interviews jurors after the trial and learns that something possibly improper happened during deliberations. Jurors may have drawn lots on a verdict or damage award, ignored limiting instructions, or voiced bias.13 Rule 606(b) closes that source. During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during deliberations, about the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote, or about any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict. The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or evidence of a juror’s statement on those matters.14
The jurors who would give this testimony perceived everything said in the jury room, and nothing in the rule doubts their honesty. The bar exists for policy reasons. Often called the “no-impeachment” rule, it furthers at least five policies, which the Third Circuit has listed:15
- discouraging harassment of jurors by losing parties eager to have the verdict set aside;
- encouraging free and open discussion among jurors;
- reducing incentives for jury tampering;
- promoting verdict finality; and
- maintaining the viability of the jury as a judicial decisionmaking body.
The ban on testimony about mental processes serves the second of these policies in particular, because it encourages jurors to speak freely in their deliberations.16
The bar has blocked testimony about widespread drug and alcohol use by jurors. It has also blocked testimony about a juror’s statements during deliberations showing that she had lied during voir dire about her willingness to treat personal injury plaintiffs fairly.17 Each kind of testimony would have revealed something real about the jury room, and each was kept out because proving it means examining what jurors said to each other and how their minds worked.
The exceptions cover the opposite kind of fact. A juror may testify about whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention, whether an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror, or whether a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.18 Each describes an event that is clear and easy to establish and does not require an inquiry into how a juror evaluated the arguments. The standard example is a verdict form that says “guilty” where the jury meant “not guilty.”19
Rule 606(b) also meets a constitutional limit. In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, a closely divided Supreme Court declined to apply the limitation to a juror’s statements of racial bigotry made during deliberations, because participation in deliberations by a juror with racial bigotry would violate a defendant’s due process rights.20
The two subdivisions are easiest to keep straight by their timing. A juror called at the trial to describe the underlying events falls under subdivision (a) and is barred because of the seat the juror occupies. A juror questioned after the verdict about how the jury decided falls under subdivision (b) and is barred for policy reasons, unless an exception reaches an outside fact such as extraneous information, an outside influence, or a clerical error on the form.