Concept
Telling 104(a) From 104(b)
Roles of judge and jury
Telling 104(a) From 104(b)
Rule 104 answers one question in two ways: who resolves a disputed fact on which an objection turns? Under Rule 104(a), the court decides any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible, and in deciding it the court is not bound by the evidence rules, except those on privilege.1 Under Rule 104(b), when the relevance of evidence depends on whether a fact exists, the proponent must introduce proof sufficient to support a finding that the fact does exist, and the court may admit the evidence on the condition that the proof come later.2 Both subsections deal with a “preliminary fact,” and nothing on the face of a disputed fact announces which one governs it.
The choice matters at three points:
- The judge finally decides a Rule 104(a) fact, and the jury decides a Rule 104(b) fact.3
- The proponent of a Rule 104(a) fact must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence, while the proponent of a Rule 104(b) fact need only offer proof on which a reasonable juror could find it.4
- A judge deciding a Rule 104(a) question may consider any unprivileged material, hearsay included, while a judge screening under Rule 104(b) may consider only admissible evidence.5
An evenly balanced record therefore defeats the proponent under the first subsection and carries the proponent past the judge under the second.6 The first subsection below gives a test for sorting disputes between the two rules. Two kinds of problems strain that test: those in which the preliminary fact coincides with a fact the jury decides on the merits, and those governed by Rule 1008, which fixes the allocation in advance for proof of writings.
Technical Rule or Logical Link
Sort a disputed fact by the objection that produced it. If the objection invokes a technical exclusionary rule, such as hearsay, privilege, or witness competency, the fact belongs to the judge under Rule 104(a). If the objection says the evidence is relevant only on the condition that some other fact is true, the fact belongs to the jury under Rule 104(b).7 Telling the two apart is the practical problem of this section.8
The traditional and still generally accepted view gives the judge the final word on preliminary facts that condition admissibility under exclusionary rules such as the hearsay doctrine, and the same practice covers facts that condition witness competency and privileges.9 In practice, the competency question that arises is whether a witness qualifies as an expert, and the judge alone decides it. Rule 104(a) likewise gives the judge alone the application of privileges such as attorney-client and spousal confidences.10 Privileges show the kind of rule involved: they exclude evidence for reasons other than its potential to impede the truth, in order to protect important societal values.11
On these questions the judge acts as a fact-finder. Both sides have a right to present testimony on the foundational issue before the judge rules, and the judge may hold a hearing, perhaps even at sidebar, to hear it. The opponent may ask to conduct voir dire, a mini cross-examination limited to the foundational fact rather than the historical merits. The technical exclusionary rules, except those on privilege, do not apply to foundation testimony, so the judge may consider any unprivileged testimony, even hearsay. The judge may also weigh credibility and may disbelieve the proponent's testimony even when it is facially sufficient.12 In the Chapter 1 example in which Cronan said the man in the station wagon “wasn't going to stop” because he was in “too much of a hurry,” the judge had to decide whether the speaker was “excited” when he spoke, because that fact decided whether the statement qualified as an excited utterance. The proponent had to establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence, and the standard is the same in civil and criminal cases, since the judge is deciding admissibility and not liability or guilt.13
The second kind of objection rests on the evidence's own logic. A spoken statement offered to prove notice to X is without probative value unless X heard it, and a letter offered as an admission by Y has no probative value unless Y wrote it. Morgan labelled this “conditional relevancy.”14 Here the judge plays a smaller part. The judge accepts the testimony at face value and asks one question: if the jury believes it, does a rational, permissive inference of the preliminary fact follow? If so, the evidence goes to the jury, and on request the judge instructs the jurors to decide the foundational fact and to disregard the evidence if they find it unproven. Unlike the judge, the jury weighs the credibility of the foundation testimony.15
Rule 104(b) does not free the judge from the rules of evidence, and the reason is that the jury may hear only admissible evidence. Suppose the relevance of a machete found in the defendant's bedroom depends on whether the victim was killed by a machete. If the officer who found the machete also gave admissible testimony describing the victim's wounds, the judge may count that testimony in deciding whether the prosecution has made the threshold showing. The judge admits the machete if a rational fact-finder could conclude the victim was killed by a machete.16 Rule 104(a) works the other way. Suppose the question is whether the victim believed death was imminent when he said, “Defendant killed me.” The judge may consider the statement itself, and may even consult a police report already ruled inadmissible that records the victim saying shortly afterward, “I'm fine. I'm too tough to die.” The evidence rules do not limit what the judge may consider on a Rule 104(a) question, so long as no privilege is involved.17
The comparison below collects what the preceding paragraphs established.
| Rule 104(a) | Rule 104(b) | |
|---|---|---|
| Typical objection | A technical exclusionary rule: hearsay, privilege, competency | The evidence is relevant only if another fact is true |
| Who decides the fact | The judge | The jury |
| Judge's role | Fact-finder who may disbelieve facially sufficient testimony | Screener who takes the proof at face value |
| Proponent's burden | Preponderance of the evidence | Evidence on which a reasonable juror could find the fact |
| Material the judge may consider | Any unprivileged information, hearsay included | Only admissible evidence |
A third category sits beside these two. Whether evidence has any tendency to prove a consequential fact under Rule 401 is a question of law, and the judge answers it alone. Evidence that the accused bought a weapon of the type used in a killing the day before it occurred raises such a question. The question whether the gun marked as prosecution exhibit #3 is the very gun the accused bought is different: it is a Rule 104(b) question of fact.18 Distinguishing conditional relevance from “simple” relevance and from other admissibility questions can be hard, as the problems that follow in the text show.19 The line is difficult to draw in real disputes as well, and Prather v. Prather is one place to see the difficulty.
Students most often go wrong by treating every disputed fact as a Rule 104(b) question because a jury could plausibly decide it. The sorting test looks instead to the source of the objection, and a fact that conditions only a technical exclusionary rule stays with the judge however factual it sounds.
The dying declaration is the usual trap. Whether the declarant believed death was imminent sounds like a state-of-mind fact for the jury, yet it conditions a hearsay exception, and the judge decides it under Rule 104(a), as the police-report example above shows.20 A few hearsay questions, this one among them, are sometimes given to juries, as is the question whether a party adopted another person's statement.21 The default for a hearsay foundation is still the judge.
Overlapping Fact Questions
The sorting test works smoothly when the fact that decides an objection has no other job in the lawsuit. A harder group of problems breaks that pattern, because the fact the judge must find to rule on the objection is also a fact the jury is empaneled to decide on the merits. These problems fit awkwardly under both subsections: the objection is technical, which points to the judge, but the disputed fact is the heart of the case, which points to the jury.23
Three standard examples show the pattern, and in each the opponent of the evidence denies the very fact on which the ruling depends:24
- In a bigamy prosecution, the state calls the woman the defendant married second, and the defendant objects under a statute disqualifying a wife from testifying against her husband. Whether she counts as his wife depends on whether he was already married, and the first marriage is the disputed element of the charge.
- A plaintiff sues on a lost writing, and the defendant objects to proof of its contents on the ground that the writing was never lost because it never existed.
- The state offers the statement of an alleged co-conspirator, and the defendants deny that any conspiracy existed.
Giving such a fact to the judge has a cost. Under Rule 104(a) the court decides the preliminary question itself, so the overlapping fact is found before the contested evidence reaches the jury.25 A judge who finds that the defendant was never married before has ruled the second wife a lawful wife, excluded her testimony, and disposed of the central question in the bigamy charge in one ruling. The criminal setting sharpens the point. The judge's finding needs only a preponderance, because the judge is deciding admissibility and not guilt, while the jury may convict only if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.26 Giving the same fact to the jury has its own cost, because a rule designed to keep evidence from jurors cannot protect them if they must hear the evidence before deciding whether they may use it. Neither allocation escapes both problems.
The federal approach to the third example treats the existence of the conspiracy as an ordinary Rule 104(a) fact. The judge finds it by a preponderance of the evidence, may consider the co-conspirator's statement itself in doing so, and rules on admissibility, while the jury still decides guilt on all the evidence.27 The finding settles only whether the jury may hear the statement. By contrast, a ruling that a witness is unqualified as an expert settles nothing the jury must decide, which is why that ruling raises no overlap problem.28
The lost-writing version of the overlap has its own provision, Rule 1008, which the next subsection takes up. A different mixed case arises when a defendant's silence is offered as adopting another person's statement. In United States v. Hoosier, an appellate court affirmed a conviction after the trial court admitted the defendant's silence in the face of his girlfriend's statement. The court reasoned that the defendant had earlier trusted the listener enough to tell him of a plan to rob a bank, that nothing suggested advice of counsel or fear of self-incrimination explained his silence, and that probable human behavior would have been to deny the statement promptly if it had been untrue. The court agreed that more than the defendant's mere presence and silence was needed, and it found more in the record.29
In a bench trial the judge decides such a point because no one else can. In a jury trial, the question is whether the judge still decides it or whether it goes to the jury, since the judge decides whether evidence is “admissible” while the jury decides whether “a fact exists” on which other evidence's relevance depends.30 Adoption by silence has both faces. It looks like a technical condition of a hearsay exemption, which points to the judge under Rule 104(a). It also looks like a logical link, because a statement offered to show notice proves nothing unless the person heard it, and that points to the jury under Rule 104(b).31 Some courts do send adoption questions to the jury.32 When a problem has this double character, name the difficulty, apply the sorting test, and give the answer the default of Rule 104(a) supplies.
The Original Writing Rule
Rule 1008 settles the lost-writing problem set aside above, and it does so by applying the Rule 104 allocation to proof of what a writing, recording, or photograph says.34 Rule 1004 excuses production of the original in some circumstances, and a party who shows the original was lost may then prove its contents by other evidence, called secondary evidence, such as a copy or a witness's description.35 A dispute over whether the original was lost, or ever existed, is therefore a factual dispute inside an evidence objection, and Rule 1008 says who resolves it.
Ordinarily, the court determines whether the proponent has fulfilled the factual conditions for admitting other evidence of the content under Rule 1004 or 1005. But in a jury trial the jury determines, in accordance with Rule 104(b), any issue about whether an asserted writing ever existed, whether another writing produced at trial is the original, or whether other evidence of the content accurately reflects it.36 The first half of that split is Rule 104(a), under which the court decides the question outright. The second half is Rule 104(b), under which the court asks only whether proof is sufficient to support a finding and the jury decides the fact.37
The two halves rest on different reasons. The court's questions concern the administration of the rule: whether production of the original is excused under Rule 1004, whether the requirements for a certified or compared copy of a public record under Rule 1005 are satisfied, whether an item is a duplicate under Rule 1001(e), and whether a genuine issue has been raised about the authenticity of the original or a duplicate under Rule 1003.38 The jury's questions concern the merits. Often the court's resolution of the issues described in Rule 1008 would go beyond mere trial administration and effectively dictate the outcome of the case, and the drafters intended to protect the jury's fact-finding role in those situations.39
The contract example shows where the line falls. A plaintiff first offers evidence that the original of an alleged contract was lost and then offers secondary evidence of its terms. Under Rule 1008 the court alone decides two things: whether the plaintiff has shown the loss of the original, under Rule 1004(a), to be more probably true than not, which permits the introduction of secondary evidence, and whether the plaintiff has introduced evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the secondary evidence accurately reflects the original. Whether the contract was in fact ever executed, and whether the secondary evidence correctly reflects the original's contents, go to the jury.40
This division raises a sequencing puzzle, because deciding that an original is lost seems to require first deciding that it existed, yet existence is reserved for the jury. The rule removes the conflict. The court need not decide whether the original ever existed. Once evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror of its one-time existence has been introduced, the court simply assumes the original existed while deciding whether its loss is more probably true than not.41
The identity of the original is the second question that goes to the jury. Suppose a buyer and a seller each produce a signed contract and each claims its own is the original and the other altered. One version gives the buyer a warranty claim and the other defeats it. The court, under Rule 1008(b), should let the jury decide which document's terms control, because a judge who chose the original would effectively supplant the jury's fact-finding role and dictate the outcome of the case.42
The jury's control over these questions has a floor, and it is the Rule 104(b) screen. To reach any question that Rule 1008 allocates to the jury, the proponent's writing or testimony must first be found admissible, so the judge still decides the preliminary facts that admissibility requires, such as whether the original was lost and whether it was lost in bad faith. The judge also requires a showing of sufficient evidence on each issue allocated to the jury: enough for a reasonable juror to find that the claimed original is genuine, and enough to find that the secondary evidence reflects the contents the proponent says the original held.43
The sorting test from the first subsection explains why each question lands where it does. Whether the original was lost, and whether the loss was in bad faith, are conditions of the exception to the original writing rule, so they resemble the technical foundations the judge decides under Rule 104(a). Whether the writing existed is a fact on which the secondary evidence's relevance depends, since proof of a contract's terms means nothing if no contract was made, so it is a question of conditional relevance for the jury under Rule 104(b). A tempting error is to assume that every overlap between an evidence objection and the merits goes to the judge because the federal approach treats the existence of a conspiracy that way. Rule 1008 gives the writing version of the overlap the opposite resolution.44 This chapter takes the rule only for its allocation, and the study of the original writing rule itself covers when an original is required and what excuses its absence.