Concept
Framing the Instruction
Limited admissibility
Framing the Instruction
Rule 105 requires the court, once it has restricted admitted evidence to its proper scope, to "instruct the jury accordingly," and the last word ties the instruction to the restriction: whatever limit the court has set, the instruction must carry to the jurors.1 The rule's text prescribes no wording, so the content of a good instruction has to be worked out from the instruction's job, which is to highlight for the jury the proper purpose of the evidence and to caution against its potential misuse.2 Jurors meet an item of evidence as a single thing, and an item that supports both a permitted inference and a forbidden one does not mark the dividing line on its face. A caution that names neither inference leaves the jurors to guess which use is off limits. A caution that names only the forbidden use leaves them no legitimate way to treat the item. An instruction that names both tells them what they may do with the evidence and where the line falls.
Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. supplies a model that runs through the first three steps and part of the fourth. Because it is a state decision, it illustrates form rather than controlling a federal court. A Wyoming appellate court set out the trial judge's instruction on a defense exhibit: the exhibit was admitted "for the sole purpose" of showing what Mr. Murphy had available to him in his investigation, and the jurors could also consider it on any motive Mr. Hatch may have had for starting the fire, because there had been an inference or implication that what a person tries to save from a fire may reflect on that. The judge then closed off everything else. The jurors were not to consider the documents "for any other reason," and they were not to consider them "for the truth of the matter asserted in any of those documents."3 Two permitted uses come first, with a reason attached to the second. Two forbidden uses close the instruction, one of them the use of the documents as proof of what they say.
The same opinion restates the standard that governs rulings of this kind. A trial court's decision on admissibility is affirmed unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion, and the appellant bears the burden of proving that the trial court acted unreasonably.4 Review is deferential, so the instruction is usually the last place the limit gets enforced in a meaningful way.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Beechum shows a more compact form of the same idea. The court regarded the setting as one in which limiting instructions are of substantial efficacy, and it concluded that the trial judge had adequately admonished the jury to consider the credit card evidence solely on the issue of Beechum's intent. The opinion then reproduces the instructions the judge gave.5 As the court describes the admonition, the word "solely" does the fencing. It names one permitted use and shuts out every other without listing them. Hatch spells out its forbidden uses, and Beechum relies on "solely" to exclude them, but both tell the jurors what the evidence is for.
The first instruction confines nothing, because an invitation to consider evidence carefully is an invitation to use it for everything it might prove. The second names the permitted questions and the forbidden ones, so each juror knows both what to do with the testimony and what to leave alone. An exam stem that reports a vague caution therefore describes an instruction that does not accomplish what Rule 105 requires, however conscientious the judge sounds.
Where evidence meets one permissible theory but risks an impermissible use, the opponent is entitled, if the evidence comes in, to an instruction attempting to forbid that use and to a parallel limit on argument. The same source adds that a frank explanation to the jury of the dangers and probative shortcomings of the evidence would serve much better than such an instruction.6 An instruction may also do some of that work by itself, because an instruction to disregard can alert jurors that the law regards the evidence as suspect, so that they weigh it with caution even if they do not wholly obey.7 Whether an instruction can do the job at all, or the evidence must be excluded instead, is the question taken up in the next section.
Timing is part of framing. The usual practice is to give the instruction when the evidence is admitted and, often, again when the judge charges the jury at the close of all the evidence.8 The first instruction reaches the jurors as they first meet the evidence, and the second reaches them as they are about to deliberate. A lawyer who wants the limit should ask that the instruction be given immediately and should ask again for a similar one at the end of the trial, before the case goes to the jury. The timing, and whether to instruct once or twice, rests in the judge's discretion.9