Concept
Instructions and Rule 403
Limited admissibility
Instructions and Rule 403
Rule 105 begins where the admissibility decision ends. Once the court has admitted evidence that is admissible against one party or for one purpose but not against another party or for another purpose, it must, on timely request, restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.1 Whether the judge should have admitted the item at all is a question that rule leaves open.
Rule 403 answers it. Evidence tends to prove too much, and Rule 403 lets the trial judge balance probative worth against the risks of “unfair prejudice,” confusion of the issues, and “misleading the jury,” admitting or excluding accordingly. Rule 105 offers a different course: admit the evidence on the point, or against the parties, for which it is competent, and give limiting instructions to prevent misuse elsewhere.2 The two rules meet at one question. A judge deciding whether to admit must predict how well an instruction would work, because the danger on Rule 403's scale is the misuse that would survive it. This section follows that question through three settings: the ordinary case, in which the prediction is good and the evidence comes in; the exceptional case, in which the prediction is poor and the evidence stays out; and the doubt beneath both, whether jurors can follow a limit at all. One example carries the discussion.
Courts that face such a statement first ask whether the admissible part can be separated from the inadmissible part, and here it cannot: removing the insurance reference removes the remark.3 Editing is unavailable, so the instruction is the only tool left, and the judge must decide whether it is enough.
Instructions Tip the Balance
The balance Rule 403 strikes includes the instruction. When evidence is admitted for a limited purpose or against fewer than all parties, the court weighs the harm that jurors might do by misusing it in light of the probable effectiveness of a limiting instruction. If, with that effectiveness taken into account, probative value is substantially outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, the evidence stays out.4 An instruction is therefore an input to the admissibility decision as well as a remedy that follows it.
Rule 403 favors admission, and that preference is why an instruction so often decides the matter. Relevant evidence is excluded only if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the trial concerns the rule lists, exclusion is an extraordinary remedy used sparingly, and the objecting party carries the burden.5 The balance applies to evidence admitted for a limited purpose, such as its effect on a witness's credibility, and to evidence admitted against fewer than all opposing parties, so a forbidden use does not drop an item into a separate category with a lower threshold for exclusion.6 The high threshold matters more here than anywhere else. The item has a legitimate use by definition, and exclusion destroys that use along with the forbidden one. Courts accordingly admit evidence with unwanted spillover more often than not and leave the objecting party with a limiting instruction, because little proof would be admissible if its impact in the case had to match its competency exactly.7
Among the matters the court considers are the importance of the fact the evidence is offered to prove, the strength and length of the chain of inferences connecting the evidence to that fact, the availability of other means of proof, whether the fact is disputed, and, where appropriate, the potential effectiveness of a limiting instruction.8 The first four bear on probative value, and the last reduces the danger, so the instruction works by subtraction. A risk that would be unacceptable if the jury were left alone with the item may be acceptable once a clear instruction has narrowed it. That is why the common practice, where the risk of prejudice is not as severe as it was in Bruton, is to admit the evidence and instruct the jury.9
The party who wants the protection must ask for it. Rule 105 requires a limiting instruction only on request, because a party may fear that an instruction meant to protect will instead focus the jury on the very misuse it is meant to prevent.10 A party who wants the instruction asks for it at once and may ask again before the case goes to the jury. The judge has discretion over the timing and over whether to give the instruction once or twice.11
United States v. Beechum shows what an instruction built for this work looks like. The jury there was told that it could consider evidence of another transaction of a like nature in determining the state of mind or intent with which the accused acted, but only if it first found that the other evidence, standing alone, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the act alleged.12 That charge names the permitted use and conditions even that use on a threshold finding. A fence that precise gives the judge good reason to believe that the danger left on the scale is smaller than it first looked.
The forecast is what moves the result. Without it, the judge would set the whole forbidden inference against the remark and face a much closer call, because Rule 403 permits exclusion when probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of misuse. With it, admission for a limited purpose under Rule 105 becomes a real alternative.13 The subtraction has limits. Where either the probative value of the evidence or the importance of the fact it proves is relatively slight, the likelihood of exclusion rises.14 The next subsection takes up the case in which the instruction cannot do the subtracting.
When Instructions Cannot Cure
Rule 105 tells the court what to do after it admits evidence, and it does not force admission. Most of the time the Rule 403 decision favors admission with an instruction. A narrow class of cases comes out the other way: the danger that jurors will misuse the evidence is acute, and the evidence is worth little for its legitimate purpose or the point it serves can readily be proved by other evidence. In those cases the judge may exclude the evidence altogether.16 The same principle is often stated as a rule: if the legitimate value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of misuse and a cautionary instruction is judged insufficiently efficacious, the evidence is excluded.17
The exception rests on an asymmetry in what each choice costs. An instruction protects only to the extent that jurors can plausibly keep the permitted and forbidden inferences apart, and it protects very little when the forbidden inference is the natural one to draw from what the item says. Exclusion sacrifices the legitimate use, which is a real loss when the evidence is the only proof of an important point and almost no loss when the point is slight or provable another way. The exceptional case therefore combines two weak spots: an instruction unlikely to hold and a legitimate use cheap to give up. When both are present, the harm likely to follow from misuse is weighed in light of the instruction's probable effectiveness, and the evidence stays out if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.18
Hearsay offered for a nonhearsay purpose is where those two weak spots most often meet. A statement can be offered only to show its effect on a listener, yet on its face assert facts directly relevant to a critical issue, and its declarant would presumably have known those facts. Common sense then suggests a grave risk that jurors will treat the statement as proof of what it says.19 Police testimony explaining why an officer went to a scene shows both ends of the range. An officer who says that a radio call directed the officer to a given location accounts for the officer's conduct without asserting anything about the accused, and that testimony is not hearsay.20 An officer who goes further and repeats the specific complaint that the accused committed a particular crime supplies content that jurors are so likely to take as proof of the crime that it should ordinarily be excluded under Rule 403.
The stated purpose is the same in both versions: to explain why the officer arrived. What changes the answer is how much the statement says. The explanation needs only the fact that a call came, so every detail of accusation beyond that fact adds nothing to the legitimate purpose and feeds the forbidden inference completely. A judge who weighs the repeated complaint finds slight value on one side of the scale and a likely misuse on the other, and no instruction can rebalance them.
An assertive statement does not, by itself, put a case in the exceptional class. Suppose the defense offers the accused's own statement that a telephone caller was a narcotics agent, to show that the accused knew who the caller was, and the government objects that jurors may take the statement as proof that the caller really was an agent. One court rejected that objection. The danger that the jury could use the statement as an assertion to be believed does not make it inadmissible, because where evidence is admissible for one purpose but not another, the accepted practice is to admit it with instructions confining the jury to the permissible purpose. A different rule applies only where the probative value for the allowed purpose is outweighed by the prejudice from the improper use.21 If the statement is the defense's only corroboration of the accused's knowledge, its legitimate value is large, and an instruction confining it to knowledge is the proper response. The officer who repeats the complaint and the defense statement about the caller therefore differ on the value side of the scale, and the content of the statement alone does not decide the result.
The exception also appears outside hearsay. When the accused offers character witnesses, the prosecution may test them with questions about the accused's earlier misconduct, and the jury is told not to use the answers as proof that the accused committed the present crime. Awkard v. United States reflects the same reasoning applied to that setting: where the legitimate value of such questioning is outweighed by the risk of misuse and a cautionary instruction is insufficiently efficacious, the evidence is excluded.22
Two of the considerations Rule 403 lists decide the letter: whether the fact is disputed and whether other means of proof exist.23
Two cautions keep the exception in its place. A fact pattern that mentions an available instruction has not settled admissibility, because the decision to admit turns on whether the instruction can realistically do its work. And the confession of a nontestifying codefendant in a joint criminal trial is different in kind. When the other evidence shows a close relationship between the two and the codefendant's personal knowledge of the facts he confessed, the risk that jurors will disregard any instruction and use the confession against the accused becomes intolerable. The codefendant has then functionally become an accuser whom the accused cannot cross-examine, and the Sixth Amendment is violated.24 The next section, on the Bruton problem, develops that rule.
Do Jurors Follow Instructions?
Every limiting instruction rests on a premise that invites doubt: that a juror who has heard a damaging fact can use it for one inference and put it out of mind for another. The law has to decide whether to trust that ability or treat it as a fiction, and it trusts the ability, with exceptions.
The doubt has respectable support. Justice Jackson, concurring in Krulewitch v. United States, described the naive assumption that instructions can overcome prejudicial effects as something every practicing lawyer knows to be “unmitigated fiction.”27 Lawyers also fear that an instruction will focus the jury on the very misuse it is meant to prevent, and they sometimes conclude that the cure is worse than the disease.28 The difficulty peaks when everything else the jurors have seen supports the forbidden inference. Jurors told to disregard a confession because the warnings that preceded it were incomplete will struggle to obey if they also know that the gun was found where the confession said it was buried.29
The courts answer that the alternative is worse. In Opper v. United States the Court treated a claim that the jury may have been confused as unfounded speculation that jurors disregarded clear instructions, and it added that the theory of trial relies on the jury's ability to follow them. Delli Paoli v. United States stated the point as a condition: unless the jury is presumed to follow instructions that are clear and that it can reasonably be expected to follow, the jury system makes little sense.30 The reason is structural. If instructions were assumed always to fail, every item with a forbidden use would have to be excluded, the legitimate use would vanish along with the forbidden one, and little proof would be admissible at all.31 Neither extreme is accurate. Jurors usually try hard to uphold their oaths and follow the law. An instruction may cure the problem completely when the evidence is not devastating or has obvious defects in reliability, and it can even tarnish the proponent of the improper evidence.32
The Court continues to rely on that premise. A concurring opinion in Smith v. Arizona, a case about expert basis testimony, gathered the decisions. The Court has repeatedly upheld reliance on limiting instructions, even in situations with potentially life-and-death stakes and even for statements that are some of the most compelling evidence of guilt available, and it has called the assumption that juries follow the trial judge's instructions “crucial” to the system of trial by jury.33 Harris v. New York allowed statements obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach a testifying defendant so long as the jury was told not to consider them as evidence of guilt, and Spencer v. Texas allowed proof of prior convictions for sentence enhancement on the condition that the jury was told not to use them in determining guilt.34 In each, the instruction points jurors to a real question, such as whether to believe the testifying defendant, and tells them what not to do with the same words.
On appeal the presumption does a second job. When evidence admitted on one point or against one party carries a great risk of misuse, a limiting instruction is usually viewed as effective, which disposes of a contention that the jury used the evidence improperly. An instruction to disregard can likewise preserve a judgment when evidence should not have come in at all.35 Courts say that the instruction “cures” the error and makes it harmless. The dissent in Old Chief v. United States reasoned this way about a prior conviction: the jury is presumed to have followed the cautionary instruction, and the instruction offset whatever prejudice the conviction might have caused.36 The majority nonetheless held that admitting the record of the prior offense was an abuse of discretion, so the presumption is one argument a court weighs with the other features of the case, and it does not end the inquiry.
The presumption gives way where the risk of misuse is greatest, and Bruton v. United States marks that boundary. The Court held that the substantial risk that a jury, despite instructions to the contrary, would treat a nontestifying codefendant's out-of-court statement as implicating the accused made admission of the statement improper.37 Delli Paoli had accepted clear instructions in the same setting, but the Court ultimately concluded that even clear instructions were not good enough there, noting that the prosecutor could proceed against the defendants separately.38 The setting differs from the impeachment cases in what the juror must set aside. In the impeachment cases jurors are told how to use a statement. In a joint trial they hear one defendant describe the other's part in the crime and must then treat those words as absent when weighing the accused, although the speaker never takes the stand and cannot be cross-examined.39 Where the risk of prejudice is less severe than it was in Bruton, the common practice remains to admit the evidence and instruct the jury.40 The next section traces the rule that grew out of Bruton.